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**HEADLINES**  
**OF THE PUBLIC TELEVISION NEWS SERVICE**  
**IN POLAND FROM 2016 TO 2017**

A Pragmatic Linguistic Analysis



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## Foreword

This publication, *Headlines of the Public Television News Service in Poland from 2016 to 2017 – A Pragmatic Linguistic Analysis*, is based on a report which was created at the Council for the Polish Language at the Presidium of the Polish Academy of Sciences and its aim was to indicate how Polish Television (*Telewizja Polska SA*) – a station that is publicly financed through mandatory fees paid by citizens – uses language to inform viewers about current political events. It is a linguistic (or more precisely: semantic and pragmatic) analysis and is preceded by a description of the legal situation surrounding the media that conditions the operation of the public television broadcaster. Subject to analysis were the information strips that consist of announcements of report materials in the main broadcast of *Wiadomości TVP*, the most important news program on public television in Poland. The study, based mainly on the description of linguistic mechanisms (including persuasive and manipulative techniques with semantic basis) that serve to create reality, above all reveals how of elements of the world are valued using lexical means. The communication practices presented in the course of the analysis were examined in terms of their compliance with the requirements of ethics of the word and the rules governing successful communication, and above all, with the principles of journalistic integrity, which require the creation of unbiased and objective texts. Although the work is not of a political nature, it also shows (in passing, as it were) a vision of Polish political life, filtered through an interpretative filter.

We hope that this publication will be of interest both to language scholars and those dealing with the ways political messages are shaped in Poland.

*The Authors*





## Introduction

### **1. Context of the study**

Freedom of speech, as a guiding principle in democratic systems (usually constitutionalized), is also functionally linked to each individual's right of access to information. Guarantees of freedom of expression are greatly reduced if members of a given community are deprived of access to sources of information from which they might learn about past and current socio-political (arti)facts.

In Central and Eastern Europe, the post-1989 political changes have also affected the media and media systems. Monopolies of state-owned radio and television stations (party- and government managed public media) have given way to pluralistic systems in which, in addition to public broadcasters, social and commercial broadcasters can also obtain a license to air radio and TV programs. Consequently, of the many possible models of media systems, a dual public-market model was chosen<sup>1</sup> in Poland, whereby the public and commercial sectors should be geared toward earning profits from their business activity, while public service broadcasters receive additional support through subscription fees paid by owners of radio and television sets.<sup>2</sup>

Public service media have also been part of the pluralistic information market since 1989. For a long time, the view remained unquestioned that the guiding principle for a public service broadcaster to participate in this market should be pluralism, manifested as broadcasting such content which

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1 For more on the dual model and the market model: Mrozowski 2001, pp. 117 ff.

2 See Skoczek 2009, pp. 69–82; Świątkowska 2014, pp. 153–163.

reflects the diverse social opinions held by the citizenry. As Ociepka points out, “media pluralism in relation to public service media has been linked to the idea of political independence and the principle of journalistic objectivity. The presentation of diverse viewpoints cannot lead in the direction toward the dominance of only one of them.”<sup>3</sup>

This view is also reflected in the Polish legal system. In addition to international agreements under which Poland has committed itself to guarantee freedom of expression and access to information (the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights),<sup>4</sup> such guarantees were also provided in the Polish Constitution of 1997 and in lower-level laws, including in particular the Broadcasting Act, the Press Law Act and internal regulations and codes of ethics. That Polish legislators attached great importance to the idea of media pluralism is also confirmed by their provision for the body regulating the media market, i.e. the National Broadcasting Council (KRRiTV), in the Polish Constitution.

A wide range of criteria to be met by programming offered by public broadcasters was listed in the Broadcasting Act of 29 December 1992 (Journal of Laws of 2017, items 1414, 2111; of 2018, items 650, 915). Section 21 (1) specifies that public radio and television is to pursue a public mission, offering, in accordance with the principles set out in the Act, to the entire society and its individual parts, diversified programs and other services in the areas of information, journalism, culture, entertainment, education and sports, characterized by pluralism, impartiality, balance and independence, and innovation, along with high quality and integrity in communication.

Additional directives are listed in Section 21(2) of the Act. According to Section 21(2), programs broadcast by a public service broadcaster should:

- show responsibility for the words they use and respect the good name of the public service broadcaster;
- reliably depict the entire variety of events and phenomena at home and abroad;
- foster free development of citizens’ views and formation of public opinion;

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3 Ociepka 2003, pp. 174–175.

4 Under Sections 9 and 91 (1) of the Polish Constitution on direct application of international law in internal relations, international agreements must play an important role “both in interpretation of constitutional provisions and in application of the law by adjudicating bodies” (Barta et al. 2001, p. 17).

- enable individual citizens and their organizations to participate in civic life by presenting diverse views and positions and exercising their right to social scrutiny and criticism;
- serve the development of culture, science and education, with particular emphasis on Polish intellectual and artistic achievements;
- respect the Christian system of values, assuming universal ethical principles as a foundation;
- serve to strengthen the family;
- serve to promote attitudes that foster health;
- serve to promote and popularize sports;
- combat social pathologies, and
- serve media education.

In view of these provisions, it should be recognized that programs broadcast by a public service broadcaster must jointly fulfill several conditions, although some of these conditions remain difficult to interpret unambiguously. The principle of ‘balancing’ information can serve as an example of such difficulties. The dispute remains whether balancing should relate to the principle of proportionality (in news programs, the time for presenting political views should reflect the level of electoral support for certain actors, consequently, large parties should be presented more frequently and small parties less frequently) or to the principle of equality (in news programs, the time for presenting views should be the same for all significant political actors – as is the case, for example, in pre-election debates involving all candidates, regardless of their estimated support in polls).

The way in which the provisions of the Broadcasting Act should be interpreted was set out by the Constitutional Tribunal in its decision of 13 December 1995.<sup>5</sup> Reconstructing the *ratio legis*, the judges stated in their decision that “the primary purpose of the solutions contained in the Broadcasting Act was securing the political neutrality and independence of public

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5 Resolution of the Constitutional Tribunal of 13 December 1995 on determining the universally binding interpretation of Section 26 (4) and Section 28 (1) (sentence two) of the Act of 29 December 1992 on radio and television broadcasting (Journal of Laws of 1996 no. 2, item 15). This legal act was *de facto* repealed in view of the approval of the new Polish Constitution of 1997 (resolutions of the Constitutional Tribunal regarding determining the binding interpretation were stripped of their legal power as of 17 October 1997); it was, however, quoted multiple times in the doctrine as a justification of the necessity of functional autonomy of public media and state authorities.

broadcasting.”<sup>6</sup> The justification went on to emphasize that “the principle of independence of public broadcasting takes on a much clearer form when its position towards the Government and its subordinate structures is considered. The Constitutional Tribunal underscored once more that the essence of the reform of 1992 was to transform government radio and television broadcasting into public radio and television. It was primarily meant to separate radio and television broadcasting from the government and the associated parliamentary majority so as to prevent these media from being treated as political instruments of the government. Public radio and television programs should, among other things, reliably show the entire variety of events and phenomena and encourage free development of views in shaping public opinion (Sections 21 (2/2,3) of the Broadcasting Act). This directive to maintain internal pluralism in public radio and television programs can only be implemented if these institutions are kept at a clear distance from the current political masters.”<sup>7</sup> Obligations to maintain standards of objectivity and independence are also contained in internal documents and codes of ethics adopted by professional associations of journalists.

Doubts as to the impartiality and objectivity of the public media have been raised regularly since the early 1990s, both by journalists and experts. However, it was only in January 2016, after the parliamentary elections in which the Law and Justice party was victorious, that a precedent was set in which a politician became chairman of the Board of Directors of Polish Television who was also involved in the activities of the ruling coalition. Chairman Jacek Kurski not only held previous parliamentary functions and actively participated in public debate, but also co-directed election campaigns. This raised concerns among commentators and opposition parties about the intentions of such a nomination.

Regrettably, the study of media content confirms the impact of this nomination on the substantial change in the public media information policy after 2015 in both the thematic information channel TVP Info and the news services of public radio and television. Comparing the main news service on public television, *Wiadomości*, with *Fakty*, a news program of the privately owned news organization TVN, Rafał Klepka demonstrated that the narrative of *Wiadomości* is clearly pro-government; experts featured in the program are there to justify the government’s reasoning, while the level of bias in the me-

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6 *Ibidem.*

7 *Ibidem.*

dia after 2015 has increased significantly (Klepka 2017, pp. 169–170). Similar comparative empirical studies by Aleksandra Seklecka showed in turn that TVN's *Fakty* devoted less time to informing viewers about the actions taken by the Polish government, often criticizing the actions of the government or the president instead. Further, almost every news service on TVP provided information on the policy of the Polish authorities from only a positive perspective, while the opposition was often presented in a bad light (as 'corrupt and divided'), with the main emphasis on the largest opposition party – Civic Platform (Seklecka 2017, p. 149). Similar conclusions were reached by other media researchers (Sobczak 2017; Dopierala, Ossowski 2018; Koncur 2017).

## 2. Purpose of the study

Considering the currently available research on the subject, we have set ourselves the goal of investigating whether the lower third (information strips) shown by the Polish public broadcaster Telewizja Polska S.A. in the main news service *Wiadomości TVP* comply with the directives set out by the legislator not only in the Broadcasting Act, but also in the Polish Language Act.<sup>8</sup> In particular, we wondered whether the messages in the form of strips on *Wiadomości TVP* create conditions conducive for the proper development of language as a means of interpersonal communication, which, according to the intention of the legislator, is among the responsibilities of Telewizja Polska S.A. (TVP) as a public institution of the Republic of Poland.<sup>9</sup>

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8 Article 3 of the Polish Language Act:

Protection of the Polish language consists in particular in:

- 1) ensuring correct usage of the language, improving the linguistic skills of its users, and creating conditions for the proper development of the language as a means of interpersonal communication;
- 2) preventing its vulgarization;
- 3) promoting knowledge about the language, including its role in culture;
- 4) fostering respect for regionalisms and dialects, and preventing their disappearance;
- 5) promoting the Polish language worldwide;
- 6) supporting the teaching of Polish in Poland and abroad.

**All public authorities, institutions and organizations participating in public life are obliged to protect the Polish language** [all emphasis introduced by the authors of this book].

9 Recognition of the protection of the Polish language as an obligation of all public authorities and institutions of the Republic of Poland and the duty of its citizens – fifth recital, indent 5 of the preamble to the Polish Language Act.

The motivation to undertake the present study came not only from the recent controversies in public debate caused by the communication practices of the editors and writers of *Wiadomości TVP* since 2015 (i.e. since the ruling coalition of Law and Justice took control of the information aired by TVP), but also from the rapid changes in the model and practices of public communication over the last dozen or so years that have occurred globally.

The most important of these changes include:

- a. the expansion of new media, resulting in the dispersion of sources of political information, followed by a crisis of trust in those centers that had thus far been legitimized by the authority of the state, concurrent with the emergence of *filter bubbles*, i.e. information circuits closed through the use of algorithms which record and process the communication activities of new media users, including political information, as a result of which each user primarily receives information consistent with their views and/or expectations;
- b. the emergence of such phenomena as *fake news* and the concept of *post-truth*;
- c. the creation of political facts, e.g. affecting outcomes of elections through dissemination of deliberately created memes and through targeted trolling practices;
- d. changes in the way politics is understood and practiced (a shift in emphasis from concern about the common good to gaining or retaining power, along with the electoral success of populist actors on the political scene, and the development of the phenomenon of post-politics).

Thus, in the face of the socio-cultural factors outlined above, we decided to look closely at the linguistic practices used by the most important public broadcaster in Poland, Telewizja Polska S.A., in informing the public about the most important political issues.

### 3. Procedures and methodology

The object of our analysis were the *information strips*, i.e. short messages signaling and announcing more elaborate pieces of journalistic content displayed by the editors of TVP 1's *Wiadomości* in the lower third of the screen, separated graphically from the piece proper and shown prior to broadcasting it, specifically in the form of a horizontal strip containing

fixed text (as opposed to the news ticker, which is a horizontal strip with moving text).

To select the research material, the authors surveyed all broadcasts of TVP's main news program *Wiadomości* from 2016 and 2017, which appears daily at 7:30 PM on Polish Television Channel One (TVP 1). Since each edition of *Wiadomości* features about ten to twelve different information strips, of which only half (or less) are directly related to political events, with the remainder accompanying items related to the economy, history, customs, lifestyles, etc., the authors decided that only the strips announcing the most important political events in Poland in the 2016 and 2017 would be excerpted for the study.

For this reason, we decided to conduct a deliberate and principled selection of a representative sample of the information strips. This means that we included those strips that were used in announcing the most important events in Poland in 2016 and 2017 as representative of the full corpus of *Wiadomości TVP* strips devoted to political events in Poland in 2016 and 2017. The significance of each event was not subjective. An objective assessment rating was based on the following criteria of importance:

1. coverage for more than seven days;
2. prominent placement (the so-called cover issue) in the daily print press in at least two national newspapers with the broadest reach (according to the data from the Press Distribution Control Association, these are *Fakt Gazeta Codzienna*, *Super Express*, *Gazeta Wyborcza*, *Rzeczpospolita*, and *Dziennik Gazeta Prawna*);
3. a survey directly related to the event conducted by at least one reputable nationwide social research agency;
4. high placement of the event on the agenda of competing news programs of private stations: TVN's *Fakty* and Polsat's *Wydarzenia*.

The following thirteen events met the objective validity criteria<sup>10</sup>:

1. Events related to acts or amendments to acts on the Constitutional Tribunal, the Supreme Court, the National Council of the Judiciary and the Law on the System of Common Courts (henceforth: The Judicial Acts) - 61 strips.
2. Events related to the actions of EU institutions related to control of the rule of law in Poland (henceforth: The EU on the rule of law) – 32 strips.

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10 A shortened description of these events can be found in Appendix 2.

3. Events related to the actions of the Commission of Inquiry to investigate the correctness and legality of the actions of public authorities and institutions against the entities comprising the Amber Gold Group (henceforth: Amber Gold) – 44 strips.
4. Events related to the actions of authorities and citizens in connection with laws concerning abortion and related matters (henceforth: Abortion) – 8 strips.
5. Events related to the commemoration and explanation of the causes of the Smolensk air crash on April 10, 2010 (henceforth: Smolensk) – 26 strips.
6. Crisis in the Polish parliament (Sejm) related to moving the proceedings to the Column Hall (henceforth: Sejm crisis) – 50 strips.
7. Actions related to the Act of 16 December 2016 amending the Act on the Conservation of Nature and the Act on Forests, as well as the Act of 11 May 2017 amending the Act on the Conservation of Nature, in relation to the felling of trees in the Białowieża Primeval Forest (henceforth: Forests) – a total of 5 strips.
8. Events in connection with the Act of 16 December 2016 amending the Act on Retirement Pensions for Police, Internal Security Agency, Intelligence Agency, Military Counterintelligence Service, Military Intelligence Service, Central Anti-Corruption Bureau, Border Guard, Government Protection Bureau, State Fire Service, Prison Service and their families (henceforth: *Ustawa dezubekizacyjna*) – 6 strips.
9. National Independence Day (henceforth: Independence Day) – 15 strips.
10. Renewal of the term of office of Donald Tusk as President of the European Council (henceforth: Tusk) – 15 strips.
11. Actions of the Commission for the removal of the legal effects of reprivatization decisions issued in violation of the law, in relation to certain Warsaw properties (henceforth: Reprivatization) – 28 strips.
12. Events in connection with the Act of Feb. 11, 2016 on State Aid in Raising Children (henceforth: 500+) – 4 strips.
13. Resident physicians' protest (henceforth: Protest of resident physicians) – 12 strips.

In sum, a corpus of 306 strips excerpted for further investigation<sup>11</sup> was subjected to a qualitative analysis in regard to the linguistic expression of

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11 For their full listing and topical categorization, see Appendix 1.



reality (i.e. the thirteen selected events and their respective course of development):

- a. presence of author-dependent and author-independent words and other linguistic elements in the message;
- b. presence of systemically valuating words and other linguistic elements in the message;
- c. presence of sentence-level valuating words and other linguistic elements in the message;
- d. presence of words and other linguistic elements which convey valuation through reference to the message's extra-linguistic context (i.e. knowledge of the world common to the sender and recipient of the message, expressed through the use of connotation, implicature and presupposition);
- e. presence of all of these expressions of value together in the message.

As the material under examination came from the news aired by a public broadcaster, an organization obliged to respect the legal norms mentioned above and, on the other hand, an entity participating in public life under Section 3 (2) of the Polish Language Act, we assumed that **the desired model of informing the public about current political events by this broadcaster should involve avoidance of evaluating these events at the level of linguistic expressions used in the message.** For this reason, in the first part of the study, we focused on isolating expressions conveying value in one of the above ways and determined the degree of saturation of the analyzed corpus with means of assigning value. In the course of the study, we also assumed that systemic evaluative expressions, which do not distort the image of the described event,<sup>12</sup> would be treated as axiologically neutral (because, according to the theory of social evaluation,<sup>13</sup> the values shared by both parties to the relation of a transmission cannot be the basis of effective persuasion<sup>14</sup>), unless the spoken context (i.e. the content of the news) or extra-linguistic context (especially discourse-related) licenses other readings.

In the second part of the study, we focused on showing a dozen or so of the evaluative techniques most frequently used by the authors of the text

12 These are primarily words systemically describing states commonly regarded as good or bad (such as *reform*, *opportunity*, *compromise*, *guilty*, *victim*, *humility*).

13 See Tokarz 2006, pp. 322–323.

14 Galasiński believes the act of evaluation is a *sine qua non* of the act of persuasion (Galasiński 1992, pp. 14–29, in particular pp. 24–25).

displayed in the information strips, so as to model the direction of persuasion and to evaluate the way the content of this persuasion is presented from the point of view of the principles of ethics of the word and Grice's rules governing successful communication.<sup>15</sup>

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15 These are the maxim of quantity (say as much as is needed in a given situation, i.e. neither too much nor too little), the maxim of quality (say things that are true or that of which you have proof), the maxim of relevance (say what is relevant for the course of communication at a given moment, or in other words "be relevant"); the maxim of manner (speak in such a way as to be understood in a given situation). For more, cf. Grice 1977; Tokarz 2006, pp. 74–82.

## Chapter 1:

# Genre Classification and persuasiveness

Modern television broadcasters generally use two types of information strips which, for the sake of brevity, we will call “moving” and “fixed” here. The first type is sometimes called *tekst taśmowy* (‘tape text’) in Polish academic literature (Trojanowska-Bis, Francuz 2007) or referred to with the English term *ticker* (also *TV-ticker*; other names include *scroll* or *crawl*). In contrast, the fixed strip, which is the actual topic of this report, has not yet received any universally accepted typological name as a genre of media texts. One may notice, however, that in public discourse in Poland, a common name of this genre that has become established (or maybe even entrenched), is *pasek* (a strip) which is the basis even for the derivation *paskowy* (‘the person who writes the texts put on strips’)<sup>16</sup> (cf. Kłosińska 2019). In the absence of any other term, we decided to use the name *strip* to name the short still text preceding the actual journalistic material displayed in all capitals against a blue background in the lower third of the screen (about a quarter of the distance from the bottom) – see the image below.

From the point of view of communication pragmatics, a strip so defined closely resembles the genres of *title* and *headline* for reading materials (i.e. *de facto* press materials), well described in Polish media literature (with a linguistic slant). Without entering into detailed considerations here, we will assume that the fixed strip on the TV screen performs the same

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16 See <http://www.nowewyrazy.uw.edu.pl>.



Figure 1. A still image of the screen of *Wiadomości TVP 1* aired on October 10, 2017 with the strip: *Young doctors demand over 9,000 zloty salaries.*

communication functions as the (printed) press *headline* reduced only to the main section (*title*). We will do so because, in our opinion, the reception of both types of statements is similar – the recipient first reads the header or the text in the strip, then receives the text of the actual message (we omit here the issues related to psychological differences in the perception of single-code materials, i.e. print, and multi-code materials, i.e. television).<sup>17</sup> Such an assumption is also supported by the fact that the fixed TV information strips after airing the appropriate message later become – looking at it from the formal side – the titles of these materials when they are published on the Internet (on the broadcaster’s official website).

According to Wojtak, the header/title of a news item has three basic functions: appellative (naming the text), descriptive or summarizing (presenting the content), and pragmatic or persuasive (influencing the recipient) (Wojtak 2004, p. 21 ff.; see also Pisarek 1967, 1969; Gajda 1987, p. 81; Bereś 2005). In the following analyses, we did not address the appellative function of the strips (due to its rather obvious nature) and we fo-

<sup>17</sup> This point of view (sequential reception of the respective utterance segments) is predominant in Polish source literature. Cf. for example: Wojtak 2004, Pisarek 1965, Furman 2006, Pałuszyńska 2006, and Ślawska 2008.

cused mainly on the description of linguistic resources used by the authors of the strips in their descriptive and persuasive functions.

The **descriptive function** of the strips is expressed primarily through the use of means independent of the sender, and their **persuasive function**, in contrast, through the use of means dependent on the sender, marked axiologically in order to influence the recipient's behavior.

Two main types of fixed strips are in use: a) the headline type, comprising strips announcing the content of the footage, which indicate its content, summarizing the most important message and highlighting the main circumstance of the event (in keeping with Pisarek's approach to the function of the press headline, cf. Pisarek 1967, pp. 25–28); strips of this type usually do not contain a verb – they are typically in the form of an individual phrase or a verbless sentence; b) a type redundant in regard to spoken text – such strips constitute a summary, exposing the most important thoughts or describing events presented in the video footage; they can take the form of both a nominal group and a sentence (cf. Kłosińska 2019). The material studied here is dominated by strips of the first type.

The persuasive potential of the strips is enormous. On the one hand, this results from the use by the broadcaster of selected linguistic resources, marked in terms of value, as mentioned above, but also from the genre-related characteristics of the text. This means that the same linguistic resources that would not have a persuasive function in a text belonging to some other media genre (especially journalistic), as they are part of the vocabulary that constitutes such a genre, e.g. a commentary or a column. However, when used in the text of a strip, they do acquire persuasive power. On the other hand, those resources which already have systemic persuasive (evaluative) properties (i.e. regardless of the genre of the statement and its context), increase their power of influence on the recipient when used in the text of a strip (cf. Kłosińska 2019). In the present report, we accept Pisarek's position, expressed as follows: "In practice, we learn about the persuasive character of a particular text first of all by the presence of persuasive means, secondly by the means which acquire persuasive power only in a given text, thirdly, by the structure of this text, fourthly, we conclude that such a character of the text is derived from our knowledge of the sender's intentions" (Pisarek 2003, p. 13). However, we would like to add to this list a fifth indicator of persuasiveness, namely, the genre of the text.

The persuasiveness of the genre in question, i.e. fixed TV strips, results from three specific circumstances in which these texts function in communication practice. The first is that **the strip occupies a strategic position in the text** – which is connected with the fact that as a kind of “title tag” of the following material, the strip can be identified by the viewers with the information proper, i.e. it can in a way even “replace” the information itself (by providing the basic information about the event, its most important components, and its evaluation), especially for those viewers who are not interested in a particular subject or who view the message only superficially. Similar processes are observed in relation to the functioning of news headlines on websites of internet news services (for more on this, see Zimny 2013, p. 596).

The second circumstance is the **susceptibility of this genre structure to ritualization** – due to the specificity of the communication situation (multi-code transmission, integrated attention<sup>18</sup> and distracting factors, the very limited capacity of the carrier, transient visual exposure to the message), the sender is more inclined to look for ‘mental shortcuts’ than in the case of other genre forms, often taking the form of what are called style phraseemes.<sup>19</sup> Since television news services repeat information on a particular subject (often concerning complex events and processes), there is a marked tendency to ritualize the language of the strips, that is to put it together of with ready-made ‘prefabricated’ linguistic elements (clichés, discursive phrases, linguistic stereotypes).

The third circumstance results from the recipient’s communicative expectations. In the case of information strips, the recipient predominantly anticipates **being informed rather than persuaded**, which results in the strips being perceived primarily from the perspective of being information, rather than persuasion, as messages that are objective rather than evaluative by their very nature. This further strengthens their persuasive power

18 Cf. “If the redundancy is high, it is assumed that viewers use integrated attention, which does not have to be split between the incoming channels. If there is an absence of redundancy, the viewer’s reaction will be switching to differentiating attention, which results from the inconsistency between the channels of transmission” (Trojanowska-Bis, Francuz 2007, p. 70).

19 “We may speak of a style phraseeme when a given word entails, both in the transmission and reception of a text (cf. the phenomenon of predictability), another word, not required functionally, i.e. one that may either be omitted with no detriment to the texts’ informativity, or replaced by another word, while their co-occurrence is motivated only by the fact that in other texts of a given type these very words have cooccurred sufficiently often” (Bralczyk 2001, p. 51).

because, according to the research of psychologists, viewers tend not to distinguish between facts and opinions in programs belonging to informational genres.<sup>20</sup> For more considerations on these questions, see Kłosińska (2019).

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20 Cf. “[...] Viewers of *Wiadomości* treat most of the information as facts and generally do not recognize the opinions of the people who are speaking on television. It may be concluded from this that TV viewers treat the news presented to them as a faithful account of a given state of affairs, but they do not recognize opinions incorporated in the news. [...] The only case in which the majority of viewers correctly recognized an opinion was a sentence in which of the person expressing it was clearly identified. It appears that the recipients are able to distinguish opinion from fact if they are informed who formulated the opinion, that is, if they can identify the source of the information. In addition, [...] it has been found that repeating an opinion which contains a clearly defined entity expressing a given assessment even doubles the likelihood of confusing it with fact” (Trojanowska-Bis, Francuz 2007, p. 71).





## Chapter 2:

# Analysis of author-dependent means of linguistic expression

Pisarek was the first to introduce the notion of words and expressions independent of the author or, to put it differently, those determined by non-linguistic reality, into Polish media linguistics in the 1960s (cf. for example Pisarek 1967, 1972). He included among these “personal names, date terms, unit names and various types of terminological or semi-terminological expressions” (Pisarek 1972, p. 11). He considered all other words in a press text to be author-dependent (not determined by extra-linguistic reality). He used the distinction between author-dependent and author-independent words to specify two fields of research on press texts.<sup>21</sup> Pisarek took the position that “the topic of a statement will be easiest to recognize from words independent of the author, while its style – from words dependent on the author” (Pisarek 1972, p. 11). Finally, it should be mentioned that these categories were used by Pisarek for quantitative research on three main press genres: news (with a dominant symbolic function, i.e., in other words, informative, and in relation to headers/titles – descriptive or summarizing), reportage (with the dominant expressive function) and commentary (with the dominant impressive function, in other words: persuasive) (Pisarek 1972, p. 13).

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21 These were the only types of texts he was concerned with at the time, because in the face of television, which was then only gaining in importance, it was the press that was the main medium providing society with knowledge about the world: analysis of the content of texts (through research on the frequency of use of words independent of the author) and stylistic-linguistic analysis (through research on the frequency of use of author-dependent words).

After more than half a century since his research, we now have much more knowledge, both quantitative and, above all, qualitative, of the media communication processes, of the mechanisms of linguistic evaluation, of the contextual and discursive conditions influencing the shaping of the form and sense of messages communicated to the general public in public space. For these reasons, we decided to expand our description of the category of words that Pisarek distinguished as dependent on the author by adding, on the one hand, non-lexical resources (morphological structures related to inflection, derivation and word manufacturing, as well as syntactic structures), and on the other hand by adding elements resulting from the adoption by the sender of a certain rhetorical strategy (e.g. quotations and paraphrases, quasi-dialogue constructions, various intertextual references). Therefore, we will continue to use the notion of *linguistic elements/resources (in)dependent on the author*.

In regard to the material analyzed in our study, apart from the types of expressions listed by Pisarek, we also included among author-independent resources unmarked (conventional, customary) names of events (e.g.: *the Smolensk disaster*, *Amber Gold*, *anti-abortion law*), along with such names of events which do not profile a particular vision (way of seeing) of a given event and do not emphasize value-related senses in a stretch of discourse ([139<sup>22</sup>] *Spór o dopuszczalność aborcji* [Dispute over allowability of abortion]; [121] *OLT Express nie płaciło portowi lotniczemu* [OLT Express did not pay the airport]; [268] *Kolejny świadek obciąża prezydent Warszawy* [Yet another witness lays the blame on the mayor of Warsaw]). For example, a strip containing solely author-independent words is in our opinion [100] *Zeznania prokuratorów od Amber Gold* [Statements of the Amber Gold prosecutors], but already in strip [101] *Kompromitacja gdańskiej prokuratury* [Embarrassment of the Gdańsk Prosecutor's office], referring to the effects of the event, about which strip [100] informs, we see the author-dependent word *kompromitacja* [embarrassment, discredit], as it is a word marked in terms of value.

In our approach, resources independent of the author also include all linguistically natural grammatical structures used according to their primary function (e.g. [21] *Jutro koniec kadencji prof. Rzeplińskiego* – notification of the expected end of Professor Rzepliński's term of office), but not those which are used in their secondary senses for persuasive purposes (e.g. [1] *Rozprawa czy spotkanie?* – the broadcaster decided to use the interrogative structure to ask the recipients for a resolution. The form is that of a dis-

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22 The numbers in square brackets refer to the number of each text – see Appendix 1.

junctive choice between two possibilities, with each of their names carrying a different value: *rozprawa* [a hearing] being positive in this context, and communicating, as it does, the seriousness of the institution of the Constitutional Tribunal and the validity of the pronouncements it issues, whereas *spotkanie* [a meeting] is negative, as it discursively alludes to other public statements, whose authors referred to the meeting of the Constitutional Tribunal in 2016 precisely *a meeting over coffee and cookies*, thus communicating their opinion on the lack of legal authority of these meetings. Ergo, on the literal level, the choice of the interrogative structure about the settlement communicated to the recipient the broadcaster's uncertainty as to the assessment of the event, but at the level of implied senses it suggested that the event might be considered illegal and that the persons participating in it, i.e. the judges of the Constitutional Tribunal, did not behave in a manner befitting the office they held).

We also assume that this classification of author-dependent resources in the above methodological interpretation does not allow us to determine so much the style of the statements under investigation (in this regard the texts gathered here are fairly homogeneous; it is their genre that distinguishes them from other media statements, and not their style), but their pragmatic function (primarily persuasive) and secondly, the view of the world fixed in these statements, which depends *par excellence* on the broadcaster. This results from the selection of autosemantic (independent) words or – less frequently – from the selection of a significant (evaluative) grammatical structure or rhetorical strategy (operating with figurative words or figures of speech, quotations, quotation marks, allusions, irony, and even unconventional spelling choices).

In the analyzed corpus of 306 strips, we found only 93 (i.e. not quite 31%) which did not contain any author-dependent elements. This means that the vast majority of the strips shown in *Wiadomości TVP 1*, announcing segments about the most important political events of 2016 and 2017 in Poland, were most likely constructed with the intention of influencing the opinion of the recipients of the message, rather than informing them of about the event in an objective manner.

A vast majority of the author-dependent elements in the corpus were systemic, sentential, or contextual means of evaluation, which will be discussed further. At this point, we will focus on discussing only those resources which, in our view, cannot be attributed to any of the above properties, i.e. those whose only feature is dependence on the communicative intention of the sender.

## 1. Names of political entities

The first phenomenon that should be noted here is that of naming the entities taking part in political life in the texts of the strips (we shall limit ourselves here only to presenting the appellations of entities represented in the Polish parliament). The table below presents the figures related to the names used in our corpus. The author-dependent element here is the selection of a specific variant of the name of the entity in power and the entities in the opposition (data for 2016–2017).

The above summary allows the following conclusions to be drawn:

1. The broadcaster avoids displaying in the text of the strips the official or customary names of the entities responsible for specific political events presented to the public (only twelve names of 306 strips, and 36 appellations of 306 if we include the customary appellations).
2. The authors of the strips present the actions of the opposition far more often than those of the ruling coalition (two strips with the name of the majority party in comparison to 34 strips referring directly or indirectly to the actions of the opposition), while the name *opposition* was used 24 times, whereas the name *coalition* did not appear at all in the material under discussion. In eighteen of the cases (75%), the word *opposition* was used without any attributes (i.e. in a manner independent of the author), while in the remaining six cases (25%) it was accompanied by a value-conveying attribute (of which in five cases the value was negative and only once it was positive). In turn, the ratio of the author-independent (objective) names of opposition entities to their author-dependent (value-conveying) names is 21 to 13 (62% to 38%).
3. The broadcaster uses a rhetorical strategy of depreciation by reducing the name of a specific political entity to the colloquial term (a clear one-word abbreviation of the proper name – *Platforma* instead of *Platforma Obywatelska*<sup>23</sup>). In the examined corpus, of ten occurrences of specific references relating to this party, seven were represented only by the unofficial variant of its name (i.e. *Platforma*). On the one hand, this is motivated by the assumption that

23 A similar strategy can be found in the material we analyzed, in references to the Constitutional Tribunal: five times the word *Trybunał* was used, twice the acronym *TK*, while the full name – *Trybunał Konstytucyjny* – was not used at all.

**Table 1. Names of parliamentary political parties used in the information strips of *Wiadomości TVP 1* as author-dependent and author-independent resources**

The entity and its names displayed on the strips	No. of occurrences	Percentage (n=306)	Numbers of strips with a given name variant	Author-dependent vs. author-independent variants
<i>Prawo i Sprawiedliwość</i> [Law and Justice] (the parliamentary group in power, comprised of representatives of <i>Prawo i Sprawiedliwość</i> , <i>Solidarna Polska</i> and <i>Porozumienie</i> ) = 235/460 seats in the <i>Sejm</i> *)				
Prawo i Sprawiedliwość	0	0%	none	not applicable
PiS	2	0.65%	[57] [259]	independent
<i>Platforma Obywatelska</i> [Civic Platform] (the most numerous opposition party = 138/460 seats in the <i>Sejm</i> )				
Platforma Obywatelska	1	0.33%	[180]	independent
PO	2	0.65%	[259] [286]	independent
Platforma	7	2.29%	[19] [87] [88] [124] [177] [220] [278]	dependent
<i>Kukiz'15</i> (a parliamentary group in opposition** = 42/460 seats)				
none	0	0%	none	not applicable
<i>.Nowoczesna</i> [.Modern (party)] (an opposition party = 28/460 seats)				
none	0	0%	none	not applicable
<i>Polskie Stronnictwo Ludowe</i> [Polish People's Party] (the smallest political party in the opposition = 16/460 seats)				
none	0	0%	none	not applicable
The opposition to the currently ruling party <i>en bloc</i>				
opozycja [opposition]	18	5.88%	[3] [4] [9] [12] [14] [35] [37] [50] [69] [90] [141] [164] [174] [186] [193] [264]	independent
totalna opozycja [total opposition]	2	0.65%	[46] [91]	dependent

\* Based on the data on the number of seats based on the results of Polish parliamentary election announced by the State Electoral Committee in October 2015.

\*\* In this case, the oppositional character of this group consists in it remaining outside of the government.

The entity and its names displayed on the strips	No. of occurrences	Percentage (n=306)	Numbers of strips with a given name variant	Author-dependent vs. author-independent variants
radykalna opozycja [radical opposition]	3	0.98%	[190] [196] [208]	dependent
umiarkowana opozycja [moderate opposition]	1	0.33%	[201]	dependent

the sender and the recipient share common knowledge about the world (therefore, from the sender's point of view, the truncation of the second part of the name is understandable), and on the other hand, it may be an expression of the author's persuasive intent (the pragmatic reduction of the differentiating part may be understood as an attempt to deprive the opposition group of its communicative identity, in this case by omitting the part *Obywatelska* [Civic] in its name).

- The naming of parliamentary entities in opposition to the governing coalition shows an advancing stabilization of stylistic phrases imposed top-down: *totalna opozycja* [total opposition] (three instances) and *radykalna opozycja* [radical opposition] (two instances). In political discourse, these are used solely by politicians of the ruling coalition and their supporters. When compared with the term *umiarkowana opozycja* [moderate opposition], used once, these phrases indicate that the main criterion for evaluating the opposition's actions is its level of involvement in criticizing the actions of the ruling coalition.

## 2. A review of other author-dependent means of linguistic expression

In the examined material, there were various additional means of expression whose value-bearing power resulted solely from the author's choices.

## 2.1. Interrogative structures

What comes to the fore here is basing the structure of the strip on the **structure of a question**. In the analyzed set of texts, of 306 strips, twenty are phrased as questions (approx. 6.5%). The persuasive power of a question as a rhetorical figure of thought has been known since ancient times and has been widely described in various sources. Therefore, suffice it to remind the reader here that a question as a persuasive measure is primarily intended to stimulate the recipients' attention, influence their feelings, evoke reflection, and encourage them to try to provide an answer; it can also serve to express the sender's emotions or express their hesitations or doubts. There are basically two modes of functioning for questions in persuasive expressions: etiology (with the speaker asking a question and providing an immediate answer to it) and erotesis (asking a question without the intention of obtaining an answer; hence another popular name for erotesis is a rhetorical question).

With regard to fixed information strips displayed in the form of questions, one can say that they naturally form an etiological whole with the subsequent segment, which is a practice transferred from press journalism, where serially repeated question-answer sequences are (as in an interview) or sometimes are the structural axis of a text (usually an article, at times also an editorial or report). Etiology is one of the basic techniques of providing journalistic content to audiences and can be exploited in various ways, also in order to exert persuasive pressure on the recipient.

Among the twenty strips in the form of questions, eight were classified as constituting an authentic etiological situation (i.e. a situation in which the answer to the question is not obvious to the recipient before viewing the segment). What follows is a brief analysis of each of these cases.

[1] *Rozprawa czy spotkanie?* [A hearing or a meeting?] (see analysis above). Conclusion: the sender's answer determines that the correct assessment of the event is communicated by the second noun, bearing negative characteristics (i.e. casting an unfavorable light on the participants in the event, but positive for the sender's persuasive intentions).

[51] *Ten ma rację, kto bardziej zły?* [Whoever is more upset is right?] The question uses a seemingly non-standard form comparative from of the adjective *zły* [bad, evil, upset]. The material covers protest rallies against the planned reform of the judiciary, whose participants in the first part of the clip present themselves as strongly emotionally involved in their

actions, but lacking substantive knowledge about the proposed changes, and therefore with no convincing arguments to support their opinions. The author summarized this part of the segment with the sentence: *They [the participants of the protest] act according to the principle that whoever is more upset is the one who is right*, and a short clip of the demonstration showing one of the participants saying *Do not accept this reality, build up the anger within you*.<sup>24</sup> The adjective *upset* brings here a meaning related to the state of irritation, agitation.

The persuasive character of strip [51] rests on the use of the adjective *zły* as a general expression of value without specifying its pragmatic meaning – this is probably why the analytical form of the comparative degree of *zły* was chosen, seemingly incompatible with the standard usage, because the standard suppletive form of *gorszy* [worse] is unambiguous, as it applies only to contexts in which it can be replaced by the antonym *lepszey* [better], and it cannot be used with those meanings which of the adjective *zły* which block the antonymy *lepszey – gorszy*, i.e. such senses as *displeased*, *dissatisfied*, and particularly *upset*, *angry*. Since for the senses of the word *zły* (beneficial for the persuasive purpose of the sender) only the periphrastic (descriptive) gradation is possible, the use of this very structure demonstrates the author's intention to use the adjective *zły* in one or perhaps in even both of these senses depreciating the characters in the segment. In conclusion, the answer to the thesis proposed in question [51] is negative, which from a pragmatic point of view should be read as a message with the content "The protesters, exposing their dissatisfaction with the reform, are in the wrong."

[89] *Kto nie chce suwerennej i silnej Polski?* [Who does not want a sovereign and strong Poland?]. This question contains the sentence presupposition: "There is someone who does not want a sovereign and strong Poland." The material presented to the audience is heterogeneous in content and inconsistent in its composition:

1. First of all, it speaks of talks regarding the establishment of a ruling coalition after the elections between the German parties CDU and SDP so as to "revive Vladimir Putin's dreams"<sup>25</sup> of continuing the Nord Stream 2 project;
2. further, the authors of the segment report that Poland is trying to block this project, which is not in the interest of either Germany or Russia;

24 <https://wiadomosci.tvp.pl/33330619/ten-ma-racje-kto-bardziej-zly>.

25 <https://wiadomosci.tvp.pl/35291316/kto-nie-chce-suwerennej-i-silnej-polski>.



3. another segment is already devoted to information about the planned new law which, among other things, was supposed to reveal which foreign corporations do not pay taxes in Poland and “take their profits out of our country,” mainly to the Netherlands, the home of Commissioner Frans Timmermans, and also among others to Luxembourg, which is a “tax haven” and whose former Prime Minister was Jean-Claude Juncker, the current head of the European Commission;
4. the authors continue to report that “previous governments did not have a problem with such neo-colonial treatment;”
5. it was only the coming to power of Law and Justice that changed this situation;
6. the government formed by this party has been implementing political and economic projects (mentioned by name) that “have weakened economic dependence on Germany;”
7. and “the reform of the judiciary is only a pretext for demonstrating this resistance [of the above states to these projects]”.

The material presented to viewers is based only on implicatures and provides no clear answer to the question posed in strip [89]. In conclusion, the answer to the question posed in strip [89] is only an enumeration of certain examples of actions taken by selected entities. Moreover, European politicians who, according to the authors of the material, oppose Poland’s interests are identified visually or linguistically and the Polish Prime Minister is shown in a conciliatory situation. The persuasive power is based here on the figure of an enthymeme (in fact, the sender provides only partial premises, some overt, some hidden, assuming that the recipient equipped with the knowledge of the world assumed by the sender should first accept the presupposition expressed by the question and then fill it in with the subject matter all by herself), which means that the responsibility for the result of the persuasion is shifted to the reception activities of the recipient.

[130] *Gdzie jest złoto Amber Gold?* [Where is the gold of Amber Gold?] The presupposition communicated here is “The gold of *Amber Gold* is out there somewhere.” The footage (in the form of a short mention) shows selected excerpts of statements made before the Commission of Inquiry by the former Amber Gold accountant, and by a former Dominican friar who had close social ties with the owners of the company. Fragments of the testimony of both witnesses were presented without taking into account the dialogical context (questions from the members of the committee), and

sometimes without care for the syntactic phrasing of the witnesses' statements (breaking the quoted statement in mid-sentence). Furthermore, only those fragments of the statements were included which could be connected with the thesis expressed in the presupposition (e.g. where the accountant says that she was not aware that she had been hired as a stooge, or in this case 'a person taking legal actions instead of another person so as to hide the identity of the latter, while the former clergyman – that at his own request he asked to see what a bar of gold looks like, which was made possible for him). In conclusion, the footage answering the question posed in strip [130] omitted some information that the recipient might consider reliable about the location of the gold (of Amber Gold). The message is based on understatement, which is supposed to trigger the implicit conclusion in the recipient that "These witnesses may know where the gold (of Amber Gold) is, but they do not want to say."

[135] *Nieudolność czy sabotaż śledztwa?* [Incompetence or sabotage of the investigation?] Here we are dealing with a question in the form of an ordinary alternative – giving an answer to such a question consists in choosing either one of the options or both. In this construction, persuasive power is based on the fact that the choice is limited to the possibilities provided by the broadcaster in advance, all of which are assessed negatively, and therefore it does not really matter which option is chosen, as the authors will achieve their persuasive goal in either case. The footage only confirms this conclusion – it refers to the passivity of the state authorities (police and prosecution) in the Amber Gold case. In conclusion, the construction of the strip's message precludes any interpretation that is different from that imposed by the authors. Moreover, it can be considered that the strip does not perform its basic informative function, as it imposes on the recipient an evaluation of the activities of state institutions in a case which was still ongoing at the time of the broadcast.

[206] *Kto gra dalej?* [Who is left in the game?] This question has a semantically complex construction – it uses an ambiguous word *play*, which in this context has a metaphorical value (the metaphor of politics as a game is one of the oldest topoi used to depict it); moreover, it is based on two presuppositions: "someone is left in the game" and "someone is treating politics as a zero-sum game" (which results from the metaphorical meaning of the noun). The relevant footage concerns disputes between opposition parties and social organizations (called the *radical opposition*) and conflicts within the largest opposition party. The answer to the question posed in the strip is never given. In conclusion, the question may be assumed to ac-

tually signal a state of ignorance on the part of the sender as to the essence of the matter presented in the segment, while the segment itself confirms that it is currently not possible to determine the state of affairs the question relates to.

[241] *Komu przeszkadza patriotyzm Polaków?* [Who is bothered by Polish patriotism?] This is another strip containing a question with a presupposition: “There is someone who is bothered by Polish patriotism.” The footage concerned the Independence March of November 11, 2017, in which tens of thousands of people, including representatives of national organizations, demonstrated their patriotism. The journalist pointed out that some foreign media and the “radical part of the opposition”<sup>26</sup> emphasized in their accounts that the march was attended by “Nazis” or “fascists” and that “it is unacceptable to the left-wing elites that thousands of Poles publicly manifest their pride of being Polish.” The material also emphasized that the march was an objection to “left-wing ideology” and “Islamization of the Old Continent,” while the display of a banner with a racist slogan and a controversial symbol (the Celtic cross) by representatives of one Polish nationalist organization was described as an “incident” and the people carrying it, a “small group of radicals.” The first conclusion is that it seems that in this case the question structure with the presupposition was meant to communicate in a covert way the only logically possible evaluative proposition, made obvious by virtue of the laws of logical reasoning, constituting the very presupposition. This proposition expresses a controversial point that is difficult to prove, and thus the use of a conclusion process based on a presupposition is persuasive in nature, and is meant, in keeping with the sender’s intention, to trigger an associative process in the recipient, whose result should be the recipient’s conviction that the patriotism of Poles bothers some entities hinted at in the segment (which are, nonetheless, described too generally to be clearly identified by the recipient). The second conclusion is that the question also uses the eristic gimmick of excessive generalization – the expression *Polish patriotism* contains two words which have precise meanings only in dictionary definitions, but whose senses in real communication practice may be vastly divergent. Therefore, strip [241] should be regarded as a kind of commentary on the facts rather than as information or announcement of these facts.

26 <https://wiadomosci.tvp.pl/34785951/komu-przeszkadza-patriotyzm-polakow>. Subsequent quotations are from this source.

[281] *Dlaczego zginęła Jolanta Brzeska?* [Why did Jolanta Brzeska lose her life?] Here, too, the question contains a presupposition: “Jolanta Brzeska lost her life for a reason (i.e. someone wanted her to).” The footage is an account of the hearings of several people connected with the case of reprivatization of a Warsaw townhouse at 9 Nabelaka Street, held before the verification committee. Those called upon to testify included Jolanta Brzeska’s daughter. The author of the news segment points to several entities which either did not lend any support to Jolanta Brzeska (“city hall officials”<sup>27</sup> and “courts”) or actively harassed her (the so-called “tenement cleaners” and “a well-known trader in claims”) – the only entity mentioned by name). Another quotation used is a fragment of the testimony of a friend of Jolanta Brzeska, an activist of the tenants movement, who testified that “if she [Jolanta Brzeska] ran afoul of someone, it is only of those who have grown rich on other people’s property”. In conclusion, the presupposition in the question posed in strip [281] is intended to convince the recipient that someone is responsible for the tragic death of Jolanta Brzeska, as evidenced by the use of the verb *to lose one’s life* (tragically or suddenly). In light of the available data, it can be concluded that this is a true proposition. The segment, however, operates eristically as in the case of strip [241] with very blurred generalizations, which does not provide an unambiguous answer to the question posed in the strip [281].

The ten remaining strips phrased as questions (strips [104] and [114] are excluded here, as they contain quotations and will be dealt with below) are rhetorical questions (erostheses) i.e. structures which are questions only on the level of punctuation, as they are devoid of formal (grammatical) exponents of interrogative intentions (pronouns or question particles – except for [220]), but rather have the pragmatic status of statements (propositions) with different degrees of probability (depending on the degree of concreteness of the content being adjudicated upon). They are as follows: [7] *Ukarany za własne zdanie?* [Punished for having his own opinion?]; [9] *Opozycja odrzuci kompromis?* [Will the opposition reject the compromise?]; [41] *Toga chroni przed odpowiedzialnością?* [Does a robe protect against liability?]; [58] *Sąd Najwyższy złamał prawo?* [Has the Supreme Court broken the law?]; [59] *Reformatorska PO-Budka?* [The Pro-reform attitude of PO-Budka?]; [124] *Platforma kryła działalność Amber Gold?* [The (Civic) Platform papered over the activities of Amber Gold?]; [128]

27 <https://wiadomosci.tvp.pl/34629827/dlaczego-zginela-jolanta-brzeska>. All quotations come from this source.

*ABW kontaktowała się z szefem Amber Gold?* [The Internal Security Agency contacted the head of Amber Gold?]; [191] *Kolejna próba destabilizacji państwa?* [Another attempt to destabilize the state?]; [220] *Czy Platforma szykuje na jutro awanturę?* [Is the (Civic) Platform spoiling for a fight tomorrow?]; [229] *Blokada opóźni dezubekizację?* [Will the blockade delay decommunization?].

From the perspective of communication, all these strips are linked by the fact that the sender assumes that each of these questions should be answered in the affirmative, thus accepting the thesis proposed in the given segment. This assumption is, on the one hand, a derivative of the discourse conditions (polarization of assessments concerning the actions of the opposition and the ruling coalition), and on the other hand, a result of the expectation that the viewer is focused on the footage presenting arguments for the thesis put forward in the question. Thus, it can be concluded that the broadcaster's communication strategy here consists in shaping both segments of the message (the question and the answer) in such a way that the recipient aspires in the act of reception to transform the rhetorical question into a real question with an answer, or in other words concedes that the answer to the question contains what the question says.

All the above strips in the form of rhetorical questions refer to the sender's negative assessment of someone's actions or existing states of affairs – this is evidenced among other things by the use of words evaluating systemically, sententially or contextually: *will reject* [-]<sup>28</sup> *a compromise* [+]; *it protects* [+] *from responsibility* [-]; *has broken* [-] *the law* [+]; *papered over* [-]; *destabilization* [-]; *a brawl* [-]; *will delay* [-] *decommunization* [+]. The subjects of these actions or persons responsible are indicated either directly, as in [9], [58], [59] (additionally through allusion), [124], [128] and [220], or indirectly, as in [7], [41] (here: metonymically, i.e. on the borderline of direct and indirect reference), [191] and [229].

The majority of the propositions in this group of analyzed rhetorical questions concern past events ([7]<sup>29</sup>, [58], [124], [128]) and present events ([41], [59], [191], [220]), so it can be assumed that they express evalua-

28 [-] means 'something bad' or 'do something bad,' [+] means 'something good' or 'do something good.' A combination of [+] [-] indicates sentential valuation.

29 In strips [7], [59] and [191] there are no formal exponents of predicates (finite verb forms); however, we treat these statements, based on their context (the accompanying footage) as sentence equivalents, and this is why we attribute predicative power to them.

tions for which the broadcaster takes responsibility, both ethically (in terms of compliance with the principles of ethics of the word and the standards of qualitative journalism) and socially (in their influence on the attitudes and behaviors of the national audience). Propositions concerning the future ([9] and [229]) have at most the status of a valuable assumption as to the possible course of events.

What requires a separate discussion here are the non-standard resources used in the strips, along with resources used in non-standard ways. In [41], the word *robe* is used metonymically in the sense of ‘being a judge, the profession of a judge’ – due to the high status of this profession, the word *robe* in this sense should have an elevated meaning (like *scepter* for *king*, or *papal tiara* for the *pope*), but the context of use indicates an ironic meaning (with the value sign reversed), i.e. depreciative in relation to the professional group so named.

Strip [59], in turn, is based on word play (a pun) – the word *pobudka* [wake-up call] is written as if it consisted of the acronym PO (*Platforma Obywatelska*) and the name of an MP of the party, former Minister of Justice Borys Budka. The clip presents the PO’s proposals for the reform of the justice system as outdated (because they had already been rejected by the Sejm once before) and belated (because they were not implemented during the party’s time in government). Thus, all three semantic elements that make up the text of the strip contribute to the irony (used for mockery or even derision) with the purpose of ridiculing the Civic Platform’s initiative (the *wake-up call* metaphorically refers to ‘late action’ here) as well as Borys Budka in person.

In strip [128], the verb *to contact* is used, which at the level of systemic description is axiologically neutral; however, when used in a sentence with the name of an offender (*Amber Gold*) it acquires a negative value. In such use, a government agency *contacting* this entity is presented as something negative or reprehensible. However, since at the time of publication of strip [128] the public was not aware of any evidence of illegal cooperation between the ABW (Internal Security Agency) and the criminal company, the verb *contact* should be interpreted as using a linguistic resource in order to semantically blur the image of the events, i.e. to emphasize the possibility of contact between the ABW and Amber Gold, but evade determining the nature of this contact.

In sum, we have determined that the authors of the analyzed strips use the structure of rhetorical questions primarily in order to emphasize the evaluative thesis proposed in the journalistic material following each of the strips.

## 2.2. Direct quotation and paraphrase

Another kind of author-dependent and evaluative linguistic resource (second in frequency of use in our corpus) is **quotation** (either direct or in paraphrase) of fragments of statements made by the people referred to in the news segment (most often signaled by quotation marks or in some other unambiguous way). The choice of the appropriate quotation is dependent on the author of the material, as is the rhetorical ploy of assigning the quotation to the footage that follows it. Since the content of the quoted statement is not by itself dependent on the author, we believe that the value-conveying expressions perform valuation solely on the basis of the author's decision, because they now refer to the prepared footage, and only in the background – according to the original intention of the original speaker – to some element of reality important for a given event.

The corpus contains eleven strips based on a direct quotation or paraphrase: [56] “*Liczy się sprawa*” [What matters is the cause] (a quotation from Zbigniew Ziobro's statement after the Polish President's veto of the so-called “judiciary reform laws”); [73] *Komisja Wenecka: winne obie strony* [The Venice Commission: both parties are at fault] (paraphrase); [104] and [114] *Co świadkowi wiadomo w sprawie?* [What does the witness know about the case?] (a quotation from a statement by Andrzej Łojkowski, former spokesman of the Appellate Prosecutor's Office in Gdańsk, made at a hearing of the Commission of Inquiry to investigate the regularity and legality of the actions of public authorities and institutions with respect to the entities comprising the Amber Gold Group); [108] *Państwo zawiodło* [The state has failed] (a quotation from the statement of Jarosław Gowin, former Minister of Justice, at a hearing of the Commission of Inquiry to investigate the correctness and legality of the actions of public authorities and institutions with respect to entities comprising the Amber Gold Group); [111] *Państwo nie działało tak, jak trzeba* [The state did not work as it should have] (a quotation from a statement made by Witold Koziński, a former member of the Polish Financial Supervision Authority at a hearing of the Commission of Inquiry to investigate the correctness and legality of the actions of public authorities and institutions with respect to the entities comprising the Amber Gold Group); [119] *Nie odnotowałem w swojej pamięci* [I made no note of it in my memory] (a quotation from a statement made by Sławomir Nowak, former Minister of Transportation at a hearing of the Commission of Inquiry to investigate the regularity and legality of the actions of public



authorities and institutions with respect to the entities comprising the Amber Gold Group); [122] *Kolokwialnie mówiąc: lipa* [To put it bluntly: ‘a bunch of bull...’] (a quotation from the statement given by Michał Tusk, son of former Prime Minister Donald Tusk at a hearing of the Commission of Inquiry to investigate the correctness and legality of the actions of public authorities and institutions toward the entities comprising the Amber Gold Group); [156] *Cisza wokół “jednolitego przekazu”* [Silence surrounding the “unified message”] (a quotation from a statement by Jerzy Miller given at a hearing of the Commission for the Investigation of State Aviation Accidents after the Smolensk disaster); [238] *Patriota to nie jest “radosny burak”* [A patriot is not a ‘cheerful bumpkin’] (a quotation from a text published in *Gazeta Wyborcza*, in which its author, Paweł Wroński, says the white-and-red flag or the state white eagle bring to mind homophobia or the very image of a cheerful ‘burak’ – literally ‘a beetroot’– used here as a derogatory term for a country simpleton) [276] *Józwiak: Nie wiem, nie pamiętam* [Józwiak: I don’t know, I don’t recall] (a paraphrase of a statement made by Jarosław Józwiak, Deputy Mayor of Warsaw, at a hearing of the Committee for the reprivatization of certain Warsaw properties). Moreover, there was one strip containing quotation marks: [203] *Prywatnemu, nie posłowi* [As a private individual, not an MP] (the segment concerned the controversies around MP Ryszard Petru’s trip to Portugal at the turn of 2017 during a parliamentary crisis – initially it was not clear whether this was a private holiday or business trip; the phrase used in the strip does not occur in the spoken text [203]. This sentence is a quotation from the novel *The Deluge [Potop]* by Henryk Sienkiewicz (1886) – spoken in relation to a traitor to the homeland. Owing to this literary allusion, the features of this character are attributed (at least to some extent) to the main figure in the *Wiadomości* report, the opposition MP Ryszard Petru. The above data lead us to draw the following conclusions:

1. Only one strip containing a quotation [56] concerns a statement made by a representative of the current government. At the same time, it is the only strip in which someone’s statement is used in a positive context.<sup>30</sup>

30 A translation of Zbigniew Ziobro’s verbatim utterance is as follows: *W takim zakresie [decyzji o zawetowaniu lub niezawetowaniu przez prezydenta RP tzw. ustaw sądowych – przyp. autorów] nie liczą się osobiste ambicje, one są na czwartym, piątym planie, liczy się sprawa, liczą się wartości, które są jeszcze wyżej nad tą sprawą.* [In this regard (authors’ note: i.e. the President’s decision whether or not to veto the so-called judiciary laws) what matters are not personal ambitions – they are far in the background, what matters is the cause, and the values that are even higher than the cause.]



2. Only one strip [73] can be considered axiologically neutral, although after taking into account the discursive context, one can also detect an evaluative element in it (the public rather expected that the Venice Commission would negatively assess the rule of law in Poland, whereas it also pointed out acts of negligence on the part of the previous authorities).
3. All other quotations or paraphrases were selected so as to indicate either weaknesses, negligence, or incompetence on the part of the state when governed by the PO–PSL coalition – strips [108] and [111] – or errors, omissions, and sluggishness of specific individuals (mainly representatives of the previous government) – strips [104], [114], [119], [122], [156], [276]. The viewers received an explanation of the position adopted by the authors of the broadcast only in the footage following the broadcast of the strip.
4. The pair of strips [104] and [114] require additional explanation – they contain the words that were spoken by prosecutor Łojkowski during a hearing before the Amber Gold commission. However, in his testimony, the witness also used these words as a quotation, as he quoted a standard procedural question asked by the prosecutors in this case. The choice of these words to be quoted by the broadcaster was possibly supposed to convince the viewers that in the Amber Gold case the prosecutor’s office in Gdańsk acted sluggishly, passively, without any real desire to establish the material truth (such a conclusion gains additional support when we compare strips [104] and [114] with the other strips concerning the activities of the Gdańsk prosecutor’s office in the Amber Gold case, e.g. [101] and [136]).
5. The persuasive power of strips [119] and [276] is, in turn, based on eristic ad hominem attacks. The authors seek to discredit Sławomir Nowak and Jarosław Józwiak by exposing their own declarations of their unfamiliarity with some details of the cases they dealt with as officials, omitting other information they communicated during the hearings. Citing both of these segments in this way bears traces of selectivity motivated by the intent to disparage the persons quoted or their actions when they held their official functions. Strip [238] should also be interpreted in a similar way, with the source of compromise here being the phrase used by Paweł Wroński (*radosny burak* – a cheerful bumpkin), and the strip itself contains his open refutation.

6. The structure of the ad hominem argument is also the basis of the last strip in this subset [156]. It quotes the expression *jednolity przekaz* [a unified message] used by Jerzy Miller during the first (closed-doors) meeting of the Committee for Investigation of National Aviation Accidents (KBWLLP).<sup>31</sup> This term was – as one may assume – the essence of the proposal that both Russian and Polish investigators should present to the public a consistent interpretation of the event as an accident. On the one hand, the footage informed the viewers that there was some controversy as to the real meaning of the words of this politician,<sup>32</sup> and that he interpreted them as a premise in favor of the thesis that Jerzy Miller sought to ensure that “the findings of the Polish commission did not deviate from those of the Russian MAK commission” (a fragment of the journalist’s commentary on the material), which was supposed to discredit Miller. The construction of the message in strip [156] is selective (an arbitrarily chosen quotation out of any significant context), and its informational content is underdefined (also by introducing the metaphorical term *cisza* [silence], not fully decipherable in terms of communication, because it does not communicate clearly who was silent about the ‘unified message’ and why).
7. Apart from strip [73], all the other strips based on quotations could not function as independent notifications about the event, so they primarily fulfil the appellative function (they provide titles for the material they announce) and the persuasive function (selection of quotations subordinated to the proposed thesis). Their informative (descriptive) function is quite limited, because the broadcaster’s intention of notifying the viewers becomes clear to the latter only after they have familiarized themselves with the segment, whereas the specific communicational nature of television broadcasts makes

31 The footage contained the following fragment of Jerzy Miller’s the statement: “Either we ensure a unified message that does not aid the construction of myths and suspicions, or we might find ourselves up a certain type of creek and without a paddle.” Cf. <https://wiadomosci.tvp.pl/26989632/cisza-wokol-jednolitego-przekazu>. All of the quotations come from this source.

32 The footage quoted Jerzy Miller’s rebuttal: *Nie chodzi o to, że fakty byłyby inne, tylko o to, że raporty miałyby inną konstrukcję. A ja chciałem, by każdy czytelnik mógł przeczytać oba dokumenty i zrozumieć, jakie jest stanowisko polskie, a jakie rosyjskie* [The point is not that any facts were different, but that the reports had different constructions. And I wanted all readers to be able to read both documents and understand what the Polish position was and what the Russian one was].

it impossible (unlike in the press) for the viewers to return to reading the strip at any time.<sup>33</sup> Thus, we can say that we are dealing here with a ploy consisting in that the viewers receive a specific clue as to what to pay special attention to even before the reception of a given segment. The use of quotations is one of the ways of profiling the agenda (see agenda setting above) due to the communication benefits for the broadcaster.

### 2.3. Other solely author-dependent means of valuation (an overview)

The types of language resources discussed below should also be included in the set of author-dependent means of conveying valuation.

The most common type of linguistic operation on the part of the broadcaster is selection of linguistic names for the facts reported in the news segment that follows the strip. We may assume that this selection is governed on the one hand by the principle of maximum condensation (resulting from the limited capacity of the strip), and on the other, by the sender's desire to emphasize the main argument or to evaluate its main thread, which sometimes results in the evaluation in the strip being inconsistent with the content of the segment, or even with the facts. The following are examples of this phenomenon in the corpus we examined.

Strip [20] informs the viewers that *President [of the Tribunal] Rzepliński wants to appoint a successor*, while it was clear from the segment that followed that he only wanted the method of electing the next president of the Constitutional Tribunal to be determined by the adopted internal regulations.

Strip [48] says that *the court takes away an apartment*. The segment was devoted, among other things, to the fact that a certain citizen raising a disabled child purchased an apartment, but in the wake of the developer's bankruptcy, he did not manage to obtain a notary deed confirming his title to the property, so the bank financing the investment took steps to recover the funds lent to the developer by reselling the apartments already built. The spokesperson of the court which issued the judgment in this case, as quoted in the segment, openly says that the court's decision that the apartment was to be auctioned off was fair and resulted from the law, and that the court, in issuing it, was guided by the interest of all of

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33 This is technically possible by viewing the footage once more on the internet, although it does require additional effort on the part of the viewer and in practice real viewers resort to this very rarely.

the creditors, rather than only by the interest of the main protagonist of the segment. Regardless of the ethical reservations, claiming that the court, enforcing the law which it had not established, *took the apartment away* from the citizen is not justifiable under the rules of journalistic ethics.

Strip [109] makes the following claim “*Nikt nie czuje się winny za Amber Gold*” [No one feels guilty over Amber Gold]. The segment that follows refers to hearings of two witnesses before the parliamentary Commission of Inquiry – a prosecutor and a judge. In the excerpted statements, they both testify that they know nothing about the state of affairs they were asked about, or do not remember the details and the course of events. By comparing the content of the segment with the content of the strip announcing it, we may detect rhetorical and logical abuse in its formulation. The first instance of this is the declaration under the presupposition that ‘someone is guilty of Amber Gold’ that someone (other than the offender) is guilty when there is no evidence of this. Another instance is the exaggerated use of the universal negative quantifier *no one* (the two people interviewed were not the only ones involved in the scandal investigated by the Commission). Lastly, the third instance is the use of the verb *czuć się* [to feel] inadequate for the sense being described. There is a Polish phrase with the meaning ‘to acknowledge one’s guilt (in a moral or legal sense)’ (*poczować się do winy*), which would have been more appropriate for expressing the intentions of the sender, as the collocation with the verb *feel* refers primarily to situations that concern guilt in a moral, rather than a legal sense.

Strip [137] says that **the Tusk government concealed the truth** about Amber Gold [*rząd Tuska ukrył prawdę o Amber Gold*]; however, the segment itself presented an account of the hearing of the former Deputy Minister of the Interior in Donald Tusk’s government, mainly referring to the fact that this official may have failed to act properly when he received an Internal Security Agency memo with information about the possible criminal nature of Amber Gold’s activities. Apart from the author’s own interpretation of the event, the viewers received no other facts that would allow them to verify the thesis put forward in the strip, so it needs to be recognized that we are dealing here with an instance of hyperbole, which can be assessed as an overinterpretation of the presented facts, since *concealing the truth* is an intentional action, motivated by a specific interest of the entity that takes such an action – however, the footage did not contain any evidence of this. Moreover, the use of the synecdoche of *pars-pro-toto* is not justified here in terms of communication practice in the context of the segment’s content (*the government* instead of *one minister*).

Other statements containing intentionally formed names of facts or assessments of facts included [67] *Gorący tydzień* [A hot week]; [97] *Walka z czasem na starcie* [Fight against time at the outset]; [98] *Zdezorientowany prokurator* [A confused prosecutor] and were adequate to the content of the journalistic materials they accompanied and did not violate any standards adopted in public communication.

The second type were expressions underspecified semantically and pragmatically, such as [147] *Po latach milczenia* [After years of silence]; [152] *Zbyt daleko od Warszawy* [Too far from Warsaw]; [168] *Teatr jednego aktora* [One-man show]. In all these, the reference is blurred and thus they do not really serve any descriptive function in relation to the subsequent news segment. They also appear to be seemingly axiologically neutral, as they do not use any systemic means of evaluation. However, when compared with the content of the message they announce, they turn out to be carriers of evaluation based on irony.

Strips [147] and [152] refer to a specific person, Tomasz Arabski, a minister in the government of Donald Tusk responsible for organizing the visit of the President of the Republic of Poland, Lech Kaczyński, to Katyń on April 10, 2010, which ended in a plane crash in which President Lech Kaczyński died, along with all 95 of the other passengers and crew on board. In February 2016, Tomasz Arabski gave an interview to one of the leading Polish daily newspapers, in which he declared that he had not neglected his duties as the organizer of this visit. Strip [147] provided an ironic commentary to the fact that Tomasz Arabski spoke in public about this issue only after six years. Strip [152] announced a segment which talked about Arabski's failure to appear at the hearing in Warsaw due to, as he explained, the distance between Gdańsk, where he lives, and Warsaw. The ironic intention of the strip's author becomes visible when we compare the information in the segment, where another defendant, also living in Gdańsk, did arrive at the hearing.

Strip [168] accompanies the segment which concerns the detention of Władysław Frasyniuk during an attempt to "block the march in the memory of the victims of the Smolensk air disaster."<sup>34</sup> The journalist calls this initiative 'a street brawl of hooligans,' and then presents Frasyniuk's statement that he 'represents all those who gave their lives in the January, November or Warsaw Uprisings', and then ironically (even derisively)

34 <https://wiadomosci.tvp.pl/32779052/teatr-jednego-aktora>. All quotations from this source.

points out that Frasyniuk is ‘an insurgent, although he did not get up from the cobblestones in Krakowskie Przedmieście on his own feet’ (as he was removed by the police). In this context, the content of strip [168] should be viewed as an instance of irony based on the connotations of the word *show* ‘something for show, something fake, something frivolous’ and on the metaphorical meaning of the phrase *one-man show* ‘an event in which the attention of observers is drawn to one person only’.

Further types of author-dependent linguistic evaluation are represented in the collected corpus as single examples. These include:

1. ironic quotes: [84] *Osobista „misja” Timmermansa* [Timmermans’ personal ‘mission’]; [92] *„Opcja nuklearna” to kapiszon* [The ‘Nuclear option’<sup>35</sup> is a storm in a teacup];
2. depreciating comparison: [188] *w Sejmie jak w przedszkolu* [in the Sejm like in a kindergarten];
3. evaluative antithesis: [145] *Przeciw rządowi, za aborcją na życzenie* [Against the government, in favor of abortion on request];
4. ironic suspension points: [212] *Petru ograł... Petru* [Petru outmaneuvered... Petru].

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35 This is Article 7 of the European Union Treaty concerning an event when the European Council finds there to be a serious risk of infringing EU values by one of the member states; it is often referred to as the “nuclear option” or the “atomic option” (stylistic phrasemes).

## Chapter 3:

# An analysis of systemic means of valuation

In the course of the study, we found that systemically evaluative words or phrases occurred in 169 of the 306 strips analyzed (55.23%). In qualitative terms, on eliminating those uses which did not distort the image of a given event,<sup>36</sup> the number of strips containing systemically evaluative lexical units was 105 (34.31%). In practice, this means that every third strip in the corpus used systemically evaluative author-dependent means of expression assessing the event in question.

Describing this group of means of valuation poses several difficulties. Firstly, in the vast majority of cases, these measures express assessment of events or entities using axiologically neutral expressions (e.g. [3] *Opozycja straszy<sup>37</sup> Majdanem* [The opposition is threatening with [another] Majdan]; [27] *Kolejne skandaliczne decyzje sędziów* [More outrageous rulings from the judges]; [169] *Marsz pamięci pod pręgierzem polityków* [March of Memory under the pillory of politicians]; [202] *Jak manipuluje niemiecka telewizja publiczna* [How German public television uses manipulation]; [278] *Złodziejska reprivatyzacja obciąża Platformę* [Larcenous reprivatization burdens the [Civic] Platform]), which in practice entails analyzing entire syntactic contexts, sometimes taking into account the context (i.e. the content of the footage).

36 We determined that the following strips met this condition: [5], [6], [9], [10], [19], [25], [26], [29], [31], [32], [33], [35], [43], [53], [54], [58], [66], [109], [110], [117], [134], [138], [145], [153], [157], [159], [163], [181], [187], [193], [213], [215], [217], [224], [225], [227], [229], [232], [237], [239], [240], [243], [249], [295], [296], [297], [298], [299], [300], [301], [302], [303], [304], [305] and [306].

37 Here and below we added emphasis to systemic means of valuation.



The second difficulty results from the fact that systemic resources are very rarely the only value-conveying elements in the text of a news strip; they are usually accompanied by elements expressing evaluation on the sentential or contextual level. However, if the author of a strip chooses to use only systemic means of evaluation (almost without exception, these are lexemes), then in the case of strips that contain a closed information package (i.e. understandable without knowing the content of the footage the strip accompanies), a regularity can be observed in that such strips usually express commonly shared or obvious evaluations. Thus, they can be considered to be essentially informative rather than persuasive. Examples of such statements include: [6] *Szukanie kompromisu wokół TK* [The search for a compromise regarding the Constitutional Tribunal]; [25] *Plan reformy sądownictwa* [The plan of the judicial reform]; [117] *Wątek lotniczy afery Amber Gold* [The airline thread of the Amber Gold scandal]; [227] *Spór o esbeckie emerytury* [Dispute over the pensions of communist secret agents]. In none of these can the author be accused of providing a distorted description of the situation, even by a recipient who is not favorably disposed toward the author. However, more often than not, the situation occurs in which a strip containing only systemic evaluative elements and communicating content consistent with the facts refers recipients familiar with the current political context to a certain evaluative set of value-oriented beliefs, held only by some. There are at least three ways of making systemically expressed valuation seem obvious and unquestionable.

1. Strips [26] *Reforma sądownictwa w Sejmie* [Judiciary reform in Parliament]; [66] *Brak jedności* [A lack of unity] and [82] *Presja na polski rząd* [Pressure on the Polish government] **open the mental spaces required for the implied formula:** and this is a good/bad thing (for the essence of this approach, cf. Laskowska 1992, pp. 118–122). Filling this formula with a positive or negative evaluative content is already at the discretion of the message sender, i.e. it depends on the way the information structure is profiled in the text.
2. In contrast, e.g. strip [159] *Prokuratura apeluje o rzetelne informacje* [The Prosecutor's Office appeals for reliable information] **implies the formula:** *which shows that X (in this case the Prosecutor's Office) is good/bad* (for more, see Laskowska 1992, pp. 118–122), in this case, with the court taking the form 'The prosecutor's office does not have reliable information, but it needs it very much (since it is making an appeal for it, i.e. it is calling for a specific action)', which shows that someone is failing to provide it (and thus acting



improperly in terms of access to information, i.e. making it difficult to establish the truth).

3. Strips [163]: *Bliżej prawdy o Smoleńsku* [Closer to the truth about Smolensk] and [256]: *Polska chce reformy Unii Europejskiej* [Poland wants reform of the European Union], apart from implying one of the above formulas, also induce the viewers to accept as obvious **specific values of the discourse**, i.e. for [163] the court: ‘The truth about the crash of the Polish government plane in Smolensk is not yet fully known, i.e. it is not yet certain whether it was an accident or an assassination’, and for [256] the court: ‘The European Union as an international organization does not act fully in accordance with the best interests of Poland.’

The third difficulty in describing this group of means of valuation is that on the level of the language system, they express values that show a clear bias, either positive or negative, but when used in texts, their value signs can be reversed. This is also at times (rarely) the case in the corpus of texts addressed in this study. We shall illustrate this phenomenon with the following examples: [38] *Nieudolna obrona tego co było* [Heavy-handed defense of what there was]; [53] *17 lat walki o sprawiedliwość* [17 years of struggling for justice]; [59] *Reformatorska PO-Budka* [The pro-reform attitude of PO-Budka (with an attempted pun in Polish)]; [198] *Moralność w trakcie kompromitacji* [Morality in the process of being compromised]; [209] *Kłótnia w obozie okupantów* [A squabble in the occupying camp]; [218] *Kapitulacja Platformy* [Capitulation of the [Civic] Platform]; [247] *Europejskie elity tolerują neonazistów* [European elites tolerate neo-Nazis]; [254] *Polska obnażyła unijne standardy demokracji* [Poland has exposed the EU standards of democracy]; [261] *Radość z Tuska pretekstem do profanacji* [Happiness with [Donald] Tusk as a pretext for desecration]; [264] *Opozycja boi się komisji weryfikacyjnej* [The opposition is afraid of the Commission of Inquiry].

In all of these statements, there are words either directly naming a value or communicating an assessment ascribed to a certain action or attitude within the system itself: *defense* [+], *justice* [+], *reformist* [+], *morality* [+], *squabble* [-], *surrender* [-], *elite* [+], *tolerate* [+], *standard (of democracy)* [+], *joy* [+], *fear* [-]. However, either their direct context (as in [38]: *heavy-handed* [-]; in [198]: *compromised* [-]; in [247]: *neo-Nazi* [-], in [254]: *expose* [-], in [254]: *desecration* [-]), or the situational and discursive context (revealed by the footage or assumed by the sender as common knowledge) is used by the broadcaster to reverse the value sign for the terms in question. It is thus

the figure of thought known as irony. Looking at it from the point of view of pragmatics, it should be noted that irony always negates the systemic (literal) content of the term used in this way, which is the basis for distinguishing various depreciative illocutions based on irony – mockery, derision, ridicule, and even insult (defamation within the meaning of the Penal Code), but also, in certain communication conditions, irony may underlie such speech acts as jokes, witticisms, and teasing. After all, it cannot reasonably be assumed that the authors of strips presented to a nationwide audience in the most important news program on public television consciously aimed for a ludic effect, therefore, the cases described above need to be treated as intentionally depreciative (in any kind of genre incarnation). Moreover, it should also be noted here that the words subjected to ironic reversal at a system level tended to be positive (eight cases) rather than negative (three cases). This can be seen as a certain persuasive strategy on the part of the broadcaster (although the sample collected is too modest to postulate a pattern) – irony is used for reversing primarily those systemically positive meanings which in the journalistic materials of *Wiadomości TVP 1* refer to the actions of the opposition (parliamentary or not), e.g. the word *obrona* [defense] in [38] is used in an axiologically reversed way, but in [216]: *Grupy “GP”* [“Gazety Polskiej”] w obronie Sejmu i rządu [‘GP’ Groups in defense of the Sejm and the government] the valuation is standard, not reversed, which may indicate a tendency of the broadcaster to use the evaluative means offered by language in a biased way and to treat these means with ambivalence (in the above example, defense is good when it “we” are being defended and bad when it “they” are).

Strip [192] deserves a separate analysis: *Wigilijny pasztet* [Christmas Eve pâté]. One can see in the use of the word *pasztet* [pâté] a reference to its meaning established within the linguistic system, although only in its non-standard varieties: *pasztet2* ‘an unpleasant situation; especially one in which the speaker has no influence on the negative state of affairs’. The *pasztet* in question, as presented in *Wiadomości* was the opposition blocking the Sejm rostrum. The use of this term is based on the value-conveying opposition of *pasztet1* (a dish) vs. *pasztet2* (‘unexpected trouble’), although it should be noted that Christians in Poland would not eat pâté on Christmas Eve, as it is a meat dish, but it can already be eaten on the first day of Christmas. The use of the word ‘pâté’ in this strip (accompanying the material which aired on December 27, 2016 and announcing the ongoing ‘post-Christmas’ protest) unblocks the connotations of ‘lack of freshness’ in both meanings – literal and figurative), and using the adjectival

form of Christmas Eve with it probably shows the broadcaster's desire to juxtapose positive associations connected in Polish culture with Christmas Eve with the negatively assessed actions of the parliamentary opposition: 'instead of enjoying the atmosphere of Christmas Eve, the opposition politicians protest in the Sejm, which generates unnecessary problems;' 'they intend to eat pâté for Christmas Eve supper;' 'On Christmas Eve, members of the radical opposition flaunted eating pâté and setting candles on the Christmas table.'<sup>38</sup> At this point it is also worth noting that the systemic evaluations occurring in the examined texts refer in the vast majority to only a few criteria,<sup>39</sup> with the social criterion taking first place – including, according to Laskowska (1992, pp.16–17), custom and law, which she considers to be values that are auxiliary to ethical values. Such axiological marking is found in lexemes frequently repeated in the strips: *reform* (and its derived forms) (twelve instances), as reforming the law essentially serves to improve the functioning of society; *compromise* (six instances), because it refers to a way of preventing social conflicts; *shocking* (four instances) and *scandalous* (one instance), because it refers to actions that the evaluator perceived as violating ethical principles or social cohesion; *provocation* (four instances), because this is how the activity was interpreted by the evaluator as harmful to the social order resulting from democratic elections; *radical (opposition)* (four instances), *total (opposition)* (three instances) and *the (judicial)/(extraordinary) caste* (three instances), because activities of such groups were assessed by the evaluator as interfering with the rules of social coexistence, especially in the area of relations between the governing and the governed.

Even this brief overview of the most common terms reveals a certain mechanism governing the choice of systemic means of evaluation. The actions of the government or its system of values were described with terms which have positive connotations, such as *reform* [25], [26], [29], [31], [32], [33], [35], [43], [49], [54], [59], [256], *sovereign* [89], *strong* [89], *hero* [175], *holiday* [237], *democracy* [237], *patriotism/patriots* [241], [245], and *(state) aid* [292]. In contrast, actions of those who were critical of the activities/attitudes of the authorities, or otherwise perceived by them as hostile (this is especially true of witnesses testifying

38 Source: <https://wiadomosci.tvp.pl/28372803/wigilijny-paszтет>.

39 Laskowska (1992, p. 14–19) lists eleven criteria of valuation: pragmatic, economic, hedonistic, vital, social, affective, perfectionistic, (a)esthetic, cognitive, ethical, and sacral.

before the Commissions of Inquiry for the Amber Gold scandal and the Warsaw reprivatization, who had not been convicted with a final judgment), were exclusively negative: *shocking* [106], [127], [267], [284], *scandalous* [27], *provocation* [143], [162], [164], [180], *coup* [44], [194], *scolding* [83], *blackmail* [85], *pressure* [86], *embarrassing* [162], *aggression* [170], *manipulated* [171], *destabilization* (of the state) [173], *disintegration* [175], *savagery* (of customs) [197], *failure* [204], *quarrel* [209], *surrender* [218], *pride* [231], *lie* [246], *slander* [244], [246], *profanation* [261], *translation* [265], *wild* (reprivatization) [267], [280], *insolence* [274], *thieving* [278], [287], *meanness* [284], *theft/stolen/pilfered* [288], [289], [290], *escalate* [302]. The third component of this mechanism was exploitation of negatively marked stylistic phrases as means of unjustified generalization of the evaluation (presumably created solely for this purpose), which is the basic (even “first”) eristic method (Schopenhauer 1984, pp. 48–50, Kochan 2005, pp. 68–72). There are three such phrases in the corpus: *total opposition* [46], [91], *radical opposition* [190], [196], [208], [214], and *the judicial caste/extraordinary caste* [36], [39], [45]. The pragmatic function of each of these is to introduce content into communication with the viewers that is maximally generalized and marked negatively: ‘Everything that the opposition does is against the authorities’ (*total*); ‘Every action of the opposition is dangerous’ (*radical*); ‘All judges consider themselves as members of a particularly privileged professional group’ (*caste*). Although these phrases occurred in the analyzed material only several times, they were used multiple times in the journalistic materials produced by Telewizja Polska S.A. during the period in question. This rules out the possibility of classifying them as constructions created ad hoc.

Besides the social and ethical aspects, other systemically expressed linguistic values were represented in the corpus only incidentally. Emotional evaluation can be seen, for example, in strip [57], in which the statement of the leader of the ruling political party is quoted: *Idziemy razem do przodu* [Together we go forward], which can be read as an expression of his optimism about the direction he has taken in terms of reforming the judiciary, which is confirmed by the accompanying footage. This type of evaluation can also be found in strip [249]: Poland bets on Saryusz-Wolski. Probably not the whole of “Poland” (i.e. all its citizens) bet on him – the name *Poland* is used here metonymically in the meaning of ‘the Polish government.’ By contrast, the cognitive criterion of evaluation is most clearly exposed in strips [137]: *Rząd Tuska ukrył prawdę o Amber Gold* [The Tusk government

concealed the truth about Amber Gold]; [163] *Blżej prawdy o Smoleńsku* [Closer to the truth about Smolensk]; and [246] *Szokujące kłamstwa szkalujące Polskę* [Shocking lies defaming Poland]. However, with regard to the material under study, the overall principle is that evaluation primarily concerns interpersonal relationships in the social sense, and the sender assumes the right to define their character at the very outset.

Such an image of the aspects of systemic evaluation predominant in the texts does not raise any doubts, as it is the political system that is the main regulator of social life; however, the directions of distribution of system-related evaluation terms adopted in the editorial office of *Wiadomości* described above may provide cause for reflection. None of the collected strips contained linguistic elements that negatively assessed the activity of the authorities directly (i.e. at the level of system-related meanings of the lexemes used in the strips). It is also noticeable that, with the use of systemic evaluation terms, the broadcaster profiled the image of each subject (event or process) featured in the segments shown after each strip. The following is a brief discussion of the image of each highlighted topic, focusing on the systemic means of evaluation used in each case.

Topic 1, “the Judicial Laws,” described primarily as the introduction of the *reform* (eleven uses), and the conflict that accompanied these activities was presented as a search for a *compromise* (four uses), which the opposition and the judicial community are *rejecting*. However, those who opposed the introduction of this regulation and the actions they took were referred to almost without exception using pejorative phrases: *scandalous* (decisions of judges) [27]; *coup* [44], [194]; *caste* (see above); *clumsy defense* [38]; [The Supreme Court] *has broken the law* [58], etc.

Topic 2, “The European Union on the Rule of Law,” also presented as a conflict between institutions of the European Union and the Polish government. All actions of the entities representing the EU or advocating on the same side of the dispute were assessed exclusively negatively, and variously referred to as *control* [65]; *pressure (on the Polish government)* [82]; *scolding* [83]; *blackmail (of Poland)* [85]; *support for putting pressure (on Poland)* [86]. Activities on this side were explicitly described as directed *against* Poland [87], [90], the European Union and its representatives were ridiculed, and their legal instruments were likened to a *kapiszon* [a non-starter/storm in a teacup] [92], while the resulting actions of EU officials their “mission” [84] (in ironic quotes) or *double standards* [93].

Topic 3, “Amber Gold,” also profiled as a polarized issue: on the “guilty” side were the criminals of Amber Gold, some of its employees,

as well as officers and institutions of the Polish state between 2009 (when Amber Gold was established) and 2015 (when the government changed). On the “honest” side were the victims of the scandal and representatives of the current political authorities in Poland. While the mere naming of the crime under investigation by the Commission of Inquiry a *scandal* gives no cause for doubt and may be regarded as primarily informative, the negative terms used for describing the statements, actions, and attitudes of the officers and institutions of the state exceed the limits of informativity, and fall within the category of (sometimes very vocal) editorial assessment of the facts, which makes it possible to qualify some of the strips as a priori comments on the facts rather than announcements of upcoming information or commentary on these facts. Here we clearly see the tendency, already described in relation to headlines of Internet news (e.g. Zimny 2013), for the headline to “replace” the content of the material it accompanies. In other words, the point is to give a recipient who knows nothing of the event a specific interpretative clue about the sender’s main intentions even before the material is viewed. Systemically negative terms used when referring to the “guilty” entities included the following terms: a) in relation to the prosecutor’s office – *embarrassment* [101], [103]; *amnesia* [125], [132]; *ineptitude* (as an option to choose in a rhetorical question) [135]; *sabotage* (as an option to choose in a rhetorical question) [135]; b) referring to witness statements – *shocking* [106], [127]; c) in relation to the police – *failed operation* [133]; d) concerning the state – *“failed”* [108], *“did not work as it should”* [111]; *the Tusk government concealed the truth about Amber Gold* [137]; e) referring to the Civic Platform – *concealed the actions of Amber Gold* [124]; f) an unidentified collective entity was referred to as the *Tri-City racket* [131] or *the Gdansk racket* [136].

Topic 4, “Abortion”, was present only in eight strips, which contained five systemic value-conveying terms, three of which referred to the social protests against the project to tighten up the abortion law, which was being tabled in the Sejm. The sender assessed these protests unequivocally negatively, referring to them variously as *grotesque* [143], *a provocation* [143] and including them among as actions that are *anti-government* [145].

Topic 5: In the corpus, only eleven systemic value-carrying terms referred to “Smolensk,” several of these may be considered justifiable, i.e. resulting from the need to provide information, including information on varying assessments of the event expressed by certain groups of citizens. Therefore, we consider the terms *right (to be remembered* [153]),



*the Smolensk catastrophe* [157], *reliable (information)* [159] or *truth (about Smolensk)* [163]) as axiologically neutral. The remaining valuing lexemes noted in the material referred mainly to the counter-picketing against the Smolensk demonstrations held every month or blocks of the so-called marches for memory. The broadcaster called these acts an *embarrassing provocation* [162], pointed to the accompanying *aggression* [170], and even obfuscated the sense of the information being provided by using the negatively phrased metaphor *under the pillory* [169] (the full phrasing of the strip: *Marsz pamięci pod przęgierzem polityków* [March for Memory under the pillory of politicians]). Other systemic value-adding terms used by the broadcaster in addressing this subject served to depreciate the opposition: (*The opposition encourages*) *provocations* [164], (*Tusk wants to be*) *above the law* [165], and *doctored documents (in the Miller commission)* [171]).

In reporting on topic 6, “The Parliamentary Crisis,” the authors focused almost exclusively on depreciating the actions of the opposition (about 50% of the collected texts contained systemically negative words, most of which referred to the protest undertaken by the opposition, and only a few to the concurrently occurring civil protests in front of the Sejm building). In keeping with Laskowska’s approach mentioned above, the negative valuations present in these strips fall primarily within the social and ethical categories: *destabilization (of the state)* [173], [191], *a (street) brawl* [175], *(the last fight) of the Communist spooks* [176], *(Komorowski) condones the violence* [179], *(non)democratic* [178], *provocation* [180], *aggression* [185], *coup* [44], [194], *radical(s)/radical* [201], [210], [214], *occupying forces* [209], *block (compromise)* [211], *surrender* [219]. The ethical terms include *the (limits) of between being decent and being ridiculous* [195], *feralization of customs* [197], *compromise* [198], *an important visit* [200] (ironic use), *failure* [204], *brawl* [220].

Topic 7, “The Forests,” were referred to in only five strips in our corpus, four of which concerned political issues (disputes with the opposition and the European Union). In each of them, the author used some kind of systemically negative term to describe the actions of both these entities: [222] *(Trees in) a political game*; [223] *(An EU judge) against (Poland)*; [224] *(EU) fines*; [226] *Double standards (of the European Commission)*.

Topic 8, “Ustawa dezubekizacyjna,” [A law taking away the pension privileges of former functionaries of the communist regime] was also addressed in only five strips. At the level of systemic value-bearing terms, in this small sample we may observe only a dichotomization of valuations

between the former communist SB functionaries (called *esbek* in Polish)<sup>40</sup> protesting against the above-mentioned Act [228], [231], to whom *pride* is attributed [231], and the victims of communist repressions People's Republic of Poland, to whom *humility* is attributed in turn [232].

For topic 9, "Independence Day", the key words were *patriot* and *patriotism* [238], [239], [241], [244], used with reference to the attitude arbitrarily attributed by the broadcaster to the participants of the "Independence Day March." In contrast, the actions of the circles critical of this initiative (some Polish and foreign media, politicians of the opposition, and politicians of the European Union) are described as *slandering (patriots* [244] or *Poland* [246]), *showing contempt (for Poles* [244]) and *tolerance of neo-Nazis* [247].

Topic 10, "Tusk," included only a few systemic evaluative terms, three of which can be considered as expressing author-dependent positive or negative valuations: *Strong defense (of Polish interests)* [257], *(Poland) exposed (the true EU standards of democracy)* [254], *Happiness with [Donald] Tusk as a pretext for desecration* [261]. Despite the paucity of data, we may conclude that also for this subject an evaluative opposition was imposed, with Poland and the Polish government (assessed positively) *against* the European Union and the opposition (assessed negatively).

The strips announcing reports of events related to topic 11, "Reprivatization," contained only systemically negative terms. The following entities were subject to this negative evaluation: the political opposition, the local government of Warsaw, the owners of the properties purchased or persons acting on their behalf. Persons affected by the actions of the above entities were referred to as *victims*, either of *crooks* [272], or the so-called 'townhouse cleaners' [279], [283], and their situation – *dramatic* [279], [283]. Sometimes, the entities placed on the "guilty" side were taken collectively and called the *(local-government) racket* [263] or *fraudsters* [272]. The authors of the strips show a particular tendency here to use evaluative stylistic phrasemes. In addition to the *local-government racket* mentioned above, the segment also contained such well-entrenched constructions as the one described above: *to put oneself above the law* [275], [286], *wild reprivatization* [267], [280], *thieving reprivatization* [277], [278], *a thieving octopus* [287] and *townhouse cleaners* [274], [279], [282], [283], who are also attributed (one time) with *insolence* and *arrogance* [274], as well as *meanness*

40 The formulation used by the journalist in the segment: <https://wiadomosci.tvp.pl/30181960/pycha-sbkow>.



[284], where this ethical qualification referred to *townhouse owners*, who cannot be identified with the *cleaners*, although this is what the broadcaster seems to suggest to the viewers. Such frequent use of stylistic phrasemes may indicate the broadcaster's belief, shared by many members of society, that the process of returning Warsaw properties to the heirs of the former owners was criminal in nature, which, from a linguistic point of view, may be seen as putting evaluation before presentation of facts. The evaluative content is then not up for discussion, as it is expressed through ready-made linguistic "prefabricated" formulas. Another aspect of this phenomenon may also be the broadcaster's intent to persuade in order to establish in the minds of the viewers the same evaluative judgments. This intent is also supported by the use of vocabulary concerning the crime of seizing someone's property – *thieving* (adj.) (see the examples above) and: *stolen (townhouse)* [288], *theft (of a townhouse)* [289], *a stolen (townhouse)* [290].

Topic 12, "500+", is the only one of the thirteen that was covered in *Wiadomości TVP 1* exclusively as a series of positive events. In the strips concerning this issue, the systemic value-carrying word is *aid (from the state, for families)* was used only once [292]. In light of the above theoretical assumptions, the use of this term constituted information, rather than commentary.

The use of systemic evaluative words relating to topic 13, "Protests of Resident Physicians," illustrated the chronology of this conflict, and even constructed a certain narrative. The first strips emphasized the fact that young physicians *demanded* [295], [296], [297] salary increases, and then it was emphasized that they *rejected the compromise* [298] because the offered increases were *too small* [299], [300], while in [299] and [300] they were already called *residents* rather than *young physicians* (emphasis on their function within the system rather than their age). Subsequent strips [301] and [302] already used the words *novice physicians* (emphasis on inexperience), and their actions after *rejecting the compromise* were again called *making demands* [301], but this time of *billions of zlotys* [301], and then *escalating* [302] the protest. In strip [303], the viewers were informed about the *record high* funds allocated for health care, and in strip [304], an appeal was made for the good of patients who *wanted the protest to end*. Strip [305] brought the information that the *protesting doctors sent patients away* (emphasizing conduct contrary to professional ethics), and strip [306] ending the series informed of *a chance for an agreement*.



## Chapter 4:

# An analysis of sentential means of valuation

In the corpus of 306 information strips, the valuations that we called sentential appeared in at least 143 texts, (46.7%). This is similar to the number of systemic valuations (approx. 45%), which confirms the correctness of the adopted research procedure. Sentential evaluative elements included names of persons, events, processes and states which were subject to systemic valuation – the similar size of both types of indicators shows their causal correlation. Observation of the group of names distinguished in this way (names which perform secondary evaluation) allows us to indicate both the directions of evaluation and the sender's preferences as to the selection of the designators being evaluated.

Before we present the results of the analysis (cf. Table 2 below), some explanation is needed. In analytical practice, it is not always possible to strictly differentiate between the valuations introduced into the examined messages through sentential means from those that come from the context (and especially those that are discursive values built into the message a priori). The name *Amber Gold*, for instance, is each time a carrier of negative valuations, while the name *Poland* – holds a positive value, which results in a situation where system-neutral or axiologically ambivalent words are sometimes marked in sentences, e.g. in strip [128] *ABW kontaktowała się z szefem Amber Gold* [Internal Security Agency contacted the head of Amber Gold] the systemically verb *to contact* receives a negative value sign due to the discursive rating of the name *Amber Gold*. The same is true of the collocation *against Poland* (occurring several times) – anyone who is *against Poland* cannot be rated positively.

On the other hand, the potential systemic significance of the verbs *to fight (the new law)* [15] or *take away (an apartment)* [48] is only realized under the assumption that the discursive values are respected (here: ‘*the new law* is something good’, ‘it is something bad to *take away* someone’s apartment’). The sentential evaluations may also be influenced by non-lexical means of expressing valuation, possible at the level of systemic organization of the language, e.g. strip [188] used the comparative construction *like in kindergarten*, which acquires evaluative power (negative) only through the usage (rather than through discourse). Therefore, in the following presentation of the results, we decided to include among the means of sentence evaluation also those instances in which it was difficult to ascertain whether their axiological potential was motivated by the systemic semantics of adjacent expressions or rather by the tradition of their use.

Tables 2, 3 and 4 contain the results of the analysis conducted using the described method. They include 103 contexts of the occurrence of names of entities whose activities were referred to in 2016–2017 in the strips shown in *Wiadomości TVP 1*.

Based on the data in the tables above, several conclusions can be drawn from this study:

1. Negativity prevails in the picture of the communicated reality constructed by this group of measures – positive valuations are rare and concern only entities supporting the authorities. There is a very large quantitative disproportionality between the opinions of those whose actions are assessed negatively (opponents of the authorities) and those of those whose actions are assessed positively (supporters of the authorities).
2. The collected material does not contain any negative evaluation terms referring to political parties other than the Civic Platform which are represented in parliament.
3. The distribution of evaluative terms in this area of the corpus (the absolute majority of negative valuations referring to opponents of the authorities) indicates the broadcaster’s preference to talk about threats to those currently in power, rather than to affirm their actions as the governing authority.
4. Linguistic naming and assessment of political entities in order to inform the public of their activities tends to be based only on the dichotomy into “what is good (right)” and “bad (wrong).”
5. The principle governing the selection of terms describing or naming political reality seems – with reference to this group of collected

names – to be the model of political communication, which Kłosińska (2012) describes as “ethical discourse.” This means that the phrasing is dominated by spoiling for a conflict, stigmatizing the opponent, shutting oneself off to the opponent’s reasoning and argumentation (for more, see Kłosińska 2012, pp. 31–32).

Table 2: Names of political, social and economic entities as sentence-based means of valuation (grouped by subject)

Names of entities expressing sentential means of valuation	Systemic means determining the sentential valuation (C = contextually)	Type of valuation	Number of strips	Topic
opozycja [opposition]	<i>straszy</i> [threatening]	–	[3]	Judicial laws
	<i>na ulicy</i> [on the street] C	–	[4]	
	<i>odrzuci kompromis</i> [reject the compromise]	–	[9]	
	<i>łączy (NATO z Trybunałem)</i> [links (NATO with the tribunal)] C	–	[12]	
	<i>znów (o Trybunale)</i> [elision with the verb <i>mówić</i> , to speak (of the tribunal)] C	–	[14]	
	<i>próbuję zablokować reformę</i> [tries to block reform]	–	[35]	
	<i>więcej [ją] dzieli</i> [more divides (it)] C	–	[37]	
	<i>totalny chaos</i> [jej] [(its) total chaos]	–	[46]	
	<i>zapowiada bitwy</i> [predicts battles]	–	[50]	
	<i>gra</i> [plays] ‘seeks to achieve their own aims by competing with someone’	–	[69]	EU on the rule of law
<i>przeciwko (Polsce)</i> [against (Poland)] C	–	[90]		
<i>chce ukarać (Polskę)</i> [wants to punish (Poland)] C	–	[91]		

Names of entities expressing sentential means of valuation	Systemic means determining the sentential valuation (C = contextually)	Type of valuation	Number of strips	Topic
	<i>gra</i> [plays] 'seeks to achieve their own aims by competing with someone'	–	[141]	Abortion
	<i>zachęca do prowokacji</i> [encourages provocations]	–	[164]	Smolensk
	<i>w obronie esbeckich emerytur</i> [defends pensions of communist secret agents]	–	[186]	Parliamentary crisis
	<i>radykałna</i> [radical]	–	[190] [196] [208] [214]	
	<i>odrzuca (apele Kościola)</i> [rejects (Church appeals)] C	–	[193]	
	<i>grozi</i> [threatens]	–	[208]	
	<i>boi się (komisji weryfikacyjnej)</i> [is afraid (of the commission of inquiry)] C	–	[264]	Reprivatization
<i>opozycyjni</i> [opposition – adj.]	<i>radykałowie</i> [radicals]	–	[245]	Independence Day
<i>obóz</i> ('opozycja') [camp ('opposition')]	<i>klótnia</i> [w nim] [squabble (in it)] <i>okupanci</i> [occupiers]	–	[209]	Parliamentary crisis
<i>Platforma Obywatelska</i> [Civic Platform]	<i>prowokacja</i> [provocation]	–	[180]	

Names of entities expressing sentential means of valuation	Systemic means determining the sentential valuation (C = contextually)	Type of valuation	Number of strips	Topic
Platforma [Platform]	<i>przeciwko (Polsce)</i> [against (Poland)] C	–	[87]	EU on the rule of law
	<i>desperacki atak</i> [desperate attack] <i>skompromitowana</i> [compromised]	–	[88]	
	<i>kryła działania (Amber Gold)</i> [papered over the activities (of Amber Gold)]	–	[124]	Amber Gold
	<i>kapitulacja</i> [capitulation]	–	[218]	Parliamentary crisis
	<i>szykuje awanturę</i> [spoiling for a fight]	–	[220]	
	<i>złodziejska reprivatyzacja obciąża [ja]</i> [thieving reprivatization implicates (it)]	–	[278]	Reprivatization
PO	<i>partia zewnętrzna</i> [external party] C	–	[259]	Tusk
	<i>[(je] wiceszefowa) stawia się ponad prawem</i> [[its] deputy party chair) puts herself above the law]	–	[286]	Reprivatization
<i> rząd Tuska</i> [the Tusk government]	<i>ukrył prawdę</i> [concealed the truth]	–	[137]	Amber Gold
<i>komisja Millera</i> [the Miller commission]	<i>zmanipulowane (dokumenty)</i> [manipulated (documents)]	–	[171]	Smolensk
Tusk	<i>chce być ponad prawem</i> [wants to be above the law]	–	[165]	
	<i>(pretekst do) profanacji</i> [(a pretext for) desecration]	–	[261]	Tusk

Names of entities expressing sentential means of valuation	Systemic means determining the sentential valuation (C = contextually)	Type of valuation	Number of strips	Topic
<i>wiceszefowa PO</i> [Civic Platform deputy party chair]	<i>stawia się ponad prawem</i> [puts herself above the law]	–	[286]	Reprivatization
<i>Gronkiewicz-Waltz</i>	<i>stawia się ponad prawem</i> [puts herself above the law]	–	[275]	
<i>prezydent Warszawy</i> [mayor of Warsaw]	<i>kolejny (świadek) obciąża [ją]</i> [yet another (witness) lays the blame (on her)] C	–	[268]	
<i>stoleczny ratusz</i> [capital City Hall]	<i>złodziejska ośmiornica</i> [thieving octopus]	–	[287]	
<i>Komorowski</i>	<i>pochwala przemoc</i> [praises violence]	–	[179]	Parliamentary crisis
<i>Sikorski</i>	<i>wspiera naciski (na Polskę)</i> [supports pressure (on Poland)]	–	[86]	EU on the rule of law
<i>Schetyna</i>	<i>wybiera drogę radykała</i> [chooses the radical path]	–	[210]	Parliamentary crisis
	<i>blokuje kompromis</i> [blocks compromise]	–	[211]	
<i>Nitras</i>	<i>nagrywa (gdy Sejm pracuje)</i> [is recording (while Parliament is working)] C	–	[221]	
<i>Arabski (name)</i>	<i>oskarżony</i> [accused]	–	[154]	Smolensk
	<i>proces</i> [trial]	–	[161]	
<i>Petru</i>	<i>blokuje kompromis</i> [blocks compromise]	–	[211]	Parliamentary crisis
<i>Sejm</i> [Parliament]	<i>pracuje (gdy poseł Nitras nagrywa)</i> [is working (while MP Nitras is recording)] C	+	[221]	
	<i>(Grupy „GP”) w obronie</i> [('Gazeta Polska') groups in defense]	+	[216]	
	<i>jak w przedszkolu</i> [like in a kindergarten] C	–	[188]	



Names of entities expressing sentential means of valuation	Systemic means determining the sentential valuation (C = contextually)	Type of valuation	Number of strips	Topic
<i>Sejmowy</i> [parliamentary]	<i>gry</i> [plays] ‘seeks to achieve their own aims by competing with someone’	–	[11]	Judicial laws
	<i>zdziczenie obyczajów</i> [brutalization of social norms]	–	[197]	Parliamentary crisis
<i>Unia Europejska</i> [European Union]	<i>(Polska chce)</i> [jej] <i>reformy</i> [(Poland wants) reforms (of it)]	–	[256]	Tusk
<i>unijny</i> [EU – adj.]	<i>biurokraci</i> [bureaucrats]	–	[93]	EU on the rule of law
	<i>podwójne standardy</i> [double standards]	–	[223]	Forests
	<i>(sędzia) przeciwko (Polsce)</i> [(judge) against (Poland)]	–	[224]	Tusk
	<i>kary</i> [penalties] C	–	[254]	Tusk
<i>Bruksela</i> [Brussels]	<i>połajanki</i> [scolding]	–	[83]	EU on the rule of law
	<i>przeciwko (Polsce)</i> [against (Poland)] C	–	[87] [90]	
<i>brukselski</i> [Brussels – adj.]	<i>ultimatum</i> [ultimatum]	–	[76]	
<i>Komisja Europejska</i> [European Commission]	<i>podwójne standardy</i> [double standards]	–	[226]	Forests
<i>europskie elity</i> [European élites]	<i>tolerują neonazistów</i> [tolerate neo-Nazis]	–	[247]	Independence Day
<i>Timmermans</i>	„ <i>misja</i> ” [‘mission’]	–	[84]	EU on the rule of law
	<i>szantażuje</i> [blackmails]	–	[85]	
<i>Saryusz-Wolski</i>	<i>polskim (kandydatem)</i> [the Polish (candidate)]	+	[248]	Tusk
	<i>(Polska) stawia na</i> [niego] [(Poland) bets on (him)]	+	[249]	
	<i>polowanie na</i> [niego] [the hunt for (him)]	+	[251]	

Names of entities expressing sentential means of valuation	Systemic means determining the sentential valuation (C = contextually)	Type of valuation	Number of strips	Topic
<i>Niemcy</i> [Germany]	(i) <i>totalna opozycja</i> [(and) total opposition] <i>chcą ukarać (Polskę)</i> [wants to punish (Poland)]	–	[91]	EU on the rule of law
<i>Berlin</i>	<i>przeciwko (Polsce)</i> [against (Poland)]	–	[90]	
<i>niemiecka telewizja publiczna</i> [German public TV]	<i>manipuluje</i> [uses manipulation]	–	[202]	Parliamentary crisis
<i>sędziowie</i> [judges]	<i>równiejsi (wobec prawa)</i> [more equal (before the law)] C	–	[18]	Judicial laws
	<i>skandaliczne decyzje</i> [outrageous rulings]	–	[27]	
	<i>strajkują (na zebraniach)</i> [strike (at meetings)]	–	[28]	
	<i>na wiecach opozycji</i> [at opposition rallies] C	–	[55]	
<i>sędziowska</i> [judiciary – adj.]	<i>kasta</i> [caste]	–	[36]	
			[39]	
<i>sądownictwo</i> [judiciary – n.]		–	[25]	
			[26]	
			[31]	
			[32]	
			[33]	
		–	[54]	
	<i>(Sejm) zreformuje</i> [(Parliament) reforms]	–	[26]	
<i>Trybunał</i> [Tribunal]	<i>walczy (z nową ustawą)</i> [is fighting (the new act)] C	–	[15]	
<i>Sąd Najwyższy</i> [Supreme Court]	<i>złamał prawo</i> [broke the law]	–	[58]	
<i>sąd</i> [court]	<i>zabiera (mieszkanie)</i> [takes away (an apartment)] C	–	[48]	
<i>prawnicy</i> [lawyers]	<i>nie znają prawa</i> [do not know the law]	–	[23]	

Names of entities expressing sentential means of valuation	Systemic means determining the sentential valuation (C = contextually)	Type of valuation	Number of strips	Topic
<i>komisja</i> (ds. Amber Gold) [(Amber Gold) commission]	<i>na tropie</i> [on the trail]	+	[131]	Amber Gold
<i>prokuratura</i> [prosecutor's office]	<i>kompromitacja</i> [embarrassment]	-	[103]	
<i>gdańska prokuratura</i> [Gdansk prosecutor's office]	<i>kompromitacja</i> [embarrassment]	-	[101]	
<i>OLT Express</i>	<i>nie płaciło</i> [did not pay]	-	[121]	
<i>Leśnicy</i> [foresters]	<i>(chcą) ratować</i> [(want) to save]	+	[225]	Forests
<i>kamienicznicy</i> [townhouse owners]	<i>podłość</i> [meanness]	-	[284]	Reprivatization
<i>młodzi lekarze</i> [young doctors]	<i>żądadją (podwyżek)</i> [demand (salary increases)] C	-	[295] [296] [297]	Protests of Resident Physicians
	<i>odrzućili kompromis</i> [rejected compromise]	-	[298]	
<i>rezydenci</i> [residents ('physicians without a specialty')]	<i>za mało</i> [too little]	-	[299] [300]	
<i>początkujący lekarze</i> [beginner doctors]	<i>żądadją miliardów</i> [demand billions]	-	[301]	
	<i>eskalują protest</i> [escalate the protest]	-	[302]	
<i>lekarze</i> [doctors]	<i>(pacjenci chcą zakończenia) [ich] protestu</i> [(patients want an end to) [their] protest] C	-	[304]	
	<i>protestujący</i> [protesting] <i>odprawili pacjentów</i> [dismissed patients]	-	[303]	

Names of entities expressing sentential means of valuation	Systemic means determining the sentential valuation (C = contextually)	Type of valuation	Number of strips	Topic
<i>grupy „GP”</i> („Gazety Polskiej”) [(‘Gazeta Polska’) groups]	<i>w obronie</i> [in defense] C	+	[216]	Parliamentary crisis
<i>państwo</i> [the state]	<i>zawiodło</i> [has failed]	–	[108]	Amber Gold
	<i>nie działało jak trzeba</i> [did not work as it should have]	–	[111]	
	<i>pomoc</i> [help]	+	[292]	500+
<i>ojcowie</i> [fathers ‘creators’]	<i>niepodległość</i> [independence]	+	[233] [242]	Independence Day
<i>PiS</i> [Law and Justice]	<i>wyciąga rękę</i> [extends its hand]	+	[187]	Parliamentary crisis
<i>rząd</i> [the government]	<i>presja</i> [na niego] [pressure (on it)]	–	[82]	EU on the rule of law
	<i>przeciw</i> [niemu] [against (it)]	+	[145]	Abortion
	<i>(Grupy „GP”) w [jego] obronie</i> [(‘Gazeta Polska’ groups) in [its] defense]	+	[216]	Parliamentary crisis
<i>politycy</i> [politicians]	<i>pod pręgierzem</i> [under the pillory] C	–	[169]	Smolensk

Table 3: Names of political, social and economic entities as sentence-based means of valuation (grouped by topic)

Topic	Names of entities expressing sentential means of valuation	Systemic means determining the sentential valuation (C = contextually)	Direction of valuation	Number of strips
500+	<i>państwo</i> [the state]	<i>pomoc</i> [help]	+	[292]
Abortion	<i>opozycja</i> [opposition]	<i>gra</i> [plays] 'seeks to achieve their own aims by competing with someone'	-	[141]
	<i>rząd</i> [the government]	<i>przeciw</i> [niemu] [against (it)]	+	[145]
Amber Gold	<i>Platforma</i>	<i>kryła działania</i> ( <i>Amber Gold</i> ) [papered over the activities (of Amber Gold)]	-	[124]
	<i>rząd Tuska</i> [the Tusk government]	<i>ukrył prawdę</i> [concealed the truth]	-	[137]
	<i>komisja</i> (ds. Amber Gold) [(Amber Gold) commission]	<i>na tropie</i> [on the trail]	+	[131]
	<i>prokuratura</i> [prosecutor's office]	<i>kompromitacja</i> [embarrassment]	-	[103]
	<i>gdańska prokuratura</i> [Gdansk prosecutor's office]	<i>kompromitacja</i> [embarrassment]	-	[101]
	<i>OLT Express</i>	<i>nie płaciło</i> [did not pay]	-	[121]
	<i>państwo</i> [the state]	<i>zawiodło</i> [has failed]	-	[108]
		<i>nie działało jak trzeba</i> [did not work as it should have]	-	[111]
Independence Day	<i>opozycyjni</i> [opposition – adj.]	<i>radykalowie</i> [radicals]	-	[245]
	<i>europejskie elity</i> [European élites]	<i>tolerują neonazistów</i> [tolerate neo-Nazis]	-	[247]
	<i>ojcowie</i> 'twórcy' [fathers 'creators']	<i>niepodległość</i> [independence]	+	[233] [242]

Topic	Names of entities expressing sentential means of valuation	Systemic means determining the sentential valuation (C = contextually)	Direction of valuation	Number of strips
Parliamentary crisis	<i>opozycja</i> [opposition]	<i>w obronie esbeckich emerytur</i> [defends pensions of communist secret agents]	–	[186]
		<i>radykalna</i> [radical]	–	[190] [196] [208] [214]
		<i>odrzuca (apele Kościoła)</i> [rejects (Church appeals)] C	–	[193]
		<i>grozi</i> [threatens]	–	[208]
	<i>obóz</i> [camp] ('opposition')	<i>klótnia [w nim]</i> [squabble (in it)] <i>okupanci</i> [occupiers]	–	[209]
	<i>Platforma Obywatelska</i> [Civic Platform]	<i>prowokacja</i> [provocation]	–	[180]
	<i>Platforma</i> [Platform]	<i>kapitulacja</i> [capitulation]	–	[218]
		<i>szykuje awanturę</i> [spoiling for a fight]	–	[220]
	<i>Komorowski</i>	<i>pochwala przemoc</i> [praises violence]	–	[179]
	<i>Schetyna</i>	<i>wybiera drogę radykała</i> [chooses the radical path]	–	[210]
		<i>blokuje kompromis</i> [blocks compromise]	–	[211]
	<i>Nitras</i>	<i>nagrywa (gdy Sejm pracuje)</i> [is recording (while Parliament is working)] C	–	[221]
	<i>Petru</i>	<i>blokuje kompromis</i> [blocks compromise]	–	[211]
	<i>Sejm</i> [Parliament]	<i>pracuje</i> [is working (while MP Nitras is recording)] C	+	[221]
		<i>(Grupy „GP”) w [jego] obronie</i> [(‘Gazeta Polska’) groups in defense]	+	[216]
<i>jak w przedszkolu</i> [like in a kindergarten] C		–	[188]	

Topic	Names of entities expressing sentential means of valuation	Systemic means determining the sentential valuation (C = contextually)	Direction of valuation	Number of strips
	<i>sejmowy</i> [parliamentary]	<i>zdziczenie obyczajów</i> [brutalization of social norms]	–	[197]
	<i>niemiecka telewizja publiczna</i> [German public TV]	<i>manipuluje</i> [uses manipulation]	–	[202]
	<i>grupy „GP”</i> („Gazety Polskiej”) [(‘Gazeta Polska’) groups]	<i>w obronie</i> [in defense] C	+	[216]
	<i>PiS</i> [Law and Justice]	<i>wyciąga rękę</i> [extends its hand]	+	[187]
	<i>rząd</i> [the government]	<i>(Grupy „GP”) w obronie</i> [(‘Gazeta Polska’) groups in defense]	+	[216]
Forests	<i>unijny</i> [EU – adj.]	<i>(sędzia) przeciwko (Polsce)</i> [(judge) against (Poland)]	–	[223]
		<i>kary</i> [penalties] C	–	[224]
	<i>Komisja Europejska</i> [European Commission]	<i>podwójne standardy</i> [double standards]	–	[226]
	<i>leśnicy</i> [foresters]	<i>(chcą) ratować</i> [(want) to save]	+	[225]
Protests of Resident Physicians	<i>młodzi lekarze</i> [young doctors]	<i>żądadą (podwyżek)</i> [demand (salary increases)] C	–	[295] [296] [297]
		<i>odrzućili kompromis</i> [rejected compromise]	–	[298]
	<i>rezydenci</i> (‘lekarze bez specjalizacji’) [residents (‘physicians without a specialty’)]	<i>za mało</i> [too little]	–	[299] [300]
		<i>początkujący lekarze</i> [beginner doctors]	<i>żądadą miliardów</i> [demand billions]	–
		<i>eskalują protest</i> [escalate the protest]	–	[302]

Topic	Names of entities expressing sentential means of valuation	Systemic means determining the sentential valuation (C = contextually)	Direction of valuation	Number of strips
	<i>lekarze</i> [doctors]	<i>(pacjenci chcą zakończenia)</i> [ich] <i>protestu</i> [(patients want an end to) [their] protest] C	–	[304]
		<i>protestujący</i> [protesting] <i>odprawili pacjentów</i> [dismissed patients]	–	[303]
Reprivatization	<i>opozycja</i> [opposition]	<i>boi się (komisji weryfikacyjnej)</i> [is afraid of the commission of inquiry] C	–	[264]
	<i>Platforma</i> [Platform]	<i>złodziejska reprivatyzacja obciąża</i> [ją] [thieving reprivatization implicates (it)]	–	[278]
	PO	[je] ( <i>wiceszefowa</i> ) <i>stawia się ponad prawem</i> [(its] deputy party chair) puts herself above the law]	–	[286]
	<i>wiceszefowa PO</i> [Civic Platform deputy party chair]	<i>stawia się ponad prawem</i> [puts herself above the law]	–	[286]
	<i>Gronkiewicz-Waltz</i>	<i>stawia się ponad prawem</i> [puts herself above the law]	–	[275]
	<i>prezydent Warszawy</i> [mayor of Warsaw]	<i>kolejny (świadek) obciąża</i> [ją] [yet another (witness) lays the blame (on her)] C	–	[268]
	<i>stoleczny ratusz</i> [capital City Hall]	<i>złodziejska ośmiornica</i> [thieving octopus]	–	[287]
	<i>kamienicznicy</i> [townhouse owners]	<i>podłość</i> [meanness]	–	[284]



Topic	Names of entities expressing sentential means of valuation	Systemic means determining the sentential valuation (C = contextually)	Direction of valuation	Number of strips
Smolensk	<i>opozycja</i> [opposition]	<i>zachęca do prowokacji</i> [encourages provocations]	–	[164]
	<i>komisja Millera</i> [the Miller commission]	<i>zmanipulowane (dokumenty)</i> [manipulated (documents)]	–	[171]
	<i>Tusk</i>	<i>chce być ponad prawem</i> [wants to be above the law]	–	[165]
	<i>Arabski</i> (name)	<i>oskarżony</i> [accused]	–	[154]
		<i>proces</i> [trial]	–	[161]
<i>politycy</i> [politicians]	<i>pod przęgierzem</i> [under the pillory] C	–	[169]	
EU on the rule of law	<i>opozycja</i> [opposition]	<i>gra</i> [plays] ‘seeks to achieve their own aims by competing with someone’	–	[69]
		<i>przeciwko (Polsce)</i> [against (Poland)] C	–	[90]
		<i>chce ukarać (Polskę)</i> [wants to punish (Poland)] C	–	[91]
	<i>Platforma</i> [Platform]	<i>przeciwko (Polsce)</i> [against (Poland)] C	–	[87]
		<i>desperacki atak</i> [desperate attack] <i>skompromitowana</i> [compromised]	–	[88]
	<i>Sikorski</i>	<i>wspiera naciski (na Polskę)</i> [supports pressure (on Poland)]	–	[86]
	<i>unijny</i> [EU – adj.]	<i>biurokraci</i> [bureaucrats] <i>podwójne standardy</i> [double standards]	–	[93]
	<i>Bruksela</i> [Brussels]	<i>połajanki</i> [scolding]	–	[83]
		<i>przeciwko (Polsce)</i> [against (Poland)] C	–	[87] [90]
	<i>brukselski</i> [Brussels – adj.]	<i>ultimatum</i> [ultimatum]	–	[76]
	<i>Timmermans</i>	„ <i>misja</i> ” [‘mission’]	–	[84]
		<i>szantażuje</i> [blackmails]	–	[85]

Topic	Names of entities expressing sentential means of valuation	Systemic means determining the sentential valuation (C = contextually)	Direction of valuation	Number of strips
	<i>Niemcy</i> [Germany]	(i) <i>totalna opozycja</i> [(and) total opposition] <i>chcą ukarać (Polskę)</i> [wants to punish (Poland)]	–	[91]
	<i>Berlin</i>	<i>przeciwko (Polsce)</i> [against (Poland)]	–	[90]
	<i> rząd</i> [the government]	<i>presja</i> [na niego] [pressure (on it)]	–	[82]
Judicial laws	<i>opozycja</i> [opposition]	<i>straszy</i> [threatening]	–	[3]
		<i>na ulicy</i> [on the street] C	–	[4]
		<i>odrzuca kompromis</i> [reject the compromise]	–	[9]
		<i>łączy (NATO z Trybunałem)</i> [links (NATO with the tribunal)] C	–	[12]
		<i>znów (o Trybunale)</i> [again (elision with the verb <i>mówić</i> , to speak (of the tribunal))] C	–	[14]
		<i>próbuję zablokować reformę</i> [tries to block reform]	–	[35]
		<i>więcej [ją] dzieli</i> [more divides (it)] C	–	[37]
		<i>totalny chaos</i> [jej] [(its) total chaos]	–	[46]
	<i>zapowiada bitwy</i> [predicts battles]	–	[50]	
<i>sejmowy</i> [parliamentary]	<i>gry</i> [games] ‘seeks to achieve their own aims by competing with someone’	–	[11]	

Topic	Names of entities expressing sentential means of valuation	Systemic means determining the sentential valuation (C = contextually)	Direction of valuation	Number of strips
	sędziowie [judges]	<i>równiejsi (wobec prawa)</i> [more equal (before the law)] C	–	[18]
		<i>skandaliczne decyzje</i> [outrageous rulings]	–	[27]
		<i>strajkują (na zebraniach)</i> [strike (at meetings)]	–	[28]
		<i>na wiecach opozycji</i> [at opposition rallies] C	–	[55]
	sędziowska [judiciary – adj.]	<i>kasta</i> [caste]	–	[36] [39]
			–	[25] [26] [31] [32] [33] [54]
	sądownictwo [parliamentary]	<i>reforma</i> [reform]	–	[26]
			<i>(Sejm) zreformuje</i> [(Parliament) reforms]	–
Trybunał [Tribunal]	<i>walczy (z nową ustawą)</i> [is fighting (the new act)] C	–	[15]	
Sąd Najwyższy [Supreme Court]	<i>złamał prawo</i> [broke the law]	–	[58]	
sąd [court]	<i>zabiera (mieszkanie)</i> [takes away (an apartment)] C	–	[48]	
prawnicy [lawyers]	<i>nie znają prawa</i> [do not know the law]	–	[23]	

Topic	Names of entities expressing sentential means of valuation	Systemic means determining the sentential valuation (C = contextually)	Direction of valuation	Number of strips
Tusk	<i>PO</i>	<i>partia zewnętrzna</i> [external party] C	–	[259]
	<i>Tusk</i>	<i>(pretekst do) profanacji</i> [(a pretext for) desecration]	–	[261]
	<i>Unia Europejska</i> [European Union]	<i>(Polska chce)</i> [jej] reformy [(Poland wants) reforms (of it)]	–	[256]
	<i>unijny</i> [EU – adj.]	<i>(Polska) obnażyła (standardy demokracji)</i> [(Poland) has exposed (standards of democracy)]	–	[254]
	<i>Saryusz-Wolski</i>	<i>polskim (kandydatem)</i> [the Polish (candidate)]	+	[248]
		<i>(Polska) stawia na</i> [niego] [(Poland) bets on (him)]	+	[249]
		<i>polowanie na</i> [niego] [the hunt for (him)]	+	[251]

Table 4: Numerical distribution of sentence-based value-conveying names of entities present in political life, grouped by topic (approximation to 0.5%)

Topic	Number of sentence-based valuations/number of strips	Total percentage of sentence-based valuations (%)	Number and rate of positive valuations (%)	Number and rate of negative valuations (%)
500+	1/4	25%	1 (100%)	0 (0%)
Abortion	2/8	25%	1 (50%)	1 (50%)
Amber Gold	8/44	18%	1 (12.5%)	7 (87.5%)
Independence Day	3/15	20%	1 (33.5%)	2 (66.5%)
Parliamentary crisis	21/50	42%	5 (22.5%)	16 (72.5%)
Forests	4/5	80%	1 (25%)	3 (75%)
Protests of Resident Physicians	7/12	58.5%	0 (0%)	7 (100%)

Reprivatization	8/28	28.5%	0 (0%)	8 (100%)
Smolensk	6/26	23%	0 (0%)	6 (100%)
Tusk	7/15	46.5%	4 (57%)	3 (43%)
EU on the rule of law	15/32	47%	1 (6.5%)	14 (93.5%)
'Ustawa dezubekizacyjna'	0/6	0%	0 (0%)	0 (0%)
Judicial laws	21/61	34.5%	0 (0%)	21 (100%)
<b>Total</b>	<b>103/306</b>	<b>33.5%</b>	<b>15 (14.5%)</b>	<b>88 (85.5%)</b>



## Chapter 5:

# **An analysis of means of valuation based on extralinguistic context**

According to our calculations, 115 out of the 306 strips we examined did not contain contextual valuations (approx. 37.5%). This figure should be treated only as a working estimate, however, as it was not possible to examine the reception of the content of the strips as part of the present report, and thus to determine whether the intentional meanings we as researchers assumed had indeed been communicated effectively.

We also assumed that the informational quality of the strips (i.e., the objectivity of the coverage) was not affected by the use of those value-conveying terms (with a plus or minus sign) which express commonly accepted evaluations. Therefore, we treated the proper name *Amber Gold* (associated with the criminal activities of the company bearing this name) or the name *Poland* (representing a positive universal value) as linguistic resources that make no significant contributions to the communicated content in terms of value judgements. Nevertheless, other proper names (mostly surnames) which seem to be author-independent and non-evaluative are marked in communication practice in terms of their axiological potential by *ethical discourse* (cf. Kłosińska 2012), that the sender uses. Thus, we consider the names *Tusk*, *Gronkiewicz-Waltz*, *Mazgula*, *Frasyniuk*, and *Bauman* as contextually (negative) evaluative resources of language, similar to such key words as *Smolensk* or *the Church*, which in turn express positive evaluations in the described discourse.

The analysis in this part of the study will be different than the previous parts of the report – we will focus primarily on showing several typical

mechanisms of valuation used by the authors of the analyzed set of strips. We do so because in relation to this type of valuation, quantitative analysis does not produce significant new knowledge, while qualitative analysis allows recognizing valuation techniques and thus gaining knowledge about the ways of using language resources to influence the recipient.

Based on our analysis of the strips, we distinguished several main techniques of communicating non-systemically motivated valuations coming from the context (i.e. shared knowledge).

## 1. Connotation

The first is exploiting the connotational<sup>41</sup> semantic background of words. We shall present this technique using several examples. Strip [168] *Teatr jednego aktora* [One man show] refers to the conceptual metaphor POLITICS IS THEATER, which has been established for centuries in culture, and which is cognitively extensive (covering both the stage and the entities operating on it: actors, directors, scriptwriters, set designers, and even stage managers), but on the level of pragmatics, it licenses mainly the connotational meanings of the lexeme *teatr* “something pretended, inauthentic, devoid of seriousness, calculated to gain applause” (the footage refers to the arrest by the police of Władysław Frasyniuk during the Smolensk counter-picketing in June 2017). Additionally, we are dealing here with depreciation of a person being referred with the phrase “one actor” (which is in Polish a component of the phrase equivalent to *one-man show*) – it is pointed out that in the event, discussed in the footage, the person in question (Władysław Frasyniuk) tried to draw attention to himself, striving to make himself the most important character.

Example [8] *Marsz na eksport* [A march for export] can be described in similar terms. The strip announces a segment covering the march organized by the Committee for the Defense of Democracy (KOD) along with the opposition. The use of the term *for export* instantiates the conceptual metaphor A MARCH IS A COMMODITY, whereby valuation is achieved by directing the recipient’s attention to associations resulting directly from the choice of such mental imagery on the part of the sender that is supposed to lead to the interpretation of the event and the

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41 We use the term *connotation* to refer to those non-definitional components of a word’s meaning which contain primarily associative content assigned to a concept which a given word signifies.



motivation of its participants in terms of commerce (resulting from an attitude of calculation and self-interest), rather than in terms of morality or world-view (based on one's ethical beliefs). The expression *for export* is additionally an example of the use of irony in order to downplay the importance of the event.

Strip [209] *Kłótnia w obozie okupantów* [A quarrel in the occupying camp] in addition to the systemic meanings, the resources at play include the connotational power of all three words in: a *quarrel* carries the connotations of violence, emotionality, and a lack of desire for compromise; the word *camp* carries connotations of isolation and discipline (i.e. obeying orders), while the *occupying forces* carry associations with illegal, aggressive, and violent action. The words *occupying forces*, used here to describe the opposition, were also used hyperbolically, which adds to the text's emotional character.

Strip [147] was constructed in a similar way: *Po latach milczenia* [After [many] years of silence] (announcing a segment concerning an interview given in 2016 by Tomasz Arabski, who was responsible for the preparation of the 2010 visit to Katyń which ended in the crash of the presidential plane). The persuasive power of the expression *After [many] years* results from the connotational meaning "long" (which is a bad thing), and the word *silence* – whose connotation is "conscious withholding of information, unwillingness to speak" (which is bad).

The segment following strip [251] *Polowanie na Saryusz-Wolskiego* [The hunt for Saryusz-Wolski] concerned the resignation of this politician from membership in the European People's Party and the discussion of his situation as a candidate for the position of President of the European Council. The footage also contained a short excerpt showing journalists trying somewhat persistently to get the politician to answer their questions, but not in an aggressive way. In this context, the use of the word *hunt* seems exaggerated, because it carries associations with hunting and the animal world, not really appropriate for the material presented (the reporters' behavior shown in the clip is fairly typical and often encountered in a situation where a public figure is reluctant to provide information to the media).

In strip [19], *Prof. Rzepliński z medalem od Platformy* [Professor Rzepliński with a medal from the [Civic] Platform], the value polarity is reversed under the influence of discourse-motivated evaluations (Rzepliński and *Civic Platform* are marked negatively), which reverses the value sign of the connotation for the word *medal* 'something valuable; a valuable

distinction.’ The entire implied content can therefore be rendered as ‘a medal from the Civic Platform is not something valuable.’ This example shows coexistence of various methods of pragmatic valuation within the text of a single strip, which is common practice in relation to the analyzed set of messages.

Strips [36] and [39] *Front obrony sędziowskiej kasty* [The defensive front of the judiciary caste], evaluations contributed by the stylistic phraseme used are also accompanied by evaluations based on connotations of the word *front* ‘organized military operations involving the use of strategy, tactics and collective action.’ In this way a picture of the event is built, which is set to expose both the strength of the opponent and the threat he poses.

A similar formula was also used to construct strip [76] *Brukselskie ultimatum wobec Polski* [The Brussels ultimatum for Poland], and [175] *Uliczna rozróżba zamiast pamięci o bohaterach* [A street brawl instead of remembering the heroes]. The first of these triggers the connotational meaning of the word *ultimatum* ‘something final, something dangerous, a situation without an exit,’ and the accompanying footage disavows this assessment, making the tone of the entire strip ironic. In contrast, the author of text [175] uses the already strongly conventionalized connotational meaning of the adjectival form of *street* ‘common, vulgar, base, simple, (c)rude, primitive,’ further strengthened by the use of the colloquial augmentative *brawl* (the phrase *street brawl* was also used to name the civic support pickets for protesting opposition MPs). The last three examples illustrate the pragmatic function of the induced connotational meanings, i.e. creating (constructing) a specific image of reality based on stereotyping and profiling, which will be discussed in more detail in the next section.

## 2. Stereotyping and profiling

We decided to discuss both of these phenomena together because in analytical practice it is difficult to draw a clear line between them. Although profiling<sup>42</sup> of meaning as a linguistic phenomenon is not persuasive per se,

42 In this report, the term *profiling* refers to emphasizing a certain feature or part of the conceptual base of a given expression at the textual level, including the initial categorization of the object, [...] selection of aspects corresponding to the categorization made [and] qualitative characteristics of the subject within the adopted aspects.

it can be (and, in relation to the material studied, very often is) exploited in order to introduce a persuasive meaning into statements, which in turn most often means that profiling serves to reproduce existing stereotypes or construct new ones.<sup>43</sup>

Let us start with an analysis of a case that is emblematic for this group of contextual valuations, i.e. strip [176]: *Ostatnia walka esbeków* [The final struggle of former Communist Secret Service operatives]. This is how one of the picket signs in front of the Sejm during the Sejm crisis was described. In the narration in the footage, it is mentioned that despite the pickets, the Sejm passed the law whose short name can be rendered in English (with some degree of approximation) as “decommunization law” and the thesis is proposed that the pickets were organized in order to prevent the passage of this law. The key to the entire context of the matter here is the common derogatory noun *esbek* (pl. *esbecy*) ‘an operative of the SB (Secret Service in the Polish People’s Republic)’, which as label conveys valuation systemically, but also brings additional meanings to the message. First of all, it profiles the situation a priori (de facto communicating the assertion that ‘no action on the part of *esbecy* can be good’) which results in stereotyping (and the resultant depreciation) of the group of people who are protesting – because even if the picket had been organized by opponents of the decommunization law, it was not only former *esbecy* who participated, but also regular citizens who did not agree to the reduction of the pensions of anyone who had worked in services subordinate to the Ministry of Internal Affairs before 1990. The content of the illustrative footage suggests that the use of the word *esbecy* served primarily to maintain (or perhaps even revive) the

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(Bartmiński 1993, p. 270). Profiling in this approach is such a fragmentary image of a designated entity in which both the objective properties of it and its subjective (individual) representations can be taken into account, depending on the accepted point of view and the interpretative perspective, which in turn consists of such elements as the accepted set of values and rationality type, and in the background – style and genre conditions.

- 43 Linguistic stereotyping, in turn, is understood from a non-evaluative perspective, as a linguistic and cultural image of the designated entity, reflecting its typical (commonly considered to be true, normal, ordinary) features (for more, see Bartmiński, Panasiuk 1993). “Stereotypes show [...] a generalized view of the world and as such belong to the sphere of common knowledge. They have [...] a bond-forming role to play; they are a tool of mobilization for the community, showing directions of action, but also defining what is ours and not ours, and therefore alien.” (Pluta 2006, pp. 230–231). However, in the material under study we also deal with created stereotypes, whose cognitive properties depend par excellence on the arbitrarily imposed viewpoint of the sender.

antagonism between the supporters of the current government and representatives of the government before 1989. The use of the term *final struggle* is also significant. On the one hand, it is an example of the rhetoric of the triumph ('At long last the Sejm passed a law of decommunization law which makes their 'struggle' the final one'). On the other, we are dealing here with a clear allusion (evident primarily to the older viewers): the expression *final struggle* refers ironically to the refrain of the *Internationale* – viewers with first-hand familiarity with the realities of the Polish People's Republic were probably meant to accept the words from the song as a kind of self-fulfilling prophecy. We may describe this strip as a mocking commentary to the clip presented in the news segment of a speech of one of the protesters, shown as saying *To jest przegrana potyczka. Musimy ją wygrać*<sup>44</sup> [This is a lost skirmish. We have to win it... (the fragment ends here)], because the use of the word *walka* in the text of the strip instead of the word *bój* on the one hand masks the intertextual context (*bój* is used in the chorus of the Polish version of the song) and connotatively depreciates the axiological value of the protest (a *walka* is less than *bój*), and on the other – ridicules the protesters (by making a reference to the nineteenth-century workers' anthem) and their attachment to ideas outdated in the twenty-first century. We shall continue our reflections on the subject, showing some of the dominant ways of profiling the image of the account of reality presented in the collected material.

The first is **opposing profiling of the cognitive stage**, whereby the information strip suggests an assessment (usually negative) that contradicts the footage or at least does not follow directly from it. This technique results in strengthening or evoking the stereotype intended by the sender. Such is the case, for example, with regard to strip [24] *Setki tysięcy złotych dla sędziów TK* [Hundreds of thousands of zlotys for Constitutional Tribunal judges]. The phrase *hundreds of thousands of zlotys* serves pragmatically as a generalized quantifier, i.e. it communicates the meaning of 'a great deal of (money)'. The footage, however, concerns the fact that judges of the Constitutional Tribunal receive at the end of their term of office – in keeping with the law – an equivalent in cash for unused leave ranging from several dozen to a hundred thousand zlotys (per judge). This event was made the main point of the main news program on public television and announced to the public with a strip that is ambiguous in its content. All this seems to have resulted from the broadcaster's intentions that exceeded merely providing information.

44 Source: <http://wiadomosci.tvp.pl/28260463/ostatnia-walka-esbekow>.

Another example of this technique is found in strip [64], *Tajna debata o Polsce* [A secret debate on Poland]. The adjective *secret* has been used here without an explanatory reference to the linguistic context, which entitles the recipient to choose one of its systemic meanings: 1. ‘kept secret’, 2. ‘illegal’, 3. ‘of certain services or their operatives: acting in secret’, 4. ‘deeply hidden, unknown to anyone’, 5. ‘very personal, intimate.’ The subject of the message rules out the fifth interpretation. In the footage it is explicitly stated that the debate on Poland, which was set to take place the day after the television broadcast, would be conducted ‘behind closed doors’, which also allowed the viewers who knew the reality of international political communication to exclude from the interpretative horizon interpretations two, three and four of the adjective *secret*. In specialist terminology, such debates are described as *confidential*; however, this adjective was not used here. Instead, the apparently synonymous lexeme *secret* was used (apparently – because *confidential* is not in fact replaceable by *secret* in this context), which made it possible for viewers who were less aware of the issue to come to believe that indeed a *debate* was in fact deliberately held *in secret*, and to see in this phrase a confirmation of the existence of some conspiracy against Poland. Apart from the fact that the strip suggests a different image of the event (conspiracy) to that presented in the footage, we are also dealing here with an attempt to blur the meaning of the adjective *secret*, which is important for the axiology of the message.

The second phenomenon connected with profiling is **emotional coloring of the cognitive stage**. For example, the use of the adjective *embarrassing* in strip [162] *Żenująca prowokacja* [An embarrassing provocation] does not bring anything significant into the message apart from expressing a strong ethical or aesthetic evaluation. One might even consider that the sender here is taking on a paternalistic attitude toward the characters of the reported event, because by profiling such a picture of the situation is to show the sender’s superiority over the people involved in the event, whom he or she wants to embarrass and thus humiliate.

Similarly, the use of such words in the texts of the strips as [88] *desperacki (atak)* [a desperate attack] (specific emotions mentioned by name: helplessness, despair, rage); *szokujące (zeznania, kłamstwa, szczegóły)* [shocking (testimonies, lies, details)] [106], [127], [246], [267], *szokujący (zapis podłości)* [a shocking (record of meanness)] [284] (specific emotions named: outrage, anger, disgust, horror); *ośmieszył* [ridiculed (3rd. pers., past tense, masc.)] [245] (sender’s emotions expressed: pity, disregard, mockery); *clumsy* [38] (sender’s emotions expressed: pity, mockery);

disorder [175] (emotions expressed: indignation, anger) and others. Emotional profiling of the way of seeing of a given event has a high persuasive value, as it reduces the critical and rational side of message reception, activating in the viewers the sphere of personal feelings, stimulating them to *experience* the content being announced, and not only to assimilate, understand and remember it.

Another interesting way of profiling the evaluation of an event in the strips is the use of names of people whom the sender assesses negatively, and whom it would not otherwise have been necessary to mention when giving an account of a particular event. This technique could be described as **customization of the image at the cognitive stage**, whereby the name of some person (perceived positively or negatively in a given type of discourse) is made the locus of persuasion. This determines the assessment of any event in advance. We find at least two such uses in our corpus: strips [199] *Sylwester z Michnikiem* [New Year's Eve with Michnik] and [215] *KOD przed Sejmem i hold dla Baumana* [KOD before the Sejm and a tribute to Bauman] – they referred to events in which the persons mentioned by name (Adam Michnik, Zygmunt Bauman) were not the main characters.

In the first case, the segment covered the New Year's Eve picnic in front of the Sejm, organized by protesting opposition MPs, which was also attended by members of the Committee for the Defense of Democracy and, among others, Adam Michnik. He was neither the organizer of the event, or at least this is not mentioned in the clip, nor a participant in the protest (because he was not an MP at the time, nor did he hold any public office). The use of his name in the text of the strip can therefore be treated as a communicative manipulation (there was no justified need to inform the viewers about Adam Michnik's appearance at this event, as it was a trivial fact in comparison with the weight of the obstruction of parliamentary activities taking place at that time), serving only – as it seems – to stigmatize the participants of both the picnic and the protest according to the principle: Adam Michnik's name takes away the value of any undertaking (even a New Year's Eve party) in which he takes part.

In the second case, the segment covered a protest rally of the opposition, during which, at the request of one of the participants, an homage was to be paid to Zygmunt Bauman, who had died a few days earlier. The footage provided no information as to whether this was done; however, it presented a statement by a journalist not connected with TVP S.A., who unequivocally condemned Bauman. The use of Bauman's name in the text of the strip in the context of the information and assessments that followed



must be seen as a violation of basic cultural norms, which – even assuming that someone does not accept another person’s activities, attitudes or views – require respect for the deceased (according to the ancient maxim *De mortuis nil nisi bene*). Thus, this is an example of an ethically extremely controversial persuasive procedure involving mockery of both the deceased (*a tribute to Bauman* is a clearly ironic) and those for whom the memory of Bauman’s achievements is an important value. The above examples are clear enough to exemplify this technique, but it is worth noting that in the corpus, only the names of those who opposed the actions of the current authorities in one way or another were subject to the principle in question. Not once did the names of any coalition politicians or the Polish President appear in the analyzed texts. Thus, it is a rule discursively attributed to the exercise of a defamatory function toward political opponents.

Yet another technique of profiling the cognitive stage is **maximizing the hostility** toward certain entities and their actions, thus **arousing a sense of danger** in the viewer. This is achieved by more or less camouflaged references to conspiracy theories, e.g., the virtually contextless use of words such as: *secret* (adj.) [64] (see: the analysis above); *mystery* [125], [132]; *mysterious* [129], [271]; *against Poland* [87], [90], [223]; *stand behind* [136]; *provocation* [143], [162], [164], [180]; and through the use of vocabulary that is supposed to inspire fear or anxiety, e.g., *threaten* [208]; *frighten* [3]; *total* [46], [91]; *radical* (adj./n.) [190], [196], [201], [208], [210], [214], [245]; *ultimatum* [76].

Closely related to this technique is profiling of the action of negatively assessed subjects as **repetitive** and perhaps even **persistent** remains. In order to introduce this element of meaning into the message, verbless constructions with the word *znów* [once more/again] are often used: [14] *Opozycja znów o Trybunale* [The opposition once again about the Tribunal], [78] *Bruksela znów o Trybunale* [Brussels once more about the Tribunal], [208] *Radykalna opozycja znów grozi* [Radical opposition threatening again], which allows us to interpret it syntactically as information on some iterative action of the entities mentioned, but on a pragmatic level, the strips communicate the sender’s dissatisfaction with the repetition of the actions (mostly with speech – the absent verb in [14] and [78], and the syntactic structure the of the type X *once again on Y* conventionally indicates someone’s speech perceived negatively by its recipient as tiresome, needless, or taxing; cf. *Ty znów o tym samym!* [You’re on (and on) about the same thing again!]; *Wałęsa znów o 500+* [Wałęsa once again on 500+]; *Znów o gminach i ich zadaniach* [Again about municipalities and their tasks]. This construction is a sign

of some kind of advantage (institutional, psychological, socioenvironmental) of the sender over the subject repeating their illocutions about a certain aspect of reality – it can only be used by someone who considers a given subject closed, explained, and therefore communicatively unimportant, unnecessary, irrelevant.

The same intention is expressed in the corpus by other means, e.g. using a temporal operator, such as *kolejny* [yet another, subsequent, further], syntactically and semantically related to some negatively marked term: [27] *Kolejne skandaliczne decyzje sędziów* [Further scandalous decisions by judges]; [50] *Opozycja zapowiada kolejne bitwy* [The opposition predicts further battles]; [191] *Kolejna próba destabilizacji państwa* [Another attempt to destabilize the state]; [268] *Kolejny świadek obciąża prezydent Warszawy* [Another witness lays the blame on the Mayor of Warsaw].

Individual events can also be exploited for the same purpose: [204] *Wpadka za wpadką* [One slip-up following another], [212] *Petru ograł... Petru* [Petru won against... Petru (himself)]; or intensifications: [214] *Opozycja coraz bardziej radykalna* [The opposition [is becoming] more and more radical]; [51] *...bardziej zły...* [more and more angry] (see above).

To conclude this section, we will draw the reader's attention to yet another persuasive mechanism connected with profiling, i.e. the **profiling of a scene as unusual**, highlighting the unexpected and even surprising aspects of a given event. We have already analyzed strips in which this technique was used on other occasions, e.g. [199] and [215] (using the names of people loosely related to the event), [1] (suggesting that a court trial is a *meeting*), [23] (attributing ignorance of the law to lawyers). Here we will point out further examples of this mechanism in the material we collected.

In strip [11] *Sejmowe gry* [Parliamentary games] [11], the nominal name of the activity comes to the fore, which can be interpreted as a means of profiling the image of the Sejm as a less than serious institution, although in fact the footage only refers to certain actions of the opposition (the reason for their absence at the parliamentary meeting at which a debate on ways of resolving the constitutional crisis was to be held). The assessment is critical. On juxtaposing the text of the strip with the relevant material, it will turn out that the sender attributed the above characteristics only to the opposition MPs. We may talk here about the use of the traditional conceptual metaphor POLITICS IS A GAME, very spacious semantically, but in the analyzed case it is updated with the more detailed variant OPPOSITION MPS ARE ACTING LIKE LITTLE CHILDREN PLAYING A FRIVOLOUS GAME.



The author of strip [134] *Ślad tajnych służb w aferze Amber Gold* [Traces of the secret services in the Amber Gold scandal], in turn, exposes the existence of a link between the activity of the secret services and the functioning of Amber Gold by using the word *trace* which indicates how insignificant this link may be. The footage that follows goes on to explain that the witness was acquainted in his childhood with the future minister in charge of the secret services in Donald Tusk's government and that the Internal Security Agency *was interested in* the activity of Amber Gold before the company went bankrupt. Thus, we are dealing here with a blurring of the meaning of strip [134] – it is not clear (even when compared with the video account) what this trace consisted of, i.e. whether the secret services had conducted a legal operational investigation of Amber Gold (which is indirectly communicated in the material, although the verb phrase *be interested in* does not contribute to clarity here), or whether they perhaps aided and abetted someone's criminal activity. The expression *secret services* may also create an atmosphere of conspiracy, collusion, intrigue. Thus, neither the strip nor the footage that follows it indicate the precise nature of the relationship between the secret services and Amber Gold, although they do suggest its existence, which serves to profile the sense 'the secret services may have been conducive to Amber Gold's activities.'

Strip [190] *Wigilia według radykalnej opozycji* [Christmas Eve according to the radical opposition] reverses the value sign of the word *Wigilia* [Christmas Eve] by using the negative discourse phrase *radical opposition*. Indeed, the footage highlights the political motivations of the protesters in the Sejm at the time, as well as the aggression and vulgarity of opponents of the government protesting in front of the Sejm. Further, it hints that the protesters are similar to communist apparatchiks who disrespect the Christmas tradition (by showing a clip with a Christmas Eve scene from the comedy *Rozmowy kontrolowane*<sup>45</sup>). This strip, thanks to its construction *X according to Y*<sup>46</sup>, profiles the image of insular, isolated opposition even on Christmas Eve.

45 This scene satirized the ignorance of Christmas customs, traditions, and its spiritual significance on the part of high-ranking Polish People's Republic officials.

46 It is a construction almost as entrenched as a fixed phrase, whose pragmatic significance may be rendered as follows: 'Y is treating X individually, in his/her own way.' Cf. similar uses with this meaning: *Ewangelia według św. Marka* [Gospel according to St. Mark]; *Świat według Garpa* [The World According to Garp (title of a novel)], *Świat według Kiepskich* [The World According to the Kiepskis – title of a Polish comedy series]; *Uroda według blondynki* [Beauty According to a Blonde (title of a blog)]; *Pizza według Magdy Gessler* [Pizza According to Magda Gessler (title of a culinary article)]; *Piękno według geja* [Beauty According to a Gay Man (title of a press article)]; *Fotografia według Langforda* [Photography According to Langford]

Rather peculiar profiling can be found in the text of strip [198] *Moralność w trakcie kompromitacji* [Morality in the process of becoming compromised] – morality is shown here as a value regressively variable over time (which contradicts the colloquial image of this human disposition), and becoming compromised as a process, not an effect of a process (which is also inconsistent with its image entrenched in language). The whole of this peculiar conceptualization of the notions of *morality* and *becoming compromised* is comprehensible only when juxtaposed with the footage that exposes the *parliamentary tomfoolery* of the protesting opposition MPs (e.g. jokes by opposition MP Joanna Mucha mocking the fact that the protest is being called a coup by the ruling party), critical assessment of these jokes by opposition leaders, and the words of Ewa Kopacz, who declared that the protesters wanted to be the *moral opposition*. The assessment being suggested here is the following: ‘the opposition is characterized by progressive disappearance of moral norms.’ This approach reinforces the negative assessment of the opposition’s actions because it shows these actions as a process leading to a collapse. Incidentally, we would like to note that Grzegorz Schetyna, leader of the Civic Platform, was shown on the screen with the caption “*shadow Prime Minister*” (referring to the phrase *shadow cabinet* “a project for the manning of the chairs in government prepared by the opposition in the event of taking over power in the state”), which obviously reinforces the thesis proposed in the material (‘the opposition is immoral despite its declarations to the contrary’), but it is also – in our opinion – a violation of the basic principles of ethics in public communication.

### 3. Presupposition and implicature

By presuppositions we mean conclusions that follow from a statement in a logically necessary way (characterized by certainty), and by implicature we mean the sort of conclusions that flow from a statement in a logically probable way (characterized by potentiality).

In analytical practice, many strips in our corpus are accompanied by some sort of presupposition (most often of the existential type), e.g. [234] *Otwarcie Świątyni Opatrzności Bożej* [The opening of the Temple of Divine Providence] presupposes the proposition ‘The Temple of Divine

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(title of a guidebook)]; *Historia według Korwina* [History According to Korwin (title of a book)].

Providence has not yet been opened,’ while [270] *Prawnicy zrzekają się Chmielnej 70* [Lawyers forfeit [the property at] 70 Chmielna Street] – the proposition ‘Before, the lawyers did not cede the property,’ but these kind of inferences are fairly natural in ordinary communication and do not affect the persuasive power of the strips in our corpus. This is why we shall take into account below only those (non-existential) presuppositions which are the effect of conscious and intentional shaping of the surface form of expression, i.e. those which carry the sender’s intended assessment.

In section 2.3 above, we discussed sentential presuppositions resulting from the sender’s choice of the question structure, so here we will limit our discussion to characterizing only one distinct case of using a lexical presupposition that occurs repetitively in the examined set of texts.

Four times the exponent of the evaluative presupposition was the adjective *kolejny* [next/subsequent/(yet) another]: [27] *Kolejna skandaliczna decyzja sędziów* [Yet another scandalous decision by the judges] (presupposition: ‘There have already been scandalous decisions by the judges before’); [50] *Opozycja zapowiada kolejne bitwy* [The opposition announces further battles] (presupposition: ‘There have already been battles initiated by the opposition before’); [191] *Kolejna próba destabilizacji państwa* [Another attempt to destabilize the state] (presupposition: ‘There have already been attempts to de-stabilize the state before’); [268] *Kolejny świadek obciąża prezydent Warszawy* [Another witness lays the blame on the mayor of Warsaw] (presupposition: ‘There have already been witnesses who testified against the Mayor of Warsaw’). It is easy to notice that all these presupposed claims express a negative assessment of the actions of the circles or people considered by the political authorities as opponents or enemies (if this does not result directly from the content of the strip – as in [191] – then the footage presented after the strip provides the viewer with sufficient premises to fill the “empty” space, i.e. the position of the agent, with the content consistent with the sender’s expectations). The value sign expressed by these presuppositions is determined by such words as *scandalous*, *battle*, *destabilize* and *lay the blame*. The previously discussed strips containing the temporal operator *znow* [again / (once) more] ([14], [78], [208]) should also be interpreted according to the same principle. In both cases, the broadcaster strives to profile a favorable image of the event, while the use of the lexeme *again* does not generate value-adjusting presuppositions (it only presupposes the recurrence of a given phenomenon, while the value-adjustment is shifted to the footage, i.e. to strictly textual mechanisms), whereas the use of the word *kolejny* [(yet) another / next] each time causes a value-adjusting presupposition.

Implicatures, i.e. probable conclusions dependent on the common knowledge of the sender and recipient and on their communicative and cultural competence (which applies especially to the recipient), are much more difficult to describe without access to reception testimonials (questionnaires, polls, statements of recipients). It is obvious that an institutional broadcaster has an advantage of communicative competence over a dispersed recipient (often presented collectively as an audience), therefore descriptions of the senses implied by the statements selected for analysis must be intuitive and subjective to a certain extent.

The first mechanism observed in the examined material is the simultaneous use by the broadcaster of regularly communicated neutral presuppositions, along with implicatures fully motivated by the discourse conditions which determine the axiological character of the entire message. This is evident in the examples containing the operator *już* [already, as early as]: [113] *ABW wiedziała o Amber Gold już w 2010 roku* [ABW knew about Amber Gold as early as 2010] (presupposition: ABW knew about Amber Gold earlier than expected, but the implicature here is: ‘and this is wrong’). Another such example is [291] *Program 500+ już w Sejmie* [The 500+ Program already in the Sejm] (presupposition: The 500+ Program was in the Sejm earlier than one might have expected, but the implicature here is: ‘and this is good’).

Another way of introducing the implied evaluation into the act of communication desired by the sender consists in expressing directly (systemically, i.e., with some “strong” expression, e.g., *pucz, agresja* [a coup, aggression] a negative assessment of the event in social terms (often inconsistent with its real character) and at the same time shifting to the implication of ethical and/or sensory evaluation. We present selected examples of the application of this technique. In strip [44] *„Pucz” – sezon drugi* [“The Coup” – season two], the quotation marks and the word *season* (with an ordinal numeral) ‘of a series of episodes of a TV program or series’ build the implicature: ‘The opposition’s protests are like an entertainment program or a TV series, i.e. they are intended to attract the attention of as many viewers as possible, but they are in fact nothing serious’. In contrast, strip [194] *Jak się robi pucz* [How to make a coup], by referring to the intertextual memory of viewers – lends credibility to the following implicature: ‘Protests of the opposition may be considered a frivolous version of the instructions on how to effectively overthrow the ruling power’ (an ironic reference to the positive illocution of titles of typical self-help guidebooks). And finally, an example already partly discussed earlier: [170] *Agresja na*

*obrzeżach marszu pamięci* [Aggression on the fringes of the March of Remembrance]. Here the semantics of *aggression* is weakened by the implicature: ‘Acts of aggression occurred only marginally, and thus the event (the March of Remembrance) was successful anyway’.

Another procedure that triggers the implicit conclusions desired by the sender is also semantic masking of the essence of the event to which the segment relates. In the collection of texts under analysis, this concerns, among others, statements suggesting conspiracy or collusion. We have already signaled this phenomenon before; here we will discuss it more closely. Implicatures referring to a conspiracy theory are triggered in the analyzed material mainly by systemically referring to the secrecy of knowledge about reality, e.g. in the [64] *Tajna debata o Polsce* [A secret debate about Poland] (implicature: ‘Someone is hiding the content of the debate about Poland – and this is bad’; see also the analysis above), [271] *Tajemniczy plan wiceprezydenta Warszawy* [A mysterious plan of the vice-president of Warsaw] (implicature: ‘The plan of the vice-president of Warsaw is not widely known, he may have acted in secret and wanted to hide something – and this is bad’) or [285] *Zagadkowe związki kamienicznika* [Mysterious relations of the townhouse owner] (implicature: ‘The townhouse owner did not act openly; he had something to hide – and this is bad’). All of these statements can be described as lacking denotational concreteness, but offering a wealth of possible associations, all of which are clearly determined axiologically. Moreover, based on the superficial ambiguity of the strips’ content, in constructing a conspiracy vision of the world, their authors also refer to mechanisms that generate implicatures in the act of reception that are not obvious but highly probable. For instance, the intention of positively evaluating the notification of the inconsistency of views or attitudes among the opposition is communicated by the broadcaster in a confrontational way: [153] *Prawo do pamięci* [The right to remembrance] (the footage allows to update the implicature: ‘Someone is denying someone else’s right to the memory of the Smolensk disaster’); [87] *Platforma z Brukselą przeciwko Polsce* [The (Civic) Platform with Brussels against Poland]; [90] *Bruksela, Berlin i opozycja przeciwko Polsce* [Brussels, Berlin and the opposition against Poland]; [91] *Totalna opozycja i Niemcy chcą ukarać Polskę* [The total opposition and Germany want to punish Poland] – to each of these statements we may attribute the implicature: ‘Non-Poles are conspiring against Poland’ and the (more deeply immersed in a discourse context) implicature: ‘Only the current government truly cares about Poland’s interests.’

Other examined statements accentuate, by means of implicature, content that is even more precisely defined from a persuasive point of view, which would not necessarily have been shared by a viewer who had not been primed in this way. Strip [196] *Spór między liderami radykalnej opozycji* [A dispute between the leaders of radical opposition] implies the sense: ‘The opposition lacks unity; it is dispersed, has many leaders who cannot communicate because they are competing with one another’ (an inference based partly on the analysis of the footage). The persuasiveness of the statement in [46] *Totalny chaos totalnej opozycji* [Total chaos of the total opposition] is based on the following implicature: ‘The opposition is completely disorganized; it has no control over its actions at all’ (motivated by the use of the expression *total chaos*). By contrast, strips [201] and [214] *Umiarkowana opozycja przeciwko radykałom* [Moderate opposition against the radicals] and *Opozycja coraz bardziej radykalna* [The opposition [becoming] more and more radical], introduce a very peculiar communicative value in the implications, i.e. scalability in assessment of the opposition’s actions. The opposition is included in them as a qualitative rather than quantitative data set (“better” vs. “worse” i.e. a predetermined contrast: moderate opposition vs. radical opposition). The direction of persuasion is controlled in this case by changing the image of the ontological status of the key concept (opposition) and by subjecting this status to an evaluation that is only gradable downwards. This implied sense can be conveyed by the following formula: ‘The opposition is bad, but moderate opposition is still better than radical opposition.’

Finally, we shall discuss one more communicative phenomenon found repeatedly in our corpus. It is based on the use of implied senses for persuasive purposes. Specifically, it involves exploiting the persuasive power of pragmatic exponents of general quantification (a phenomenon thus far only signaled in this report). Systemic exponents of these meanings (*everyone* and *no one*) were used only three times: in [109] *Nikt nie czuje się winny za Amber Gold* [No one feels guilty over Amber Gold]; [181] *Wszyscy chcą wolnych mediów* [Everyone wants free media], and [207] *Nikt nie zamknął Kolumnowej* [No one closed the Column Hall], each time supporting the persuasive intention of the broadcaster, which means that the inclusive pronoun *everyone* appeared as a carrier of the broadcaster’s predetermined positive evaluation, and the exclusive (excluding) pronoun *no one* – as a carrier of valuation in the opposite direction. However, as far as pragmatic exponents of general quantification are concerned, what prevails in the corpus is quantification through the use of numerals.

Although the phenomena referred to with these numerals are quantifiable, the pragmatic plane of each expression's influence is rather about blurring the boundary between the calculable numerical value of a given data point and the social perception of its value. In other words, it is about the recipient perceiving a certain numerical value as great, i.e. disproportionate to the realities which the message concerns. The sender's intention here is – as one may surmise – to present an issue by means of expressions containing names of relatively large numbers in such a way that the recipient will consider such data to be psychologically inconceivable or even morally unacceptable. This phenomenon was at the basis of the construction used in strip [24] *Setki tysięcy złotych dla sędziów TK* [Hundreds of thousands of zlotys for CT judges] (see above), and is particularly evident in the coverage of the topic “Protest rezydentów” [The protest of resident physicians] (strips [295] to [306]), which makes it possible to consider this technique a deliberate strategy of formatting information, as in five strips (of twelve concerning this topic) there appeared information interpreted linguistically and contextually about specific (in terms of everyday perception very large) sums of money, which is to be perceived by the recipient as excessive and thus provoke disagreement (or even indignation) vis à vis the postulates of the professional group of young doctors presented in the footage of the segments in question.





## Summary

Following all the analyses reported above, we conclude that in the examined set of texts, 75 of 306 strips (24.5%) did not contain any linguistically discernible exponents of valuation (while maintaining the assumption that the objectivity of a message is not affected by the use of terms expressing commonly accepted valuations that are cannot be negated through discourse). This means that de facto only one in four strips (headers/titles) of the message presented by the public broadcaster to the viewers is a notification in the strict sense, i.e. information intentionally devoid of evaluation.<sup>47</sup>

The ratio of 24.5% of the strips devoid of any evaluative elements should be considered very low for the main public medium in Poland in 2016–2017 (i.e. maintained from the capital of civic contributions and not from private funds). Our analyses revealed that a vast majority of the texts of the strips of *Wiadomości TVP 1* serve non-informational functions – mainly persuasive (influencing the recipient), magical (reality-creating) and expressive (articulating the sender’s emotions and evaluations). These types of texts are not created to provide the recipient with objective information about a given event, but to create their authors’ original vision of these events and to influence the recipient’s beliefs (including evaluations). The vision of the world presented in the strips of *Wiadomości*

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47 We include here strips no. [2], [10], [13], [21], [22], [25], [26], [29], [30], [32], [33], [34], [42], [43], [47], [52], [60], [62], [63], [66], [68], [70], [71], [72], [73], [74], [75], [77], [79], [80], [81], [95], [96], [97], [98], [99], [100], [102], [107], [110], [115], [116], [117], [139], [140], [148], [149], [150], [151], [154], [155], [157], [161], [166], [174], [182], [233], [234], [235], [240], [242], [243], [248], [252], [253], [255], [262], [266], [269], [291], [292], [293], [294], and [306].

*TVP 1* is one-sided (sometimes distorted), and its axiological axis is in most cases the opposition: “the current government” vs. “those who do not support it.” The actions of the government and the ruling party are presented in a positive light, while the actions of the opposition parties and civic movements that do not accept the decisions of the government or the activities of the EU institutions are usually assessed negatively, and sometimes these people and institutions become objects of general depreciation (irony, mockery, ridicule, etc.). Assessments are often made a priori and therefore imposed on the viewer – linguistic formulas containing the assessment element appear on the strip preceding the relevant reporter’s material, which makes it possible for the viewer to have a set view of the event before learning its details. The conclusions indicated here follow analyses. The latter show that, let us remind – 75 out of 306 strips in our corpus (24.5%) did not contain any linguistically distinguishable evaluative exponents, which means that only **one in four analyzed strips accompanying the journalistic material was a notification in the strict sense, i.e. information that is intentionally devoid of any evaluation.** This indicator should be considered low, and therefore it needs to be stated that **the authors of the strips of *Wiadomości TVP 1* often do not provide citizens with objective information, but rather with their own vision of the discussed events.**

The relatively frequent practice of imposing a priori valuations, profiling a one-sided (sometimes even distorted) vision of events that is favorable for the broadcaster, and thus failing to provide the public with a reliable and objective message in which information and commentary can be easily distinguished from each other, entails that those responsible for the content of the strips broadcast by *Wiadomości TVP 1* in the analyzed period may have failed to fulfil the obligation imposed on them by the legislator<sup>48</sup> as well as associations of journalists.<sup>49</sup> The obligation in questions is to provide citizens with reliable (i.e. true, undistorted, objective, unbiased) information, which consists in non-partisan presentation of the whole variety of events and phenomena. It is also a duty to serve

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48 Articulated in the Polish Constitution of 2 April 1997, the Act of Dec. 29, 1992 on radio and television broadcasting, the “Press Law” Act of Jan. 26, 1984, the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights of Dec. 16, 1966, ratified on Mar. 3, 1977, the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, done at Rome on Nov. 4, 1950, ratified on Jan. 19, 1993.

49 The Media Ethics Charter signed on Mar. 29, 1995, the Journalists’ Code of Ethics of the Association of Polish Journalists.

the society, which manifests itself among other things in being guided by the general good and treating all its members with respect – this requirement also may not have been met by those responsible for broadcasting the strips of *Wiadomości TVP 1*, because, as the analyses indicated, these strips in most cases presented the arguments of one political entity (the ruling party), and social and political entities that did not share these arguments were presented in them in a derisive and depreciative way.

Under Section 3 of the Law on the Polish Language, the obligation to protect the Polish language is imposed on all public authorities, institutions, and organizations participating in public life. In particular, this protection is to consist in creating conditions conducive for the development of language as a tool of interpersonal communication. In this context, it needs to be stated that also this obligation may have been fulfilled inadequately by the persons responsible for broadcasting the strips of *Wiadomości TVP 1*. The language used in these strips was often treated not as a social resource, but as an instrument of political struggle, serving only one political actor in creating his own vision of the world and imposing it on the citizenry. In such cases, symbolic violence becomes the norm. By symbolic violence we mean imposing a vision of the world as axiologically obvious and imposing on public discourse a set of ideologically interpreted meanings corresponding to a specific vision of events, strongly polarized from the axiological perspective. The entities the broadcaster considers to be political opponents are subjected to discrediting, while criticism of their actions and of themselves is often not fact-based, but rather serves the purpose of damaging their reputation. By using language to achieve the goals of a particular political entity and at the same time discredit other entities, the authors of the strips often resort to linguistic aggression. Indeed, this is how they construct statements in such a way as to inflict harm. In the course of the analysis, we have noted numerous instances of aggressive linguistic actions against persons and institutions in axiological conflict with the ruling party and the government – embarrassment, accusations, ridicule, the use of irony, mockery, etc.

The linguistic and communicative practice in the strips of *Wiadomości TVP 1* is often manipulative in nature. Whenever this is the case, the persuasive influence of the broadcaster on the recipient is concealed, so as to pursue the particular aims of the broadcaster, without taking into account the category of the common good, understood broadly, and inclusive in its essence. Such linguistic activities can be assessed as unethical, as the

participants of the communicative act do not all enjoy full and equal participation in the communication community, because some of them are treated disparagingly, which deprives them of their dignity and excludes them from the community. Recipients of *Wiadomości TVP 1* are often provided with no conditions to freely shape their own opinions and beliefs concerning the subjects covered, which fundamentally violates ethics of the word. Many of the analyzed strips show evidence of unethical linguistic practices such as labelling, stigmatization, stereotyping, all of which operate on the meaning of words, their semantic marking, and modal forms, in ways that are beneficial for the broadcaster. The linguistic and communicational mechanisms revealed in the course of the analysis make it clear that the discursive practices used by the authors of the majority of *Wiadomości TVP 1* strips violated the rules governing successful communication (also known as Grice's Maxims): the maxim of quantity (ordering the selection of linguistic means appropriate to the current needs in terms of their quantity), the maxim of relevance (ordering the formulation of such a linguistic message that will be appropriate to the subject of the statement) and the maxim of manner (ordering such a selection of linguistic means that guarantees comprehensibility of the message). The degree of respect for the fourth principle – the maxim of quality, which prescribes telling the truth – cannot be the subject of the present considerations, as it concerns the reference of the messages examined to extralinguistic reality, which is not subject to linguistic analysis or evaluation. The maxims of quantity and relevance are violated even when certain phenomena are described hyperbolically, with their features or their evaluation being exaggerated (cf. e.g. the following strips [46] *Totalny chaos totalnej opozycji* [Total chaos of the total opposition], [208] *Radykalna opozycja znów grozi* [Radical opposition making threats again] or a sequence of strips concerning the protest of resident physicians: [295] *Młodzi lekarze żądają podwyżek* [Young doctors demand salary increases], [296] *Młodzi lekarze żądają podwyżek* [Young doctors demand salary increases], [297] *Młodzi lekarze żądają ponad 9 tys. złotych pensji* [Young doctors demand over 9,000-zloty salaries], [298] *Młodzi lekarze odrzucili kompromis* [Young doctors rejected the compromise], [299] *Rezydenci: 5 tys. zł pensji to za mało* [Residents: a salary of PLN 5,000 is not enough], [300] *Rezydenci: 3,5 tys. zł podwyżki to za mało* [Residents: pay rises of PLN 3,500 are not enough], [301] *Początkujący lekarze żądają miliardów złotych* [Beginner doctors demand billions of zlotys], and [302] *Początkujący lekarze eskalują protest* [Beginner doctors escalate the protest]).

The principle of relevance is violated, for example, when small facts or phenomena relevant to the event are exposed (as is the case in communications relating to pickets organized under the Sejm during the parliamentary crisis related to the transfer of the parliament's proceedings from the Plenary Hall to the Column Hall: [199] *Sylwester z Michnikiem* [New Year's Eve with Michnik], [215] *KOD przed Sejmem i hołd dla Baumana* [Committee for the Defense of Democracy before the Sejm and a tribute to Bauman], or in the strips accompanying reports on the protest of MPs: [202] *Jak manipuluje niemiecka telewizja* [How German TV uses manipulation], and [192] *Wigilijny pasztet* [Christmas Eve pâté]). On the other hand, failure to respect the maxim of manner is evident in those announcements in which vague, underspecified terms are used knowingly and deliberately (e.g. [147] *Po latach milczenia* [After years of silence], [143] *Prowokacja i groteska* [Provocation and grotesque], [134] *Ślad tajnych służb w aferze Amber Gold* [Traces of the secret services in the Amber Gold scandal], and [128] *ABW kontaktowała się z szefem Amber Gold?* [Did the Internal Security Agency communicate with the head of Amber Gold?]). The methods of communication with the recipient in the information strips displayed on Polish Television's flagship news program are often at odds with the principles of ethics of the word on the part of the strips' authors. They tend to present the reasons of one political actor, often using symbolic violence and linguistic aggression. These methods have their numerous negative effects on the social level, three of which we shall signal here.

First, it undermines the foundations of the citizens' trust in the state. Telewizja Polska S.A. is a public broadcaster, which is supposed to represent the social interest – the bias of the information program may make some citizens feel ignored by it and thus they do not identify themselves with the state (on whose behalf the public broadcaster communicates). Secondly, the one-sided message presenting, among other things, the actions of part of the society and its parliamentary representation in a depreciative way (including open ridicule) and the creation of a sense of danger from political entities not accepted by the broadcaster – all this causes these entities to be excluded from the community, which in turn leads to the disintegration of communal ties, weakening of the communal sense of identity and, as a consequence, may cause aggressive behavior of some of its members toward others. The use of linguistic aggression can be seen as tacit consent to the use of physical aggression, and indeed occurrence of the former often precedes occurrence of the latter. Thirdly, the communication practices described in this report on the part of the authors of the strips on *Wiadomości*

*TVP 1* evoke a negative public reception – Polish Television’s information strips become the object of jokes (mainly Internet memes). An online ‘strip generator’ available free of charge allows entering any text which is then displayed as the text of a strip in a still image captured from *Wiadomości*. The strips have also been satirized in civic actions,<sup>50</sup> e.g. a happening called “*Zrób to sam! Przynieś pasek TVP*” [Do it yourself! Bring a strip to TV]<sup>51</sup>, in sarcastic or ironic comments, and on social networking profiles (e.g. “Paski z TVP Info”<sup>52</sup> [TVP Info strips], “Głupie jak pasek z TVP Info”<sup>53</sup> [As stupid as a TVP Info strip], “Paski grozy” [Strips of horror]<sup>54</sup>. The phenomenon of TVP strips has also lived to see its representation in the Polish colloquial language – the expressive phrase *paski grozy* [strips of horror] was coined, as well as the unofficial name of whoever creates them – *paskowy* [the strip maker] (cf. *Paskowy*” *TVP Info w szczytowej formie* [TVP Info’s strip maker in top shape], *Internauci żartują z paska o protestujących kobietach*<sup>55</sup> [Internet users are poking fun at the strip about protesting women], „*Paskowy*” *z TVP Info znów na ustach wszystkich internautów*<sup>56</sup> [The Strip Maker of TVP Info once again the talk of all Internet users] „*Paskowy*” *TVP Info wygrał ten dzień. Jego „dzieła” przyćmiły wystąpienie Beaty Szydło*<sup>57</sup> [The Strip Maker of TVP Info won the day. His “works” overshadowed even Beata Szydło’s speech], „*Paskowy*” *w TVP Info znowu zaszalał. W sieci zawrzało*<sup>58</sup> [The Strip Maker of TVP Info went crazy again. The Web boiled]).

50 See <https://pasek-tvpis.pl>.

51 See <https://www.facebook.com/oko.press/videos/1935647696696771>.

52 See <https://www.facebook.com/PaskizTVP>.

53 See <https://www.facebook.com/PasekTVPinfo>.

54 See <https://www.facebook.com/paskigrozy>.

55 See <https://wiadomosci.wp.pl/paskowy-tvp-info-w-szczytowej-formie-internauci-zartuja-z-paska-o-protestujacych-kobietach-6198979956725377a>.

56 See <https://wmeritum.pl/paskowy-tvp-info-znow-ustach-wszystkich-internautow-komentowal-wystapienia-politykow-opozycji-sejmowej-debaty-foto/213393>.

57 See <https://wiadomosci.wp.pl/paskowy-tvp-info-wygral-ten-dzien-jego-dzieła-przyćmiły-wystąpienie-beaty-szydło-6195769708234369a>.

58 See <https://www.fakt.pl/wydarzenia/polityka/paskowy-w-tvp-info-znowu-zaszalał/dw1bk2t>.

## Glossary

**Agenda-setting** – a hypothesis according to which establishing the hierarchy of importance of events presented to the audience by the administrators of a given media communication channel has a significant impact on the formation of public perceptions or views on a given issue, and even on the way the audience perceives the socio-political reality (for more, see McQuail 2008, pp. 501–503; Stripan, Davis 2007, pp. 362–369; Dobek-Ostrowska 2006, p. 45).

**Linguistic aggression** – linguistic action aimed at inflicting harm to a recipient or an object. It includes such overt forms of linguistic action as a) criticism and reprimand, b) condemnation and judgement, and such covert actions: a) expressing suspicion, suspicion, censure, b) calumny, slander, libel, c) gossip, d) betrayal, denunciation, accusation, anonymous tip, anonymous accusation, e) witticism and joke, f) irony. Public forms of linguistic aggression in turn are divided into a) discrediting, b) accusation, c) incitement, instigation d) ridicule, mockery, e) derision, poking fun (after: Peisert 2004).

**Discreditation** - the kind of criticism that: a) does not concern the substance, but a given entity or person; b) “is not a descriptive analysis and synthesis, but an evaluative and persuasive statement”; c) “is the result and manifestation of one’s own involvement in a case, in some dispute based on a divergence (conflict) of interests and views – and thus is definitely biased criticism, rather than impartial (because the author of the criticism is interested in a negative assessment), not disinterested”, d) is unfriendly (although not necessarily malicious), e) serves to disqualify the opponent, and not to influence his improvement (after Karwat 2007, p. 47).



**Journalistic ethics** – according to Boniecki, journalistic ethics includes the following principles: 1) the principle of priority of the recipient’s good over that of journalists, publishers, and producers; 2) the principle of truth (which is served by reliability in gathering information, lack of manipulation, non-violation of personal rights of third parties, non-violation of the common good, moral responsibility for the word not spoken, for the word spoken unfortunately, for the word that falls from the mouth of authority relativizing values, for an unfair judgment); 3) the principle of objectivity (separation of information from commentary, lack of involvement on the part of the journalist or medium in the success of the undertakings described); 4) the principle of respect and tolerance (“to speak without harming, to show without shocking, to bear witness without aggression, to reveal without condemning” – rules of informing about shocking phenomena without promoting evil adopted by the French newspaper *Ouest France*) (after Boniecki 2010).

**Ethics of the word** – “a field of science or of the humanities dealing with the study, description and evaluation of the ways in which language is used in relation to the values adopted by society and setting of the standards for the use of language which help to protect these values” (Cegięła 2014, p. 9). “As a research discipline, ethics of the word inquires about and defines the possibilities of such linguistic contact that affords its participants an equal and full coexistence in the communication community, a sense of security and the possibility of cooperation” (Cegięła 2014, p. 20). Markowski and Puzynina consider “proper use of language” to be the foundation of ethics of the word. By this they understand “the right to the sender’s sincerity (in informational or persuasive contact) and the right of the recipient to choose attitudes freely and to be free from fear during conversational and persuasive contact” (more generally – this is “the principle of respecting the dignity of the human partner of linguistic contact”, according to which “what must be considered deviant are acts of insincere speech and linguistic acts formulated in a way that imposes views, intimidates the recipient, ones that are vulgar, mocking, etc.)” (Markowski, Puzynina 1993, p. 56). According to Cegięła, unethical language practices include labelling, stigmatization, stereotyping, dehumanization (including depersonification), manipulation (including disinformation, distortion and biased selection of information, as well as operations beneficial only to the sender on the meaning or characterization of words or on the modal shape of speech), exclusion, discrediting, eristic and other arguments (Cegięła 2014, passim; cf. also Puzynina, Pajdzińska 1996).



**Information** – a genre of media communication notifying of an event by answering the questions: who? what? where? when? why? how? (after: Pisarek 2006 (ed.), pp. 82–83).

**Commentary** – a genre of media communication presenting the subjective point of view of the sender, and thus influencing the way the recipients perceive a given fragment of reality. “Commentary directs the viewers’ attention to current issues, shapes their point of view, informs how reality should be perceived, explains the processes taking place in it, shedding new light on the problem, and guiding the recipients to the way of thinking of the commentator, who persuades the recipients to accept their reasoning. Commentary borders on information in that it requires the facts to be given, so that they may be illuminated and interpreted. The main goal of commentary is to express one’s position on the facts that have occurred, analyze them, and argue about them substantively, recalling different points of view and to dispute them, and finally to convince the recipient to the author’s reasons. Commentary should be signed with the author’s name, because it is his opinion on a given subject that is taken into account” (Pisarek 2006 (ed.), pp. 96–97). “A commentary is a journalistic statement of the highest degree of topicality and strongly outlined position of the author(s). It is a genre in which the persuasive function is dominant: it is about giving the audience a certain interpretation of facts, about their targeted elucidation. Commentary should be unambiguous on all levels: the recipient cannot doubt whose position is represented in it, nor what that position is. Any ambiguities, open questions, metaphors are [...] ill-advised.” (Bauer 2000, p. 159).

**Manipulation** – a concept that is blurred and defined in various ways; most often it is assumed that manipulation is such a persuasive influence of the sender on the recipient that meets all the following conditions: 1) it is hidden from the recipient, 2) it causes the recipient to act in accordance with the will (interest) of the sender as a result of the manipulation, 3) it is free of violence on the part of the sender, 4) it exploits any weaknesses of the recipients or external circumstances which make it difficult for them to choose their own behavior, 5) it pursues only particular and/or selfish aims of the senders or their group, disregarding the good of the recipients or the community as a whole, 6) it assumes an instrumental role of the recipients, 7) it is commonly regarded as unethical (see more about this: Puzynina 1992, pp. 212–222; Karwat 2001, Bralczyk 2000).

**Persuasion** – “conscious use of signs and symbols to influence someone’s beliefs, attitudes and decisions, to gain someone’s acceptance of the

proposed views, behavior, and decisions. Its primary goal is not so much to logically prove the validity of a certain view as to gain influence over a given person.” (Szymanek 2005, p. 228). There are three basic types of persuasion: 1) convincing, the aim of which is to prove the rightness or truthfulness of something, assuming that the recipient is an intellectually active individual and that the sender has honest and reliable intentions; this type is considered to be the most ethical and common in various areas of social life;<sup>59</sup> 2) swaying (also called propaganda), the aim of which is to gain as many supporters as possible for the ideas, attitudes or doctrines adhered to by the persuading subject; this type assessed as ethically ambivalent (may serve both useful and socially harmful purposes); 3) inciting (also called agitation), whose aim is to impose a specific pattern of behavior on the recipient by means of an ad hoc influence based on an evocative and authoritative message; this type assessed as the most ethically controversial, as it is often realized in practice by means of techniques close to manipulation (after Korolko 1990, pp. 30–31, Dobek-Ostrowska 2006, pp. 85–86).

**Linguistic valuation** – “expression of assessment through linguistic means, i.e., attributing an evaluation to a material object, a person, an activity or the effect of an activity on the basis of a certain criterion.” (Laszkowska 1992, p. 20). According to Puzynina, on the other hand, *valuing* is a mental activity of a human being, consisting in stating what positive or negative values (and to what extent) are appropriate – in the opinion of the valuing person – for given characteristics, behaviors, states of affairs, and indirectly for objects. (Puzynina 1992, p. 83). The carriers of linguistic evaluation are mainly lexemes (dictionary words), which are classified as follows, according to how the assessment is communicated: a) words with primary axiological markedness, i.e. ones whose definitions contain an obligatory evaluative component<sup>60</sup> (e.g. *scandal*, *embarrassment*, *a radical*, *blunder*) – referred to as systemic evaluative terms in this report; b) words exhibiting secondary axiological markedness, i.e. ones whose definitions do not contain an obligatory evaluative component in their semantic structure, but are at times carriers of evaluation in a given context or situation, which most often results either from their combination with other evaluative words in the context of a given sentence (e.g. *sędziowska kasta* [*the ju-*

59 The information and opinion-related activities of public media should, in principle, be included in this type of persuasion.

60 Here and below, we provide examples from the material we gathered.

*dicial caste*], *sejmowe zdziczenie obyczajów* [brutalization of social norms at the Sejm], *brukselskie połajanki* [scolding from Brussels]). In references to them, we shall use the term sentence-based evaluative expressions), or from their linguistically and/or culturally fixed connotations, or their axiological marking in a particular stretch of discourse (e.g. *gold* ‘wealth’, *cause* ‘idea’, *the Kremlin* ‘Russian authorities’). We shall use the term expressions conveying valuation through context. Carriers of valuation may also be morphological formants, inflectional endings, and syntactic structures.

**Mention** (*newsflash*) – “as an informative genre it usually answers only three questions: who? what? where? about a single fact or event. Most often, the entire mention is contained in one or two sentences. Its author focuses on the most important detail of the event. A mention is a component of the chronicle, a review of the events of a day, week, or month, so it is usually placed in news programs or broadcast on the radio or television immediately after the event in the agency news service. In this case, it concerns facts of exceptional importance or ones related to commonly known people” (after: Pisarek 2006 (ed.), p. 237).



## APPENDIX 1

### **LIST OF ANALYSED MESSAGES (INFORMATION STRIPS OF *WIADOMOŚCI TVP 1* FROM 2016–2017) DIVIDED BY THE TOPIC TO WHICH THEY APPLIED**

**Topic 1:** Events related to the acts or amendments to the acts on the Constitutional Tribunal, on the Supreme Court, on the National Council of the Judiciary and on the Law on the Common Court System – **61 strips** in total.

- [1.] ROZPRAWA CZY SPOTKANIE?  
[A HEARING OR A MEETING?]
- [2.] WIELKI SPÓR  
[A GREAT DISPUTE]
- [3.] OPOZYCJA STRASZY MAJDANEM  
[THE OPPOSITION IS THREATENING WITH (ANOTHER)  
MAJDAN]
- [4.] OPOZYCJA NA ULICY  
[OPPOSITION ON THE STREET]

- [5.] KOMPROMIS NA SPECJALNYCH WARUNKACH  
[COMPROMISE ON SPECIAL TERMS]
- [6.] SZUKANIE KOMPROMISU WOKÓŁ TK  
[THE SEARCH FOR A COMPROMISE REGARDING THE  
CONSTITUTIONAL TRIBUNAL]
- [7.] UKARANY ZA WŁASNE ZDANIE?  
[PUNISHED FOR HAVING HIS OWN OPINION?]
- [8.] MARSZ NA EKSPORT  
[A MARCH FOR EXPORT]
- [9.] OPOZYCJA ODRZUCI KOMPROMIS?  
[WILL THE OPPOSITION REJECT THE COMPROMISE?]
- [10.] SZANSA NA KOMPROMIS  
[CHANCE FOR A COMPROMISE]
- [11.] SEJMOWE GRY  
[PARLIAMENTARY GAMES]
- [12.] OPOZYCJA ŁĄCZY NATO Z TRYBUNAŁEM  
[THE OPPOSITION LINKS NATO WITH THE TRIBUNAL]
- [13.] USTAWA O TRYBUNALE W SENACIE  
[ACT ON THE TRIBUNAL IN THE SENATE]
- [14.] OPOZYCJA ZNÓW O TRYBUNALE  
[THE OPPOSITION ONCE AGAIN ABOUT THE TRIBUNAL]
- [15.] TRYBUNAŁ WALCZY Z NOWĄ USTAWĄ  
[THE TRIBUNAL IS FIGHTING THE NEW ACT]
- [16.] JUTRO DECYZJA TK W SPRAWIE TK  
[TOMORROW DECISION OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL TRI-  
BUNAL ON THE CASE OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL TRIBU-  
NAL]

- [17.] TRYBUNAŁ W SWOJEJ SPRAWIE  
[THE TRIBUNAL ON ITS OWN CASE]
- [18.] SĘDZIOWIE RÓWNIJEJSI WOBEC PRAWA  
[JUDGES MORE EQUAL BEFORE THE LAW]
- [19.] PROF. RZEPLIŃSKI Z MEDALEM OD PLATFORMY  
[PROFESSOR RZEPLIŃSKI WITH A MEDAL FROM THE  
(CIVIC) PLATFORM]
- [20.] PREZES RZEPLIŃSKI CHCE WSKAZAĆ NASTĘPCĘ  
[PRESIDENT (OF THE TRIBUNAL) RZEPLIŃSKI WANTS TO  
NAME HIS SUCCESSOR]
- [21.] JUTRO KONIEC KADENCJI PROF. RZEPLIŃSKIEGO  
[TOMORROW END OF PROFESSOR RZEPLIŃSKI'S TERM]
- [22.] JULIA PRZYŁĘBSKA NOWYM PREZESEM TK  
[JULIA PRZYŁĘBSKA NEW PRESIDENT OF THE CONSTITU-  
TIONAL TRIBUNAL]
- [23.] PRAWNICY, KTÓRZY NIE ZNAJĄ PRAWA  
[LAWYERS WHO DO NOT KNOW THE LAW]
- [24.] SETKI TYSIĘCY ZŁOTYCH DLA SĘDZIÓW TK  
[HUNDREDS OF THOUSANDS OF ZLOTYS FOR CONSTITU-  
TIONAL TRIBUNAL JUDGES]
- [25.] PLAN REFORMY SĄDOWNICTWA  
[THE PLAN OF THE JUDICIAL REFORM]
- [26.] REFORMA SĄDOWNICTWA W SEJMIE  
[JUDICIARY REFORM IN PARLIAMENT]
- [27.] KOLEJNE SKANDALICZNE DECYZJE SĘDZIÓW  
[MORE OUTRAGEOUS RULINGS FROM THE JUDGES]
- [28.] SĘDZIOWIE STRAJKUJĄ NA ZEBRANIACH  
[JUDGES STRIKE AT MEETINGS]

- [29.] REFORMA KRS CORAZ BLIŻEJ  
[REFORM OF NATIONAL COUNCIL OF THE JUDICIARY  
EVER CLOSER]
- [30.] ROZMOWY O KONSTYTUCJI I REFERENDUM  
[DISCUSSIONS ON THE CONSTITUTION AND A REFEREN-  
DUM]
- [31.] SĄDOWNICTWO WYMAGA REFORMY  
[THE JUDICIARY NEEDS REFORM]
- [32.] OTWARTA DROGA DO REFORMY SĄDOWNICTWA  
[OPEN ROAD TO JUDICIAL REFORM]
- [33.] SEJM ZDECYDOWAŁ: RUSZA REFORMA SĄDOWNICTWA  
[PARLIAMENT DECIDES: REFORM OF THE JUDICIARY BE-  
GINS]
- [34.] SĄD NAJWYŻSZY CZEKAJĄ ZMIANY  
[SUPREME COURT FACES CHANGES]
- [35.] OPOZYCJA PRÓBUJE ZABLOKOWAĆ REFORMĘ SĄDÓW  
[OPPOSITION TRIES TO BLOCK REFORM OF COURTS]
- [36.] FRONT OBRONY SĘDZIOWSKIEJ KASTY [identical with 39]  
[THE DEFENSIVE FRONT OF THE JUDICIARY CASTE]
- [37.] OPOZYCJĘ WIĘCEJ DZIELI NIŻ ŁĄCZY  
[MORE DIVIDES THE OPPOSITION THAT UNITES IT]
- [38.] NIEUDOLNA OBRONA TEGO CO BYŁO  
[HEAVY-HANDED DEFENSE OF WHAT THERE WAS]
- [39.] FRONT OBRONY SĘDZIOWSKIEJ KASTY [identical with 36]  
[THE DEFENSIVE FRONT OF THE JUDICIARY CASTE]
- [40.] PREZYDENT WCHODZI DO GRY  
[PRESIDENT ENTERS THE GAME]



- [41.] TOGA CHRONI PRZED ODPOWIEDZIALNOŚCIĄ?  
[DOES A ROBE PROTECT AGAINST LIABILITY?]
- [42.] SEJM O SĄDZIE NAJWYŻSZYM  
[PARLIAMENT ON THE SUPREME COURT]
- [43.] SEJM ZREFORMUJE SĄDOWNICTWO  
[PARLIAMENT REFORMS THE JUDICIARY]
- [44.] „PUCZ” – SEZON DRUGI  
[“THE COUP” – SEASON TWO]
- [45.] KONIEC „NADZWYCZAJNEJ KASTY”  
[THE END OF “THE EXTRAORDINARY CASTE”]
- [46.] TOTALNY CHAOS TOTALNEJ OPOZYCJI  
[TOTAL CHAOS OF THE TOTAL OPPOSITION]
- [47.] SENAT PRACUJE NAD USTAWĄ O SĄDZIE NAJWYŻSZYM  
[SENATE WORKING ON AN ACT ON THE SUPREME COURT]
- [48.] SĄD ZABIERA MIESZKANIE  
[THE COURT TAKES AWAY AN APARTMENT]
- [49.] PRESJA NA ZWOLENNIKÓW REFORMY SĄDÓW  
[PRESSURE ON SUPPORTERS OF COURT REFORM]
- [50.] OPOZYCJA ZAPOWIADA KOLEJNE BITWY  
[THE OPPOSITION PREDICTS FURTHER BATTLES]
- [51.] TEN MA RACJĘ, KTO BARDZIEJ ZŁY?  
[WHOEVER IS MORE UPSET IS RIGHT?]
- [52.] PREZYDENT WETUJE DWIE USTAWY  
[PRESIDENT VETOES TWO ACTS]
- [53.] 17 LAT WALKI O SPRAWIEDLIWOŚĆ  
[17 YEARS OF STRUGGLING FOR JUSTICE]

- [54.] REFORMA SĄDOWNICTWA NIEUNIKNIJONA  
[REFORM OF THE JUDICIARY UNAVOIDABLE]
- [55.] SĘDZIOWIE NA WIECACH OPOZYCJI  
[JUDGES AT OPPOSITION RALLIES]
- [56.] „LICZY SIĘ SPRAWA”  
[“WHAT MATTERS IS THE CAUSE”]
- [57.] PREZES PiS: IDZIEMY RAZEM DO PRZODU  
[PiS CHAIR: TOGETHER WE GO FORWARD]
- [58.] SĄD NAJWYŻSZY ZŁAMAŁ PRAWO?  
[HAS THE SUPREME COURT BROKEN THE LAW?]
- [59.] REFORMATORSKA PO-BUDKA?  
[THE PRO-REFORM ATTITUDE OF PO-BUDKA?]
- [60.] PREZYDENCKIE WETA PRZEKAZANE DO SEJMU  
[PRESIDENTIAL VETOS SENT TO THE PARLIAMENT]
- [61.] RZĄD CHCE ZMIAN W SĄDOWNICTWIE  
[GOVERNMENT WANTS CHANGES TO JUDICIARY]
- [62.] SZTUKA DYPLOMACJI  
[THE ART OF DIPLOMACY]
- [63.] POLITYKA EUROPEJSKA  
[EUROPEAN POLICY]

**Topic 2:** Events related to the actions of EU institutions regarding control of the rule of law in Poland – **32 strips** in total.

- [64.] TAJNA DEBATA O POLSCE  
[A SECRET DEBATE ON POLAND]
- [65.] BRUKSELSKA KONTROLA  
[BRUSSELS CONTROL]

- [66.] BRAK JEDNOŚCI  
[A LACK OF UNITY]
- [67.] GORĄCY TYDZIEŃ  
[A HOT WEEK]
- [68.] W STRASBURGU O POLSCE  
[ON POLAND IN STRASBOURG]
- [69.] OPOZYCJA GRA W EUROPIE  
[OPPOSITION PLAYS IN EUROPE]
- [70.] KOMISJA WENECKA W POLSCE  
[THE VENICE COMMISSION IN POLAND]
- [71.] KOMISJA WENECKA W WARSZAWIE  
[THE VENICE COMMISSION IN WARSAW]
- [72.] KOMISJA WENECKA – DZIEŃ DRUGI  
[THE VENICE COMMISSION – DAY TWO]
- [73.] KOMISJA WENECKA: WINNE OBIE STRONY  
[THE VENICE COMMISSION: BOTH PARTIES ARE AT  
FAULT]
- [74.] JUTRO REZOLUCJA O POLSCE  
[TOMORROW RESOLUTION ON POLAND]
- [75.] REZOLUCJA PRZYJĘTA  
[RESOLUTION ADOPTED]
- [76.] BRUKSELSKIE ULTIMATUM WOBEC POLSKI  
[THE BRUSSELS ULTIMATUM FOR POLAND]
- [77.] POUFNA OPINIA  
[A CONFIDENTIAL OPINION]
- [78.] BRUKSELA ZNÓW O TRYBUBALE  
[BRUSSELS ONCE MORE ABOUT THE TRIBUNAL]

- [79.] KOMISJA WENECKA W POLSCE  
[THE VENICE COMMISSION IN POLAND]
- [80.] KOMISJA WENECKA Z WIZYTĄ W TK  
[THE VENICE COMMISSION VISITS CONSTITUTIONAL  
TRIBUNAL]
- [81.] DEBATA O POLSCE W STASBURGU  
[DEBATE ABOUT POLAND IN STRASBOURG]
- [82.] PRESJA NA POLSKI RZĄD  
[PRESSURE ON THE POLISH GOVERNMENT]
- [83.] POŁAJANKI Z BRUKSELI  
[A SCOLDING FROM BRUSSELS]
- [84.] OSOBISTA „MISJA” TIMMERMANSA  
[TIMMERMANS’ PERSONAL ‘MISSION’]
- [85.] TIMMERMANS SZANTAŻUJE POLSKĘ  
[TIMMERMANS BLACKMAILS POLAND]
- [86.] SIKORSKI WSPIERA NACISKI NA POLSKĘ  
[SIKORSKI SUPPORTS PRESSURE ON POLAND]
- [87.] PLATFORMA Z BRUKSELĄ PRZECIWKO POLSCE  
[THE (CIVIC) PLATFORM WITH BRUSSELS AGAINST PO-  
LAND]
- [88.] DESPERACKI ATAK SKOMPROMITOWANEJ PLATFORMY  
[A DESPERATE ATTACK BY THE COMPROMISED (CIVIC)  
PLATFORM]
- [89.] KTO NIE CHCE SUWERENNEJ I SILNEJ POLSKI?  
[WHO DOES NOT WANT A SOVEREIGN AND STRONG PO-  
LAND?]
- [90.] BRUKSELA, BERLIN I OPOZYCJA PRZECIWKO POLSCE  
[BRUSSELS, BERLIN AND THE OPPOSTION AGAINST POLAND]

- [91.] TOTALNA OPOZYCJA I NIEMCY CHCĄ UKARAĆ POLSKĘ  
[THE TOTAL OPPOSITION AND GERMANY WANT TO PUNISH POLAND]
- [92.] „OPCJA NUKLEARNA” TO KAPISZON  
[THE ‘NUCLEAR OPTION’ IS A STORM IN A TEACUP]
- [93.] PODWÓJNE STANDARDY UNIJNYCH BIUROKRATÓW  
[THE DOUBLE STANDARDS OF EU BUREAUCRATS]
- Topic 3:** Events related to the actions of the Commission of Inquiry to investigate the correctness and legality of the activities of public authorities and institutions toward the entities comprising the Amber Gold Group – **44 strips** in total.
- [94.] BĘDZIE KOMISJA ŚLEDCZA WS. AMBER GOLD  
[THERE WILL BE AN AMBER GOLD INVESTIGATIVE COMMISSION]
- [95.] SEJM POWOŁA KOMISJĘ ŚLEDCZĄ DS. AMBER GOLD  
[PARLIAMENT FORMS AMBER GOLD INVESTIGATIVE COMMISSION]
- [96.] RUSZA KOMISJA ŚLEDCZA DS. AMBER GOLD  
[AMBER GOLD INVESTIGATIVE COMMISSION BEGINS]
- [97.] WALKA Z CZASEM NA STARCIE  
[FIGHT AGAINST TIME AT THE OUTSET]
- [98.] ZDEZORIENTOWANY PROKURATOR  
[A CONFUSED PROSECUTOR]
- [99.] JAK ZACZYNAŁO SIĘ ŚLEDZTWO WS. AMBER GOLD  
[HOW THE AMBER GOLD INVESTIGATION BEGAN]
- [100.] ZEZNANIA PROKURATORÓW OD AMBER GOLD  
[STATEMENTS OF AMBER GOLD PROSECUTORS]

- [101.] KOMPROMITACJA GDAŃSKIEJ PROKURATORY  
[EMBARRASSMENT OF THE GDAŃSK PROSECUTOR'S  
OFFICE]
- [102.] PROKURATORZY ZEZNAJĄ WS. AMBER GOLD  
[PROSECUTORS TESTIFY IN AMBER GOLD CASE]
- [103.] KOMPROMITACJA PROKURATORY WS. AMBER GOLD  
[PROSECUTORS' EMBARRASSEMENT IN AMBER GOLD  
CASE]
- [104.] CO ŚWIADKOWI WIADOMO W SPRAWIE? [identical with 114]  
[WHAT DOES THE WITNESS KNOW ABOUT THE CASE?]
- [105.] PROKURATOR SEREMET PRZED KOMISJĄ ŚLEDCZĄ  
[PROSECUTOR SEREMET BEFORE THE INVESTIGATIVE  
COMMISSION]
- [106.] SZOKUJĄCE ZEZNANIA  
[SHOCKING STATEMENTS]
- [107.] SĘDZIA PRZED KOMISJĄ DS. AMBER GOLD  
[JUDGE BEFORE COMMISSION IN AMBER GOLD CASE]
- [108.] „PAŃSTWO ZAWIODŁO”  
[THE STATE HAS FAILED]
- [109.] NIKT NIE CZUJE SIĘ WINNY ZA AMBER GOLD  
[NO ONE FEELS GUILTY OVER AMBER GOLD]
- [110.] KLUCZOWE PRZESŁUCHANIE WS. AMBER GOLD  
[KEY HEARING ON AMBER GOLD]
- [111.] „PAŃSTWO NIE DZIAŁAŁO TAK, JAK TRZEBA”  
[THE STATE DID NOT WORK AS IT SHOULD HAVE]
- [112.] AMBER GOLD MIAŁA SPECJALNĄ OSŁONĘ  
[AMBER GOLD HAD SPECIAL COVER]

- [113.] ABW WIEDZIAŁA O AMBER GOLD JUŻ W 2010 ROKU  
[ABW KNEW ABOUT AMBER GOLD AS EARLY AS 2010]
- [114.] CO ŚWIADKOWI WIADOMO W SPRAWIE? [identical with 104]  
[WHAT DOES THE WITNESS KNOW ABOUT THE CASE?]
- [115.] PRZESŁUCHANIA PRZED KOMISJĄ DS. AMBER GOLD  
[HEARINGS BEFORE THE AMBER GOLD COMMISSION]
- [116.] WĄTEK LOTNICZY AMBER GOLD  
[THE AIRLINE THREAD OF AMBER GOLD]
- [117.] WĄTEK LOTNICZY AFERY AMBER GOLD  
[THE AIRLINE THREAD OF THE AMBER GOLD SCANDAL]
- [118.] KONCESJA DLA OLT WYDANA OD RĘKI  
[CONCESSION FOR OLT ISSUED IMMEDIATELY]
- [119.] „NIE ODNOTOWAŁEM W SWOJEJ PAMIĘCI”  
[I MADE NO NOTE OF IT IN MY MEMORY]
- [120.] PRZELEW NA 10 MILIONÓW BEZ UMOWY I PODATKU  
[TRANSFER OF 10 MILLION WITH NO CONTRACT OR TAXES]
- [121.] OLT EXPRESS NIE PŁACIŁO PORTOWI LOTNICZEMU  
[OLT EXPRESS DID NOT PAY THE AIRPORT]
- [122.] KOŁOKWIALNIE MÓWIĄC: LIPA  
[TO PUT IT BLUNTLY: ‘A BUNCH OF BULL ...’]
- [123.] MARCIN P. – NIE MAM POLAKOM NIC DO ZWRÓCENIA  
[MARCIN P. – I HAVE NOTHING TO RETURN TO THE POLISH PEOPLE]
- [124.] PLATFORMA KRYŁA DZIAŁANIA AMBER GOLD?  
[THE (CIVIC) PLATFORM PAPERED OVER THE ACTIVITIES OF AMBER GOLD?]

- [125.] NIEPAMIĘĆ I TAJEMNICA [identical with 132]  
[OBLIVIOUSNESS AND MYSTERY]
- [126.] „NIE MIAŁEM TAKIEJ ŚWIADOMOŚCI”  
[I WAS NOT AWARE OF THIS]
- [127.] SZOKUJĄCE ZEZNANIA PRZED KOMISJĄ AMBER GOLD  
[SHOCKING STATEMENTS BEFORE AMBER GOLD COMMISSION]
- [128.] ABW KONTAKTOWAŁA SIĘ Z SZEFEM AMBER GOLD?  
[THE INTERNAL SECURITY AGENCY CONTACTED THE HEAD OF AMBER GOLD?]
- [129.] TAJEMNICZE MILCZENIE TEŚCIOWEJ MARCINA P.  
[THE MYSTERIOUS SILENCE OF MARCIN P.’S MOTHER-IN-LAW]
- [130.] GDZIE JEST ZŁOTO AMBER GOLD?  
[WHERE IS THE GOLD OF AMBER GOLD?]
- [131.] KOMISJA NA TROPIE TRÓJMIEJSKIEGO UKŁADU  
[COMMISSION ON THE TRAIL OF TRI-CITIES RACKET]
- [132.] NIEPAMIĘĆ I TAJEMNICA [identical with 125]  
[OBLIVIOUSNESS AND MYSTERY]
- [133.] KLĘSKA OPERACJI „BURSZTYN”  
[THE FAILURE OF OPERATION ‘AMBER’]
- [134.] ŚLAD TAJNYCH SŁUŻB W AFERZE AMBER GOLD  
[TRACES OF THE SECRET SERVICES IN THE AMBER GOLD SCANDAL]
- [135.] NIEUDOLNOŚĆ CZY SABOTAŻ ŚLEDZTWA?  
[INCOMPETENCE OR SABOTAGE OF THE INVESTIGATION?]
- [136.] UKŁAD GDAŃSKI STAŁ ZA AFERĄ AMBER GOLD  
[GDAŃSK RACKET WAS BEHIND AMBER GOLD SCANDAL]



[137.] RZĄD TUSKA UKRYŁ PRAWDE O AMBER GOLD  
[THE TUSK GOVERNMENT CONCEALED THE TRUTH  
ABOUT AMBER GOLD]

**Topic no. 4:** Events related to the actions of authorities and citizens in connection with laws concerning abortion and related matters - **8 strips** in total.

[138.] FEMINISTKI CHCĄ BEZPIECZNEJ ABORCJI  
[FEMINISTS WANT SAFE ABORTION]

[139.] SPÓR O DOPUSZCZALNOŚĆ ABORCJI  
[DISPUTE OVER THE ALLOWABILITY OF ABORTION]

[140.] POSŁOWIE O ABORCJI  
[MP'S ON ABORTION]

[141.] OPOZYCJA GRA ABORCJĄ  
[THE OPPOSITION PLAYS WITH ABORTION]

[142.] USTAWA ANTYABORCYJNA ODRZUCONA  
[ANTI-ABORTION ACT REJECTED]

[143.] PROWOKACJA I GROTESKA  
[PROVOCATION AND GROTESQUE]

[144.] CHCĄ ABORCJI NA ŻYCZENIE  
[THEY WANT ABORTION ON DEMAND]

[145.] PRZECIWIW RZĄDOWI, ZA ABORCJĄ NA ŻYCZENIE  
[AGAINST THE GOVERNMENT, FOR ABORTION ON  
DEMAND]

**Topic no. 5:** Events related to the commemoration and explanation of the causes of the plane crash near Smolensk on April 10, 2010 – **26 strips** in total.

[146.] ŻADNA TEZA NIE JEST PRZYJĘTA  
[NO THESIS IS ACCEPTED]

- [147.] PO LATACH MILCZENIA  
[AFTER YEARS OF SILENCE]
- [148.] SZÓSTA ROCZNICA  
[SIXTH ANNIVERSARY]
- [149.] UROCZYŚCIOCOCI W SMOLEŃSKU  
[SOLEMNITIES IN SMOLENSK]
- [150.] 10.IV.2010  
[APRIL 10, 2010]
- [151.] WSPOMNIENIE POŻEGNANIA NA OKĘCIOCUCU  
[REMINISCENCES OF A FAREWELL AT OKĘCIE AIRPORT]
- [152.] ZBYT DALEKO DO WARSZAWY  
[TOO FAR TO WARSAW]
- [153.] PRAWO DO PAMIĘCIOCUCI  
[THE RIGHT TO REMEMBRANCE]
- [154.] OSKARŻONNY ARABSKI  
[ARABSKI ACCUSED]
- [155.] SPRAWOZDANIE PODKOMISJIOCUCI BERCZYŃSKIEGO  
[REPORT OF THE BERCZYŃSKI SUBCOMMITTEE]
- [156.] CISZA WOKÓŁ „JEDNOLITEGO PRZEKAZUCUCU”  
[SILENCE SURROUNDING THE “UNIFIED MESSAGE”]
- [157.] NOWE DOWODY WS. KATASTROFY SMOLEŃSKIEJ  
[NEW EVIDENCE REGARDING THE SMOLENSK DISASTER]
- [158.] RODZINY SMOLEŃSKIE CHCĄ EKSHUMACJIOCUCI OFIAR  
[SMOLENSK FAMILIES WANT EXHUMATION OF VICTIMS]
- [159.] PROKURATURA APELUJECUCI O RZETELNE INFORMACJECUCI  
[THE PROSECUTOR’S OFFICE APPEALS FOR RELIABLE INFORMATION]

- [160.] ŚWIADEK TOMASZ T.  
[THE WITNESS TOMASZ T.]
- [161.] PROCES TOMASZA ARABSKIEGO  
[THE TRIAL OF TOMASZ ARABSKI]
- [162.] ŻENUJĄCA PROWOKACJA  
[AN EMBARRASSING PROVOCATION]
- [163.] BLIŻEJ PRAWDY O SMOLEŃSKU  
[CLOSER TO THE TRUTH ABOUT SMOLENSK]
- [164.] OPOZYCJA ZACHĘCA DO PROWOKACJI  
[THE OPPOSITION ENCOURAGES PROVOCATIONS]
- [165.] TUSK CHCE BYĆ PONAD PRAWEM  
[TUSK WANTS TO BE ABOVE THE LAW]
- [166.] ŚWIADEK DONALD TUSK  
[THE WITNESS DONALD TUSK]
- [167.] FRASYNIUK Z PŁK. MAZGUŁĄ W JEDNYM SZEREGU  
[FRASYNIUK IN LINE WITH COL. MAZGUŁA]
- [168.] TEATR JEDNEGO AKTORA  
[ONE MAN SHOW]
- [169.] MARSZ PAMIĘCI POD PRĘGIERZEM POLITYKÓW  
[MARCH OF MEMORY UNDER THE PILLORY OF POLITICIANS]
- [170.] AGRESJA NA OBRZEŻACH MARSZU PAMIĘCI  
[AGGRESSION ON THE FRINGES OF THE MARCH OF REMEMBRANCE]
- [171.] ZMANIPULOWANE DOKUMENTY W KOMISJI MILLERA  
[MANIPULATED DOCUMENTS IN THE MILLER COMMISSION]

**Topic no. 6:** Crisis in the Polish parliament (Sejm) in relation to the transfer of proceedings from the plenary chamber to the Column Hall – **50 strips** in total.

[172.] POWTÓRKA Z SAMOOBRONY  
[A REPEAT OF SELF-DEFENSE]

[173.] NIEUDANA PRÓBA DESTABILIZACJI PAŃSTWA  
[FAILED ATTEMPT TO DESTABILIZE THE STATE]

[174.] PLAN OPOZYCJI  
[THE OPPOSITION'S PLAN]

[175.] ULICZNA ROZRÓBA ZAMIAST PAMIĘCI O BOHATERACH  
[A STREET BRAWL INSTEAD OF REMEMBERING THE HEROES]

[176.] OSTATNIA WALKA ESBEKÓW  
[THE FINAL STRUGGLE OF FORMER COMMUNIST SECRET SERVICE OPERATIVES]

[177.] WOLNE MEDIA WEDŁUG PLATFORMY  
[FREE MEDIA ACCORDING TO (CIVIC) PLATFORM]

[178.] STANDARD (NIE)DEMOKRATYCZNY  
[AN (UN)DEMOCRATIC STANDARD]

[179.] KOMOROWSKI POCHWAŁA PRZEMOC  
[KOMOROWSKI PRAISES VIOLENCE]

[180.] PROWOKACJA PLATFORMY OBYWATELSKIEJ  
[PROVOCATION BY CIVIC PLATFORM]

[181.] WSZYSCY CHCĄ WOLNYCH MEDIÓW  
[EVERYONE WANTS FREE MEDIA]

[182.] DZIEŃ NEGOCJACJI  
[A DAY OF NEGOTIATION]

- [183.] ŻADNYCH GRANIC, ŻADNYCH ŚWIĘTOŚCI  
[NO BOUNDARIES, NOTHING IS SACRED]
- [184.] W CIENIU KREMLA  
[IN THE SHADOW OF THE KREMLIN]
- [185.] AGRESJA MIMO TRAGEDII  
[AGRESSION IN SPITE OF TRAGEDY]
- [186.] OPOZYCJA W OBRONIE ESBECKICH EMERYTUR  
[THE OPPOSITION DEFENDS PENSIONS OF COMMUNIST  
SECRET AGENTS]
- [187.] PiS WYCIĄGA RĘKĘ  
[PiS EXTENDS ITS HAND]
- [188.] W SEJMIE JAK W PRZEDSZKOLU  
[IN THE PARLIAMENT LIKE IN A KINDERGARTEN]
- [189.] ŚWIĘTA SPĘDZĄ W SEJMIE  
[HOLIDAYS WILL BE SPENT IN THE PARLIAMENT]
- [190.] WIGILIA WEDŁUG RADYKALNEJ OPOZYCJI  
[CHRISTMAS EVE ACCORDING TO THE RADICAL  
OPPOSITION]
- [191.] KOLEJNA PRÓBA DESTABILIZACJI PAŃSTWA?  
[ANOTHER ATTEMPT TO DESTABILIZE THE STATE?]
- [192.] WIGILIJNY PASZTET  
[CHRISTMAS EVE PÂTÉ]
- [193.] OPOZYCJA ODRZUCA APELE KOŚCIOŁA  
[THE OPPOSITION REJECTS CHURCH APPEALS]
- [194.] JAK SIĘ ROBI PUCZ  
[HOW TO MAKE A COUP]

- [195.] GRANICE PRZYZWOITOŚCI I ŚMIESZNOŚCI  
[THE LIMITS OF DECENCY AND RISIBILITY]
- [196.] SPÓR MIĘDZY LIDERAMI RADYKALNEJ OPOZYCJI  
[A DISPUTE BETWEEN THE LEADERS OF THE RADICAL  
OPPOSITION]
- [197.] SEJMOWE ZDZICZENIE OBYCZAJÓW  
[BRUTALIZATION OF SOCIAL NORMS AT THE SEJM]
- [198.] MORALNOŚĆ W TRAKCIE KOMPROMITACJI  
[MORALITY IN THE PROCESS OF BEING COMPROMISED]
- [199.] SYLWESTER Z MICHNIKIEM  
[NEW YEAR'S EVE WITH MICHNIK]
- [200.] PETRU I SCHMIDT Z WAŻNĄ ZAGRANICZNĄ WIZYTĄ  
[PETRU AND SCHMIDT ON AN IMPORTANT FOREIGN VISIT]
- [201.] UMIARKOWANA OPOZYCJA PRZECIWKO RADYKAŁOM  
[MODERATE OPPOSTION AGAINST THE RADICALS]
- [202.] JAK MANIPULUJE NIEMIECKA TELEWIZJA PUBLICZNA  
[HOW GERMAN TV USES MANIPULATION]
- [203.] „PRYWATNEMU, NIE POSŁOWI”  
[AS A PRIVATE INDIVIDUAL, NOT AN MP]
- [204.] WPADKA ZA WPADKĄ  
[ONE SLIP-UP FOLLOWING ANOTHER]
- [205.] SCHETYNA KONTRA PETRU  
[SCHETYNA CONTRA PETRU]
- [206.] KTO GRA DALEJ?  
[WHO IS LEFT IN THE GAME?]
- [207.] NIKT NIE ZAMKNAŁ KOLUMNOWEJ  
[NO ONE CLOSED THE COLUMN HALL]

- [208.] RADYKALNA OPOZYCJA ZNÓW GROZI  
[RADICAL OPPOSITION THREATENING AGAIN]
- [209.] KŁÓTNIA W OBOZIE OKUPANTÓW  
[A SQUABBLE IN THE OCCUPYING CAMP]
- [210.] SCHETYNA WYBIERA DROGĘ RADYKAŁA  
[SCHETYNA CHOOSES THE RADICAL PATH]
- [211.] SCHETYNA I PETRU BLOKUJĄ KOMPROMIS  
[SCHETYNA AND PETRU BLOCK COMPROMISE]
- [212.] PETRU OGRAŁ... PETRU  
[PETRU WON AGAINST... PETRU (HIMSELF)]
- [213.] DWIE WIZJE DEMOKRACJI  
[TWO VISIONS OF DEMOCRACY]
- [214.] OPOZYCJA CORAZ BARDZIEJ RADYKALNA  
[THE OPPOSITION (IS BECOMING) MORE AND MORE  
RADICAL]
- [215.] KOD PRZED SEJMEM I HOŁD DLA BAUMANA  
[KOD BEFORE THE SEJM AND A TRIBUTE TO BAUMAN]
- [216.] GRUPY „GP” W OBRONIE SEJMU I RZĄDU  
[“GAZETA POLSKA” GROUPS IN DEFENSE OF THE SEJM  
AND THE GOVERNMENT]
- [217.] CZEGO DOWIEDZIELIŚMY SIĘ DZIĘKI PROTESTOWI  
[WHAT WE LEARNED THANKS TO THE PROTEST]
- [218.] KAPITULACJA PLATFORMY  
[CAPITULATION OF THE (CIVIC) PLATFORM]
- [219.] ANI ULICA, ANI ZAGRANICA  
[NEITHER THE STREET, NOR ABROAD]

[220.] CZY PLATFORMA SZYKUJE NA JUTRO AWANTURĘ?  
[IS THE (CIVIC) PLATFORM SPOILING FOR A FIGHT  
TOMORROW?]

[221.] SEJM PRACUJE, POSEŁ NITRAS NAGRYWA  
[PARLIAMENT IS WORKING, MP NITRAS IS RECORDING]

**Topic no. 7:** Activities in connection with the Nature Conservation Act and in connection with the felling of trees in the Białowieża Forest – **5 strips** in total.

[222.] DRZEWA W POLITYCZNEJ GRZE  
[TREES IN THE POLITICAL GAME]

[223.] UNIJNY SĘDZIA PRZECIWKO POLSCE  
[EU JUDGE AGAINST POLAND]

[224.] SZYSZKO: POLSCE NIE GROŻĄ UNIJNE KARY  
[SZYSZKO: POLAND NOT IN DANGER OF EU PENALTIES]

[225.] LEŚNICY CHCĄ RATOWAĆ PUSZCZĘ BIAŁOWIESKĄ  
[FORESTERS WANT TO SAVE THE BIAŁOWIEŻA FOREST]

[226.] PODWÓJNE STANDARDY KOMISJI EUROPEJSKIEJ  
[THE DOUBLE STANDARDS OF THE EUROPEAN  
COMMISSION]

**Topic no. 8:** Events in connection with the amendment of the Act on retirement pensions for uniformed officers and their families – **6 strips** in total.

[227.] SPÓR O ESBECKIE EMERYTURY  
[DISPUTE OVER THE PENSIONS OF COMMUNIST SECRET  
AGENTS]

[228.] MARSZ KOD I PROTEST ESBEKÓW  
[MARCH BY KOD AND PROTEST BY COMMUNIST SECRET  
AGENTS]



[229.] BLOKADA OPÓŹNI DEZUBEKIZACJĘ?  
[WILL THE BLOCKADE DELAY DECOMMUNIZATION?]

[230.] POWTÓRKA NOCNEJ ZMIANY  
[REPEAT OF NIGHTTIME CHANGES]

[231.] PYCHA SB-KÓW  
[THE PRIDE OF THE COMMUNIST SECRET AGENTS]

[232.] POKORA OFIAR PRL  
[THE HUMILITY OF THE VICTIMS OF THE POLISH PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC]

**Topic no. 9.** Celebrations of National Independence Day – **15 strips** in total.

[233.] OJCOWIE POLSKIEJ NIEPODLEGŁOŚCI [identical with 242]  
[THE FATHERS OF POLISH INDEPENDENCE]

[234.] OTWARCIE ŚWIĄTYNI OPATRZNOŚCI BOŻEJ  
[THE OPENING OF THE TEMPLE OF DIVINE PROVIDENCE]

[235.] MARSZ NIEPODLEGŁOŚCI  
[THE INDEPENDENCE MARCH]

[236.] KOD I KOMOROWSKI Z WŁASNYMI OBCHODAMI  
[KOD AND KOMOROWSKI WITH THEIR OWN CELEBRATIONS]

[237.] ŚWIĘTO NIEPODLEGŁOŚCI I ŚWIĘTO DEMOKRACJI  
[INDEPENDENCE DAY AND DEMOCRACY DAY]

[238.] PATRIOTA TO NIE JEST „RADOSNY BURAK”  
[A PATRIOT IS NOT A ‘CHEERFUL BUMPIN’]

[239.] WIELKI MARSZ PATRIOTÓW  
[THE GREAT MARCH OF PATRIOTS]

[240.] MARSZ NIEPODLEGŁOŚCI PRZEBIEGŁ BEZPIECZNIE  
[THE INDEPENDENCE DAY MARCH TOOK PLACE SAFELY]

- [241.] KOMU PRZESZKADZA PATRIOTYZM POLAKÓW?  
[WHO IS BOTHERED BY POLISH PATRIOTISM?]
- [242.] OJCOWIE POLSKIEJ NIEPODLEGŁOŚCI [identical with 233]  
[THE FATHERS OF POLISH INDEPENDENCE]
- [243.] ŚWIĘTO NIEPODLEGŁOŚCI  
[INDEPENDENCE DAY]
- [244.] SZKALUJĄ PATRIOTÓW, GARDZĄ POLAKAMI  
[THEY SLANDER PATRIOTS, SHOW CONTEMPT FOR  
POLES]
- [245.] KULSON OŚMIESZYŁ OPOZYCYJNYCH RADYKAŁÓW  
[KULSON RIDICULED OPPOSITION RADICALS]
- [246.] SZOKUJĄCE KŁAMSTWA SZKALUJĄCE POLSKĘ  
[SHOCKING LIES DEFAMING POLAND]
- [247.] EUROPEJSKIE ELITY TOLERUJĄ NEONAZISTÓW  
[EUROPEAN ELITES TOLERATE NEO-NAZIS]

**Topic no. 10:** Renewal of the term of office of Donald Tusk as President of the European Council – **15 strips** in total.

- [248.] SARYUSZ-WOLSKI POLSKIM KANDYDATEM  
[SARYUSZ-WOLSKI THE POLISH CANDIDATE]
- [249.] POLSKA STAWIA NA SARYUSZ-WOLSKIEGO  
[POLAND BETS ON SARYUSZ-WOLSKI]
- [250.] PRZYSTANEK POLSKA  
[THE POLAND STOP]
- [251.] POLOWANIE NA SARYUSZ-WOLSKIEGO  
[THE HUNT FOR SARYUSZ-WOLSKI]
- [252.] PRZED SZCZYTEM RADY EUROPEJSKIEJ  
[AHEAD OF THE EUROPEAN COUNCIL SUMMIT]

- [253.] TUSK WYBRANY NA DRUGĄ KADENCJĘ  
[TUSK ELECTED TO A SECOND TERM]
- [254.] POLSKA OBNAŻYŁA UNIJNE STANDARDY DEMOKRACJI  
[POLAND HAS EXPOSED THE EU STANDARDS OF DEMOCRACY]
- [255.] KOMISJA WEZWIE DONALDA TUSKA  
[COMMISSION WILL SUMMON DONALD TUSK]
- [256.] POLSKA CHCE REFORMY UNII EUROPEJSKIEJ  
[POLAND WANTS REFORM OF THE EUROPEAN UNION]
- [257.] TWARDA OBRONA POLSKICH INTERESÓW  
[TOUGH DEFENSE OF POLISH INTERESTS]
- [258.] KOMU OPŁACA SIĘ UNIA EUROPEJSKA  
[FOR WHOM DOES THE EUROPEAN UNION PAY?]
- [259.] PREZES PiS: PO PARTIĄ ZEWNĘTRZNĄ  
[PiS CHAIRMAN: CIVIC PLATFORM AN EXTERNAL PARTY]
- [260.] W BERLINIE ZADOWOLENIE Z WYBORU TUSKA  
[SATISFACTION IN BERLIN AT THE ELECTION OF TUSK]
- [261.] RADOŚĆ Z TUSKA PRETEKSTEM DO PROFANACJI  
[HAPPINESS WITH (DONALD) TUSK AS A PRETEXT FOR DESECRATION]
- [262.] TUSK WEZWANY DO PROKURATURY  
[TUSK SUMMONED TO THE PROSECUTOR'S OFFICE]
- Topic no. 11:** Actions taken by the Commission for Removal of the Legal effects of Reprivatization Decisions Issued in Violation of the Law, in Relation to Certain Warsaw Properties – **28 strips** in total.
- [263.] UKŁAD SAMORZĄDOWY  
[THE LOCAL GOVERNMENT ARRANGEMENT]

- [264.] OPOZYCJA BOI SIĘ KOMISJI WERYFIKACYJNEJ  
[THE OPPOSITION IS AFRAID OF THE COMMISSION OF  
INQUIRY]
- [265.] MIAŁ WYJAŚNIĆ AFERĘ, SAM MUSI SIĘ TŁUMACYZYĆ  
[HE WAS TO CLEAR UP THE SCANDAL, NOW HE HAS TO  
EXPLAIN HIMSELF]
- [266.] PREZYDENT WARSZAWY WEZWANA PRZED KOMISJĘ  
[THE MAYOR OF WARSAW BEFORE THE COMMISSION]
- [267.] SZOKUJĄCE SZCZEGÓŁY DZIKIEJ REPRYWATYZACJI  
[SHOCKING DETAILS OF WILD REPRIVATIZATION]
- [268.] KOLEJNY ŚWIADEK OBCIĄŻA PREZYDENT WARSZAWY  
[YET ANOTHER WITNESS LAYS THE BLAME ON THE MAY-  
OR OF WARSAW]
- [269.] KOMISJA UCHYLA DECYZJĘ STOŁECZNEGO RATUSZA  
[THE COMMISSION ANNULS THE DECISION OF THE CAPI-  
TAL CITY HALL]
- [270.] PRAWNICY ZRZEKAJĄ SIĘ CHMIELNEJ 70  
[LAWYERS FORFEIT (THE PROPERTY AT) 70 CHMIELNA  
STREET]
- [271.] TAJEMNICZY PLAN WICEPREZYDENTA STOLICY  
[A MYSTERIOUS PLAN OF THE VICE-PRESIDENT OF WAR-  
SAW]
- [272.] OFIARY OSZUSTÓW ODZYSKAŁY NADZIEJĘ  
[VICTIMS OF FRAUDSTERS REGAIN HOPE]
- [273.] GRONKIEWICZ-WALTZ DECYDOWAŁA O REPRYWATYZACJI  
[GRONKIEWICZ-WALTZ DECIDED ON REPRIVATISATION]
- [274.] BEZCZELNOŚĆ I BUTA CZYŚCICIELI KAMIENIC  
[THE INSOLENCES AND BOORISHNESS OF THE TOWN-  
HOUSE CLEANERS]

- [275.] GRONKIEWICZ-WALTZ STAWIA SIĘ PONAD PRAWEM  
[GRONKIEWICZ-WALTZ PUTS HERSELF ABOVE THE LAW]
- [276.] JÓŹWIAK: NIE WIEM, NIE PAMIĘTAM  
[JÓŹWIAK: I DON'T KNOW, I DON'T RECALL]
- [277.] WALKA ZE ZŁODZIEJSKĄ REPRYWATYZACJĄ  
[THE FIGHT AGAINST THIEVING REPRIVATIZATION]
- [278.] ZŁODZIEJSKA REPRYWATYZACJA OBCIĄŻA PLATFORMĘ  
[THEIVING REPRIVATIZATION IMPLICATES (CIVIC) PLAT-  
FORM]
- [279.] DRAMAT OFIAR CZYŚCICIELI KAMIENIC [identical with 283]  
[DRAMA OF THE VICTIMS OF THE TOWNHOUSE  
CLEANERS]
- [280.] DZIKA REPRYWATYZACJA ZE ŚMIERCIĄ W TLE  
[WILD REPRIVATISATION WITH DEATH IN THE BACK-  
GROUND]
- [281.] DLACZEGO ZGINĘŁA JOLANTA BRZESKA?  
[WHY DID JOLANTA BRZESKA LOSE HER LIFE?]
- [282.] WALCZYŁA Z CZYŚCICIELAMI KAMIENIC I ZGINĘŁA  
[SHE FOUGHT THE TOWNHOUSE CLEANERS AND LOST  
HER LIFE]
- [283.] DRAMAT OFIAR CZYŚCICIELI KAMIENIC [identical with 279]  
[DRAMA OF THE VICTIMS OF THE TOWNHOUSE CLEANERS]
- [284.] SZOKUJĄCY ZAPIS PODŁOŚCI KAMIENICZNIKÓW  
[THE SHOCKING RECORD OF THE MEANNESS OF THE  
TOWNHOUSE OWNERS]
- [285.] ZAGADKOWE ZWIĄZKI KAMIENICZNIKA  
[THE MYSTERIOUS RELATIONSHIPS OF THE TOWNHOUSE  
OWNER]

- [286.] WICESZEFOWA PO STAWIA SIĘ PONAD PRAWEM  
[(CIVIC) PLATFORM DEPUTY PARTY CHAIR PUTS HERSELF  
ABOVE THE LAW]
- [287.] ZŁODZIEJSKA OŚMIORNICA W STOŁECZNYM RATUSZU  
[THIEVING OCTOPUS (MAFIA) IN THE CAPITAL CITY  
HALL]
- [288.] DOROBILI SIĘ NA KAMIENICY SKRADZIONEJ ŻYDOM  
[THEY PROFITEERED FROM TOWNHOUSES STOLEN  
FROM JEWS]
- [289.] DOWÓD NA KRADZIEŻ KAMIENICY WALTZÓW  
[EVIDENCE OF THEFT OF THE WALTZ'S TOWNHOUSE]
- [290.] GRONKIEWICZ-WALTZ I UKRADZIONA KAMIENICA  
[GRONKIEWICZ-WALTZ AND THE STOLEN TOWNHOUSE]

**Topic no. 12:** Events in connection with the Act on State aid in Raising Children – **4 strips** in total.

- [291.] PROJEKT 500+ JUŻ W SEJMIE  
[DRAFT OF 500+ ALREADY IN PARLIAMENT]
- [292.] POMOC PAŃSTWA DLA RODZIN  
[STATE AID FOR FAMILIES]
- [293.] RUSZYŁ PROGRAM RODZINA 500 PLUS  
[FAMILY 500+ PROGRAM STARTED]
- [294.] WNIOSKI 500+  
[500+ APPLICATIONS]

**Topic no. 13:** Protests of resident physicians – **12 strips** in total.

- [295.] MŁODZI LEKARZE ŻĄDAJĄ PODWYŻEK [identical with 296]  
[YOUNG DOCTORS DEMAND SALARY INCREASES]

- [296.] MŁODZI LEKARZE ŻĄDAJĄ PODWYŻEK [identical with 295]  
[YOUNG DOCTORS DEMAND SALARY INCREASES]
- [297.] MŁODZI LEKARZE ŻĄDAJĄ PONAD 9 TYS. ZŁ PENSJI  
[YOUNG DOCTORS DEMAND OVER 9,000-ZLOTY  
SALARIES]
- [298.] MŁODZI LEKARZE ODRZUCILI KOMPROMIS  
[YOUNG DOCTORS REJECTED THE COMPROMISE]
- [299.] REZYDENCI: 5 TYS. ZŁ PENSJI TO ZA MAŁO  
[RESIDENTS: A SALARY OF PLN 5,000 IS NOT ENOUGH]
- [300.] REZYDENCI: 3,5 TYS. ZŁ PODWYŻKI TO ZA MAŁO  
[RESIDENTS: PAY RISES OF PLN 4,500 ARE NOT ENOUGH]
- [301.] POCZĄTKUJĄCY LEKARZE ŻĄDAJĄ MILIARDÓW ZŁOTYCH  
[BEGINNER DOCTORS DEMAND BILLIONS OF ZLOTYS]
- [302.] POCZĄTKUJĄCY LEKARZE ESKALUJĄ PROTEST  
[BEGINNER DOCTORS ESCALATE THE PROTEST]
- [303.] REKORDOWO WYSOKIE FUNDUSZE NA SŁUŻBĘ ZDROWIA  
[RECORD HIGH FUNDING FOR HEALTH SERVICE]
- [304.] PACJENCI CHCĄ ZAKOŃCZENIA PROTESTU LEKARZY  
[PATIENTS WANT AN END TO THE DOCTORS' PROTESTS]
- [305.] PROTESTUJĄCY LEKARZE ODPRAWILI PACJENTÓW  
[PROTESTING DOCTORS DISMISSED PATIENTS]
- [306.] SZANSA NA POROZUMIENIE  
[CHANCE FOR AN AGREEMENT]





## APPENDIX 2

# Description of the political events reported on the news service *Wiadomości TVP 1* in 2016 and 2017, accompanied by the strips discussed in the report

### Topic no. 1 (from November 13, 2015)

Events related to the acts or amendments to the acts on the Constitutional Tribunal, on the Supreme Court, on the National Council of the Judiciary and on the Law on the Common Court System.

The Law and Justice electoral list in the parliamentary elections of October 25, 2015, obtained a parliamentary majority. Only a few weeks later, a group of Law and Justice parliamentarians submitted to the Sejm of the eighth term a draft amendment<sup>61</sup> to the Act on the Constitutional Tribunal.<sup>62</sup> The justification for the submitted amendment was primarily to correct the mistakes<sup>63</sup> that the Sejm of the seventh term was supposed to have made when passing this law.

The applicants criticized in particular the fact that the law allowed for the election of five judges of the Constitutional Tribunal by the outgoing Sejm (this was done in October 2015), in a situation where their terms of office were to start after the parliamentary elections (the terms of three

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61 Draft bill of the Act on Amending the Law on the Constitutional Tribunal (the Sejm of the Republic of Poland, Document no. 12 of Nov. 13, 2015).

62 The Act of Jun. 25, 2015 in the Constitutional Tribunal (Journal of Laws of Jul. 30, 2015, item 1064).

63 This term was used by the reporter of the Commission, MP Marek Ast. See: the Shorthand report of the First Session of the Polish Sejm on November 19, 2015, Warszawa 2015, p. 146.

judges expired on November 6, 2015, and two more on December 2 and 8, 2015, respectively).

President Andrzej Duda, acknowledging the legitimacy of the charges against the procedure of electing the five judges of the Constitutional Tribunal by the outgoing Sejm of the seventh term, did not have any of them sworn in<sup>64</sup> and also accepted the amendment to the law proposed by the Law and Justice party<sup>65</sup> which was adopted in an extraordinary manner and at a record pace (the legislative process took seven days).

On November 25, 2015, the Sejm of the 8th term in an unprecedented way adopted five resolutions stating that the resolutions of the Sejm of the 7th term were invalid, insofar as they concerned the appointment of judges of the Constitutional Tribunal in October 2015.<sup>66</sup> On November 30, 2015, the Constitutional Tribunal called on the Sejm to refrain from appointing new judges of the Constitutional Tribunal until a judgment was issued on compliance with the Constitution of the Act on the Constitutional Tribunal adopted by the Sejm of the previous term.<sup>67</sup> The Polish Sejm of the Republic of Poland for the 8th term of office did not recognize this appeal and on December 2, 2015 appointed five new judges to the Constitutional Tribunal.<sup>68</sup> The President swore in the four newly elected judges on the night of December 2 to 3, 2015, and the fifth judge on December 9, 2015.<sup>69</sup>

64 <https://wydarzenia.interia.pl/tylko-u-nas/news-100-dni-rzadow-dudy-co-w-tym-czasie-zrobil-prezydent,nId,1924881>; <https://tvn24.pl/polska/nie-powolano-nowych-sedziow-tk-byli-prezesi-wydali-oswiadczenie-ra593450-3317722>.

65 <https://www.polskieradio.pl/5/3/Artykul/1546853,Prezydent-Andrzej-Duda-pod-pisal-nowelizacje-ustawy-o-Trybunale-Konstytucyjnym-Wejdzie-w-zycie-5-grudnia>; <https://wiadomosci.onet.pl/kraj/prof-andrzej-zoll-skonczylo-sie-dwudziestopieciolecie-polski-demokratycznej/2rjbz0>.

66 Resolutions of the Sejm of the Republic of Poland of Nov. 25, 2015 on the declaration of nullity of Resolutions of the Sejm of the Republic of Poland of Oct. 8, 2015, on the election of a judge of the Constitutional Tribunal, published in the Polish Monitor (M.P.) on Oct. 23 2015. (M.P. of Nov. 26, 2015., items 1131, 1132, 1133, 1134, and 1135).

67 Ruling of the Constitutional Tribunal of Nov. 30, 2015 regarding case ref. no. K 34/15.

68 Resolutions of the Sejm of the Republic of Poland on the election of a judge of the Constitutional Tribunal (M.P. of Dec. 2, 2015, items 1182, 1183, 1184, 1185, and 1186).

69 <https://www.prezydent.pl/aktualnosci/wydarzenia/prezydent-odebral-slubowanie-od-sedziow-tk,70>.

On December 3, 2015, the Constitutional Tribunal issued a judgment in which it found, among other things, that the provisions of the Act on the Constitutional Tribunal, insofar as they concerned the appointment of judges to replace those judges whose term of office had expired in November 2015, were consistent with the Polish Constitution, while insofar as they concerned the appointment of judges to replace judges whose term of office expired in December 2015, they were inconsistent with the Constitution.<sup>70</sup> However, President Andrzej Duda refused to swear in the three properly appointed judges in October 2015 due to the fact that these positions were filled by virtue of resolutions of the Polish Parliament of December 2, 2015.<sup>71</sup>

The actions of the parliamentary majority and the President of the Republic of Poland in relation to the Constitutional Tribunal have been criticized not only by opposition groups, but also by academic bodies and non-governmental organizations. They have also become a source of civil protests,<sup>72</sup> and led to the European Commission launching a procedure to control the rule of law in Poland.

In the following months, representatives of the parliamentary majority took further actions aimed at comprehensive changes in the justice system.<sup>73</sup> As a result of these activities, in 2016 and 2017, the Polish Parliament adopted and the President of the Republic of Poland signed a new Act on the Constitutional Tribunal<sup>74</sup>, an amendment to the law on the common court

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70 Judgment of the Constitutional tribunal of Dec. 3 2015, file reference no. K 34/15 (Official Journal of Dec. 16, 2015, item 2129).

71 <https://www.polskieradio.pl/5/3/Artykul/1554973>.

72 Academic committees: <https://www.uw.edu.pl/wp-content/uploads/2015/12/uchwala-senatu-uw-w-sprawie-poszanowania-ladu-konstytucyjnego.pdf>; <https://wpia.uj.edu.pl/documents/41601/89321185/201512010845.pdf>. Organizations: [https://www.hfhr.pl/wp-content/uploads/2016/04/KH\\_22042016.pdf](https://www.hfhr.pl/wp-content/uploads/2016/04/KH_22042016.pdf); <https://bip.siecobywatelska.pl/userfiles/file/Opinie/10-tez-o-naturze-konfliktu-potrzebie-kompromisu-i-kierunku-reformy-Trybuna%C5%82u-Konstytucyjnego.pdf>. Civic protests: <https://www.rp.pl/kraj/art4122161-protest-pod-sejmem-rece-precz-od-trybunalu>.

73 <https://www.pap.pl/aktualnosci/news%2C897690%2Cpis-zlozylo-projekt-zmiany-ustawy-o-sadach.html>; <https://www.radiomaryja.pl/informacje/pis-zlozylo-projekt-zmiany-ustawy-o-sadach/>; <https://polskatimes.pl/reforma-sadownictwa-co-dokladnie-ma-sie-zmienic-w-sadach/ar/12275916>; <https://www.tvp.info/33917664/nikogo-nie-mozna-odwolac-no-blagam-rusza-kampania-sprawiedliwe-sady>.

74 The Act of Jul. 22, 2016 on the Constitutional Tribunal (Journal of Laws of Aug. 1 2016, item 1157).

system,<sup>75</sup> an amendment to the Act on the National Council of the Judiciary and a new Act on the Supreme Court.<sup>76</sup>

Critics of the adopted solutions pointed to their unconstitutionality. As a result of the adoption of the acts there was, among other things, a legal dispute related to the retirement age for Supreme Court judges (including the First President of the Supreme Court during her constitutional term),<sup>77</sup> and to suspension of the membership of the National Council of the Judiciary in the European Network of Councils for the Judiciary on the grounds that it did not meet the criterion of full independence from the executive branch.<sup>78</sup> During the legislative process there have also been numerous demonstrations by citizens demanding that the state authorities respect the Polish Constitution and respect the rule of law.<sup>79</sup>

## Topic no. 2 (from January 12, 2016)

### Events related to the actions of EU institutions regarding control of the rule of law in Poland.

In response to the events related to the adoption of the amendment to the Act on the Constitutional Tribunal in November 2015 by the Polish Parliament of the 8th term, which resulted in controversy over the composition of the Constitutional Tribunal, and due to legislative solutions concerning public media in Poland, the European Commission decided on January 13, 2016, to start the procedure of controlling the rule of law in Poland.<sup>80</sup> The Polish government opposed this decision.<sup>81</sup>

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75 The Act of Jul. 12, 2017 amending the Law on the System of Common Courts and certain other acts (Journal of Laws of Jul. 28, 2017, item 1452).

76 The Act of Dec. 8, 2017 amending the Act on the National Judicial Council and certain other acts (Journal of Laws of Jan. 2, 2018, item 3); the Act of Dec. 8, 2017 on the Supreme Court (Journal of Laws of Jan. 2, 2018, item 5).

77 <https://www.rp.pl/sady-i-trybunaly/art1759141-prezes-sadu-najwyzszego-malgorzata-gersdorf-uznaje-stan-sporzynku>.

78 <https://www.encj.eu/node/495>.

79 <https://wyborcza.pl/7,75398,23631643,europo-nie-odpuszczaj-polska-protestuje-w-obronie-sadu-najwyzszego.html>; <https://wiadomosci.wp.pl/malgorzata-gersdorf-w-sadzie-najwyzszym-protest-w-warszawie-6269670948718721a>.

80 *College Orientation Debate on recent developments in Poland and the Rule of Law Framework: Questions & Answers*, [http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release\\_MEMO-16-62\\_en.htm](http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_MEMO-16-62_en.htm).

81 Cf. e.g. the speech by Prime Minister Beata Szydło to the European Parliament on Jan. 19, 2016. <https://www.europarl.europa.eu/doceo/document/CRE-8-2016-01-19->

The initiation of the control procedure for the rule of law was to lead to a de-escalation of the conflict related to accusations against Polish authorities of violating the constitutional principle of separation of powers by the Polish authorities and to prevent the launch of the procedure provided for in Article 7 (1) of the Treaty on European Union.<sup>82</sup> To this end, the European Commission issued recommendations to the Polish government concerning the rule of law.<sup>83</sup> In December 2017, the European Commission decided that the results of the dialogue with the Polish government had been insufficient, and launched the procedure provided for in Article 7(1) of the Treaty on European Union, which meant requesting that the Council identify a serious risk of a Member State violating the values of the European Union.<sup>84</sup> The launch of the procedure provided for in Article 7(1) of the Treaty on European Union was an unprecedented event – no such measures had previously been applied to any other Member State. A Member State's non-compliance with the rule of law is subject to sanctions, including suspension of voting rights.<sup>85</sup>

The Polish government questioned the validity of the European Commission's substantive argumentation on the doubts related to the reforms of the most important institutions of the judiciary in Poland, but also its formal legitimacy to control the rule of law in Poland. The government also presented arguments justifying the need for a comprehensive reform of the judiciary, the proportionality of actions taken in relation to social needs and referring to the need and desire for dialogue and the need for

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ITM-010\_EN.html. More on this in Cianciara (2018).

82 *Traktat o Unii Europejskiej (wersja skonsolidowana)* (Journal of Laws C 326 of Oct. 26, 2012).

83 Recommendation of the Commission (EC) 2016/1374 of Jul. 27, 2016 on the rule of law in Poland (Official Journal L 217/53 of Aug. 12, 2016); Recommendation of the Commission (EC) 2017/146 of Dec. 21, 2016 on the rule of law in Poland, complementing Recommendation (EC) 2016/1374 (Official Journal L 22/65 of Jan. 27, 2017); Recommendation of the Commission (EC) 2017/1520 of Jul. 26, 2017 on the rule of law in Poland, complementing Recommendations of the Commission (EC) 2016/1374 and (UE) 2017/146 (Official Journal L 228/19 of Sep. 2, 2017); Recommendation of the Commission (EC) 2018/103 of Dec. 20, 2017, on the rule of law in Poland complementing Recommendations (UE) 2016/1374, (UE) 2017/146 i (UE) 2017/1520 (Official Journal L 17/50 of Jan. 23, 2018).

84 Cf. Grzelak 2018, pp. 213–230.

85 Zawidzka-Łojek, Barcz 2018, p. 11–12.

the European Commission to respect the autonomy of sovereign members of the European Union.<sup>86</sup>

Representatives of the opposition parties in Poland, in turn, argued that as a result of actions causing the dispute with European Union institutions, Poland had lost its important international position and was not being regarded by the largest European countries as a strategic partner. Referring to the nearing Brexit, the opposition leaders warned that the attitude of the Polish government could ultimately lead to similar consequences.<sup>87</sup>

### Topic no. 3 (from July 19, 2016)

Events related to the actions of the Commission of Inquiry to investigate the correctness and legality of the activities of public authorities and institutions toward the entities comprising the Amber Gold Group.

Amber Gold started its operations in 2009, offering its customers attractive high-interest deposits in the form of a precious metal storage agreement. That same year, the Polish Financial Supervision Authority (KNF) submitted a notification to the public prosecutor's office about the possibility of a crime being committed, suspecting the company's authorities of conducting banking activity without the required permits. The KNF also entered the company on its list of public warnings. However, the number of the company's clients continued to grow. In 2012, Amber Gold was shut down and all its clients' contracts were terminated. In September 2012, the court declared Amber Gold insolvent.<sup>88</sup>

The case of Amber Gold's bankruptcy caused protests from clients, who demanded the recovery of the invested funds (almost eighteen thou-

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86 *Biała Księga w sprawie reform polskiego wymiaru sprawiedliwości*, Kancelaria Prezesa Rady Ministrów, Warszawa 2018, <https://www.gov.pl/attachment/c9882d3c-1897-48c0-8f58-676505fc758f>; Cianciara, op. cit.; <https://www.tvp.info/36462212/msz-polska-w-odpowiedzi-na-zalecenia-ke-zadeklarowala-gotowosc-dalszego-dialogu>.

87 <https://www.tokfm.pl/Tokfm/7,103454,22810279,opozycja-po-decyzji-ke-pis-sam-jest-sobie-winien-teraz-musi.html>; <https://www.rp.pl/plus-minus/art2166011-polacy-to-euroentuzjasci-kto-nas-wrabia-w-polexit>.

88 <https://prawo.money.pl/aktualnosci/wiadomosci/artukul/afery;amber;gold;zaczela;sie;w;2009;roku;oto;cala;jej;historia,27,0,1150747.html>; <https://radiogdansk.pl/wiadomosci/2016/09/07/krotka-historia-amber-gold-gdzie-podzialy-sie-te-miliony/>; <https://www.bankier.pl/wiadomosc/KNF-ostrzega-przed-firma-pozyczkowa-Amber-Gold-2120754.html>; <https://tvn24.pl/biznes/z-kraju/amber-gold-kalendarium-wydarzen-co-ustalono-w-tej-sprawie-ra750620-4481475>.

sand people were ultimately wronged<sup>89</sup>) and accused state institutions of lack of proper information about the risk associated with investing money in financial instruments based on a pyramid scheme.<sup>90</sup>

After the parliamentary elections of 2015, victorious for Law and Justice, a committee of inquiry for Amber Gold was established in the Polish Parliament.<sup>91</sup> The committee's actions were to demonstrate, among other things, how effective the actions of state bodies had been, to the extent that they could have prevented the establishment or functioning of Amber Gold. After the adoption of the motion to establish a commission of inquiry in 2016, the opposition accused the Law and Justice party that the main reason for the commission's establishment was an attempt to hold the former prime minister Donald Tusk (already President of the European Council at the time), politically responsible for the bankruptcy of Amber Gold. In the analyzed period, the media reported on the course of the committee of inquiry's meetings with the accused owners of Amber Gold and the most important politicians called for explanations.

## Topic no. 4 (March 22, 2016–November 4, 2016)

**Events related to the actions of authorities and citizens in connection with the legal regulation of the conditions of admissibility of abortion and related matters.**

Under the Act of 7 January 1993, abortion was legal in Poland in three cases: when the pregnancy poses a threat to the life or health of the mother, when there are reasons to believe that there are serious and irreversible impairments of the fetus or an incurable disease threatening its life, or when the pregnancy is the result of a prohibited act. This was one of the most restrictive laws in Europe that sets out the conditions for the admissibility of abortion.<sup>92</sup> However, it was usually described in Polish public discourse as a compromise.

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89 <https://www.money.pl/gospodarka/wiadomosci/artykul/sledztwo;w;sprawie;amber;-gold;18;tys;pokrzywdzonych;851;mln;zl;strat,3,0,1597955.html>.

90 <https://radiogdansk.pl/wiadomosci/2016/09/07/krotka-historia-amber-gold-gdzie-podzialy-sie-te-miliony/>.

91 Committees of inquiry in the Polish Parliament are meant to constitute an instrument of parliamentary control over government activities. See: Bagieńska-Masiota 2010; Żukiewicz 2009; Banaszak 2007.

92 The Act of Jan. 7, 1993 on family planning, human embryo protection and conditions of permissibility of abortion (Journal of Laws of 1993, No 17, item 78 as amended), Section 4 (a) (1).



In April 2016, the ‘Stop Abortion’ Committee started a campaign of collecting signatures for a civic project which envisioned repealing all of the above conditions of the admissibility of termination of pregnancy (which would be tantamount to a *de facto* ban on abortion).<sup>93</sup>

In response to this initiative, one month later, the ‘Save the Women’ Committee began collecting signatures for a civic bill on women’s rights and informed motherhood. This bill envisaged the right of women to terminate a pregnancy until the twelfth week after conception, and in three special cases – also after the twelfth week of pregnancy.<sup>94</sup>

Both civic bills were submitted to the Polish Parliament together with the required number of signatures. On September 23, 2016, a vote was held. MPs decided by a majority of votes to refer the “Stop abortion” project to the committees, whilst rejecting the project proposed by “Save the Women.” Voting within the various parliamentary clubs was not unanimous.<sup>95</sup>

The decision of the MPs triggered spontaneous social protests called ‘black protests’ and led to the formation of the informal civil movement ‘All-Poland Women’s Strike.’ On October 3, 2016, multiple demonstrations modelled on the 1975 absentee strike of women in Iceland took place in many cities. Between one and several hundred thousand women and citizens took part in them.<sup>96</sup> The strike was described as an ‘umbrella revolution’, a ‘black Monday’ or a ‘black march’. It was reported on by the world’s most important news services.<sup>97</sup> As a result of the protests, the

93 Draft bill on amending the law of Jan. 7, 1993 on family planning, human embryo protection and conditions of permissibility of abortion of Jun. 6, 1997, Penal Code, (Sejm RP, Document no. 784 of Aug. 19, 2016).

94 Draft bill of the Act on Women’s Rights and Informed Parenting (the Sejm of the Republic of Poland, Document no. 830 of Sept. 9, 2016).

95 Shorthand report of the 26th session of the Polish Sejm on Sept. 22, 2016, Warszawa 2016, pp. 184–246; Shorthand report of the 26th session of the Polish Sejm on Sept. 23, 2016, Warszawa 2016, pp. 268–271.

96 <https://www.wprost.pl/kraj/10025692/szef-policji-podsumowal-czarnyprotest-i-odpowiedzial-krytykom-niemal-100-tys-uczestnikow-w-143-miejscach.html>; <https://wiadomosci.gazeta.pl/wiadomosci/7,114883,20786378,w-warszawie-30-tys-protestujacych-we-wroclawiu-20-tys-tlumy.html>.

97 <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-37449903>; <https://www.theguardian.com/world/video/2016/oct/05/poland-signals-u-turn-total-abortion-ban-protests-video-report>; <https://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/europe/abortion-ban-poland-warsaw-parliament-vote-party-jaroslav-kaczynski-pis-a7358036.html>; <https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/worldviews/wp/2016/10/03/polish-women-go-on-nationwide-strike-against-proposed-abortion-ban/>.



Polish Parliament also rejected the civic project, which assumed the introduction of a total ban on abortion.<sup>98</sup>

## Topic no. 5 (from February 4, 2016)

Events related to the commemoration and explanation of the causes of the plane crash near Smolensk on April 10, 2010.

The crash of the TU-154 aircraft near Smolensk (Russia) on April 10, 2010, killed 96 prominent politicians and officials, including the President of Poland Lech Kaczyński and his wife.<sup>99</sup> Both the Polish and Russian sides appointed special commissions to explain the causes of the disaster. The first to announce its findings, on January 12, 2011, was the Joint Committee of the Interstate Aviation Committee (MAK) and the Russian Ministry of Defense.<sup>100</sup> The Polish Commission for the Investigation of Air Accidents of the State Aviation Administration prepared a report that was officially presented to the public on July 29, 2011.<sup>101</sup>

The findings of both committees were questioned by the then parliamentary opposition, mainly by representatives of Law and Justice.<sup>102</sup> In November 2010, the Parliamentary Group for Investigating the Causes of the Tu-154M Disaster of April 10, 2010, was established in the Sejm of the 7th term.<sup>103</sup> The Team presented a report on its work on April 10, 2013.<sup>104</sup> The report was criticized by both members of the State

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98 Shorthand report of the 27. session of the Polish Sejm on Oct. 6, 2016, Warszawa 2016, pp. 298–304.

99 <https://wiadomosci.wp.pl/lech-kaczynski-nie-zyje-katastrofa-samolotu-96-ofiar-6037566880612993a>; <https://www.tokfm.pl/Tokfm/7,103086,7752546,katastrofa-samolotu-prezydenta-nikt-nie-przezyl.html>.

100 <https://www.newsweek.pl/polska/raport-koncowy-mak-byla-presja-by-ladowac-pobierz-dokumenty/615sv07>; <https://tvn24.pl/wiadomosci-z-kraju,3/raport-mak-nie-jest-kompletny,158741.html?h=1680>.

101 *Final Report from the examination of the aviation accident no. 192/2010/11 involving the Tu-154M airplane, tail number 101, which occurred on April 10th, 2010 in the area of the SMOLENSK NORTH airfield*, Warszawa 2011 (selected internet sources: [https://doc.rmf.pl/rmf\\_fm/store/rkm.pdf](https://doc.rmf.pl/rmf_fm/store/rkm.pdf); [https://aviation-safety.net/reports/20100410-0\\_T154\\_101\\_POL.pdf](https://aviation-safety.net/reports/20100410-0_T154_101_POL.pdf)).

102 <https://jedynka.polskieradio.pl/artykul/936891>.

103 <http://www.sejm.gov.pl/sejm7.nsf/agent.xsp?symbol=ZESPOL&Zesp=94>.

104 <https://www.polskieradio.pl/5/3/Artykul/820253>.

Commission for Aviation Accident Investigation and by experts on aviation.<sup>105</sup>

After the victory of Law and Justice in the parliamentary elections in October 2015, the idea of re-evaluating the official causes of the Smolensk plane crash returned. For this purpose, on February 4, 2016, the 8th term Subcommittee on Aviation Accident Re-examination was appointed in the Polish Parliament.<sup>106</sup>

The actions of the authorities in this matter provoked protests from both the parliamentary opposition and citizens opposing the use of the catastrophe for political gain. The Civic Platform established its own Team for the Investigation of Instances of Manipulation of the Causes of the Disaster of April 10, 2010.<sup>107</sup> Members of the Subcommittee of the Ministry of National Defense were accused of not having sufficient experience in air disaster investigation.<sup>108</sup>

Apart from the institutional and legal dimension, the tragic consequences of the Smolensk catastrophe have also gained a symbolic dimension. In 2017, the Mazovian Voivode gave permission for cyclical meetings to pay tribute to the victims of the Smolensk catastrophe in the center of Warsaw. These events (including the culminating march) were to be organized from May 2017 to April 2020, on the tenth day of each month from 6 am to 10 pm.<sup>109</sup> However, marches on these days were

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105 <https://www.polityka.pl/tygodnikpolityka/kraj/1541041,1,prof-pawel-artymowicz-komentuje-raport-zespołu-antoniego-macierewicza.read>; <https://wiadomosci.wp.pl/edward-lojek-zarzuty-macierewicza-to-wierutne-bzdury-6031557211096193a>.

106 <https://wydarzenia.interia.pl/raporty/raport-lech-kaczynski-nie-zyje/przyczyny-tragedii/news-powolanie-podkomisji-ds-ponownego-zbadania-katastrofy-smolensk,nId,2139883>; <https://www.radiomaryja.pl/informacje/szef-mon-wyjasnia-powolanie-podkomisji-ds-katastrofy-smolenskiej/>.

107 <https://faktysmolensk.niezniknelo.com/sklad.html>.

108 <https://www.newsweek.pl/polska/polityka/do-rzeczy-krytykuje-komisje-macierewicza-mizerne-efekty-prac/ljzsfz>; <https://www.tokfm.pl/Tokfm/7,102433,23247107,-ci-pseudoeksperci-nie-znaja-fizyki-i-aerodynamiki-ekspert.html>; <https://www.wprost.pl/kraj/10109939/opozycja-krytykuje-podkomisje-smolenska-za-brak-wynikow-to-dojna-krowa-wydalismy-na-to-publiczne-pieniadze.html>; <https://www.fakt.pl/wydarzenia/polska/poslanka-pis-elzbieta-kruc-krytykuje-podkomisje-macierewicza-mocne-slowa/cq37pkq>.

109 <https://oko.press/images/2018/02/decyzja-z-27-kwietnia.pdf>. The permission was withdrawn by decision of the Mazovian Voivode issued on June 29, 2018, no. WSO-I.6110.1.16.2018: <https://bip.mazowieckie.pl/artykuly/441/informacja-o-miejscach-i-terminach-zgromadzen-organizowanych-cyklicznie>.

blocked by members of the Obywatele RP [Citizens of Poland] social movement. As a result, the police secured the participants of marches with a special cordon, while those blocking the march were accused of disturbing public gatherings.<sup>110</sup>

## Topic no. 6 (December 16, 2016–February 22, 2017)

### Crisis in the Polish parliament (Sejm) in relation to the transfer of proceedings from the plenary chamber to the Column Hall.

On December 16, 2016, the Speaker of the Sejm excluded from the session a member of the Civic Platform, Michał Szczęrba<sup>111</sup> for disturbing the session by posting on the rostrum a card with the inscription “#Wolne-MediawSejmie” [#FreeMedia in the Sejm].

Members of the parliamentary clubs of the Civic Platform and Nowoczesna began the occupation of the parliamentary rostrum in protest against the decision of the Speaker of the Sejm.<sup>112</sup> In order to enable further deliberations, including proceedings on the budget law, the Speaker of the Sejm decided to move the session from the Plenary Hall to the Column Hall of the Sejm.<sup>113</sup> However, journalists were not allowed in this room, and opposition MPs were prevented from accessing the venue by blocking the entrance with chairs. Opposition MPs protested and indicated that there was no quorum in the Column Hall of the Sejm and that they were being prevented from submitting formal motions, so that the decisions taken there had no legal force.<sup>114</sup>

110 <https://www.pap.pl/aktualnosci/news%2C763152%2Cobywatele-rp-bedzie-kolejna-kontrmanifestacja-miesiecznicze-smolenska.html>; <https://natemat.pl/196503,obywatele-rp-od-rana-blokują-miesiecznicze-smolenska-trwa-protest-na-krakowskim-przedmiesciu>; <https://tvn24.pl/tvnwarszawa/najnowsze/wzrost-koszt-ochrony-miesiecznicy-z-powodu-kontrmanifestacji-285977>; <https://polska-times.pl/87-miesiecznica-i-kontrmanifestacja-obywateli-rp-zdjecia/ar/12255209>.

111 Shorthand report of the 33. session of the Polish Sejm on Dec. 16 2016, Warszawa 2016, p. 62.

112 <https://dorzczy.pl/kraj/17074/poslowie-opozycji-okupują-sejmowa-mównice.html>.

113 <https://wpolityce.pl/polityka/319659-awantura-w-sejmie-szczęrba-wychodzi-z-kartka-o-wolnych-mediach-kuchcinski-wyklucza-go-z-obrad-poslowie-po-i-n-okupują-mównice-wideo>.

114 <https://www.wprost.pl/kraj/10035158/protest-opozycji-i-starcia-przed-sejmem-co-wydarzylo-sie-minionej-nocy.html>; <https://oko.press/kuchcinski-wielokrotnie-lamal-wczoraj-regulamin-sejmu-16-grudnia-groza-mu-lata-wiezienia/>; <https://tvn24.pl/polska/pis-zapewnia-kworum-bylo-opozycja-pokazuje-listy-obecnosci-ra700470>;

Activities inside the building of the Sejm led to a civic demonstration before it. The demonstrators blocked the exit from the Sejm at night and there were clashes with the police.<sup>115</sup> The protest of the members of the Civic Platform and Nowoczesna in the Plenary Hall was continued until the day of the next session of the Sejm, which was held on January 11, 2017. On December 24, the protesting MPs organized a parliamentary Christmas Eve supper, and several hundred citizens gathered in front of the building of the Polish Sejm, expressing their symbolic support for the protesting MPs.<sup>116</sup> The civic protests lasted until January 1. The occupation of the Plenary Hall and clashes between demonstrators and the police in front of the building of the Polish parliament were widely commented on in world media.<sup>117</sup> The leaders of Law and Justice argued that the protest of MPs and their supporters was a coup against the democratically elected authorities.<sup>118</sup>

The opposition suspended the protest at the Sejm on January 12, 2017, filing a motion to dismiss Marek Kuchciński from the post of Speaker of the Sejm. The motion was considered on February 22, 2017, and did not gain the approval of the parliamentary majority.<sup>119</sup>

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<https://pomorska.pl/posel-brejza-nagral-ziobre-podpisujacego-liste-obecnosci-po-zamknieciu-obrad-sejmu/ar/11589374>; <https://www.money.pl/gospodarka/wiadomosci/artykul/budzet-2017-sejm-chaos-w-sejmie-jaroslaw,250,0,2220794.html>.

115 <https://www.radiolodz.pl/posts/31261-chaos-w-sejmie-kilkudziesieciosobowa-grupa-poslow-opozycji-okupuje-mownice-sejmowa>; <https://wiadomosci.dziennik.pl/polityka/artykuly/538081,awantura-krzyki-w-sejmie-posel-wstawil-sie-za-dziennikarzami-politycy-opozycji-zablokowali-mownice-sejmowa.html>; <https://www.fakt.pl/polityka/policja-atakuje-demonstrantow-przed-sejmem/8xjm1g6>.

116 <https://wiadomosci.gazeta.pl/wiadomosci/7,114884,21167638,wigilia-opozycji-w-sejmie-przed-sejmem-tez-stanal-swiateczny.html>; <https://www.wprost.pl/kraj/10036245/sejmowa-wigilia-protestujacy-poslowie-spedzaja-swieta-na-wiejskiej.html>.

117 <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-38347674>; <https://www.euronews.com/2016/12/17/protest-broken-up-outside-poland-s-parliament>; <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-poland-politics-crisis/police-break-up-blockade-of-polands-parliament-amid-political-crisis-idUSKBN1452TL?il=0>.

118 <https://wiadomosci.wp.pl/pis-nazwal-to-puczem-wyjasniamy-na-czym-polega-problem-z-glosowaniem-w-sali-kolumnowej-6199706250004609a>.

119 Shorthand report of the 36th session of the Polish Sejm on February 22, 2017, Warszawa 2017, pp. 4–18.

## Topic no. 7 (from December 16, 2016)

### Activities in connection with the Nature Conservation Act and in connection with the felling of trees in the Białowieża Forest.

On December 16, 2016, during the parliamentary crisis, an act was adopted under which the freedom of property owners to remove trees and shrubs located on their premises was increased.<sup>120</sup> In a short space of time, this led to an increase in the number of felled trees with no administrative control. It was pointed out that the adopted law could be of great benefit to developers who would gain additional space for investments at the expense of trees and shrubs.<sup>121</sup>

On February 20, 2017, at a meeting with party activists, leader of the Law and Justice party Jarosław Kaczyński criticized the law supported by the Minister of the Environment.<sup>122</sup> In the meantime (March 2017), the opposition submitted a motion to pass a vote of no confidence regarding the minister, but it did not gain the approval of the parliamentary majority.<sup>123</sup>

In May 2017, the European Commission responded to the decision to increase the felling zone in Primeval Forest of Białowieża, a protected area, unique in Europe. The Ministry of the Environment argued that these actions were necessary due to the invasion of a certain species of bark beetle, which caused tree death. Many scientists and conservationists protested this decision, pointing to the commercial background of the Minister of the Environment's decision to increase the clearing area. In May and June, environmentalists organized protests in the area of the Białowieża Forest, preventing the entry of heavy logging equipment and thereby making any felling activities impossible.<sup>124</sup>

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120 The Act of Dec. 16, 2016 amending the Nature Protection Act and the Forest Act (Journal of Laws of Dec. 30, 2016., item 2249).

121 <https://oko.press/wycinka-bez-kontroli-pis-sali-kolumnowej-przeglosowalo-projekt-ministra-szyszki/>; <https://www.agrofakt.pl/wycinka-drzew-na-wlasnej-posesji-2017/>; <https://www.money.pl/gospodarka/wiadomosci/arttykul/wycinka-drzew-zezwolenia,157,0,2245533.html>; <https://www.prawo.pl/biznes/prezydent-podpisal-ustawe-umozliwiajaca-wycinke-drzew-na-prywatnej-posesji-bez-zezwolenia,167583.html>.

122 <https://dorzeczy.pl/kraj/22507/szyszko-odpowiada-kaczynskiemu-ws-wycinki-drzew.html>; <https://www.wprost.pl/kraj/10043619/kaczynski-krytykuje-ustawe-minister-jej-broni-to-bardzo-dobry-projekt-z-punktu-widzenia-prawa-wlasnosci.html>.

123 Shorthand report of the 38th session of the Polish Sejm on March 23, 2017, Warszawa 2017, p. 259.

124 <https://puszcza-bialowieska.blogspot.com/2017/04/komisja-europejska-odrzuca-argumenty.html?m=0>; <https://www.fakt.pl/wydarzenia/polityka/puszcza-bialowieska-dru>

On July 20, 2017, the European Commission brought an action before the EU Court of Justice vis a vis Poland's failure to comply with the directives established for the conservation of protected sites located in Natura 2000 areas. On July 27, the Court's vice-president ordered that the felling be stopped immediately.<sup>125</sup> The Polish government did not comply with this decision.<sup>126</sup> The dispute continued until November 2017, when the Court again ordered the immediate cessation of felling and threatened the Polish government with financial penalties.<sup>127</sup> Only the day after that was the felling of trees in the Białowieża Forest discontinued.

## Topic no. 8 (November 24, 2016 – October 1, 2017)

### Events in connection with the amendment of the Act on retirement pensions for uniformed officers and their families.

On November 24, 2016, the Law and Justice government submitted to the Sejm of the Republic of Poland a bill on abolishing pension privileges for uniformed officers connected in any way with the security apparatus of the Polish People's Republic from July 22, 1944 to July 31, 1990<sup>128</sup> (even if they were positively verified and qualified to work in the uniformed services of the democratic Third Republic after 1990).

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gie-ostrzezenie-dla-polski/6c5ljf5; <https://www.rmfm24.pl/fakty/pol-ska/news-polska-przed-trybunalem-ue-za-wycinke-w-puszczy-bialowieskie>; <https://www.polsatnews.pl/wiadomosc/2017-05-15/stuletnie-deby-wciaz-padaja-m-in-stuhr-janda-i-staszczuk-staja-w-obronie-puszczy-bialowieskiej/>; <https://www.tokfm.pl/Tokfm/7,102433,21857767,przy-jechal-lesniczy-i-oglosil-ze-las-jest-zamkniety-ekolodzy.html>.

125 Decision of the Vice-President of the Tribunal of Jul. 27, 2017. Proceedings regarding an interim measure – Request for applying interim measures – Application for review *inaudita altera parte* – Directive 92/43/EEC – Directive 2009/147/EC – Protection of natural habitats and wild fauna and flora C-441/17 R.

126 <https://www.polityka.pl/tygodnikpolityka/kraj/1714496,1,wycinka-w-puszczy-trwarzad-zadnych-kar-sie-nie-boi.read>; <https://businessinsider.com.pl/polityka/ministerszyszo-o-ke-i-wycince-drzew-w-puszczy-bialowieskiej/mhpn2ge>.

127 Ruling of the Tribunal (Grand Chamber) of Nov. 20, 2017. Proceedings regarding an interim measure – Request for applying interim measures – Directive 92/43/EEC – on the conservation of natural habitats and of wild fauna and flora – Directive 2009/147/EC – protection of wild birds, case C-441/17 R.

128 Draft bill on amending the Act on retirement provision for officers of the Police, Internal Security Agency, Intelligence Agency, Military Counterintelligence Service, Military Intelligence Service, Central Anti-Corruption Bureau, Border Guard, Government Protection Bureau, State Fire Service and Prison Service and their families (the Sejm of the Republic of Poland, Document no 1061 of Nov. 24, 2016).

The draft law triggered multiple protests of representatives of uniformed services and trade unions, who opposed the use of collective responsibility by the government without taking into account each officer's individual service record after 1990.<sup>129</sup> The Supreme Court in its opinion on the draft law indicated that for those who had passed the verification and obtained decisions on being qualified to work in the uniformed services after 1990, the principle of trust in the state and the law might be violated.<sup>130</sup>

The proponents of the act and its supporters stressed the need to restore social justice, which in their opinion meant that people involved in serving the Polish People's Republic cannot be privileged over those who were not involved in the system or those who actively fought for Poland to regain full sovereignty before 1990, and who are deprived of such privileges.<sup>131</sup> Despite the protests, the Act entered into force on October 1, 2017.

## Topic no. 9 (from November 11, 2016, cyclically)

### Celebrations of National Independence Day.

National Independence Day falls on November 11, and commemorates the events of 1918, when Poland regained its independence after 123 years of partitions. In the following years, the celebrations were ritualized and official: representatives of the authorities participated in state ceremonies, special concerts, exhibitions and other cultural events were organized.

On that day, other marches were also initiated by circles on the extreme right: Młodzież Wszechpolska [All-Polish Youth] and Obóz Narodowo-Radykalny [the Radical-National Camp] also initiated their own marches. Since

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129 [https://www.rmf24.pl/news-protest-mundurowych-przeciwko-ustawie-dezubekizacyjnej-wszysnId,2316705#crp\\_state=1](https://www.rmf24.pl/news-protest-mundurowych-przeciwko-ustawie-dezubekizacyjnej-wszysnId,2316705#crp_state=1); <https://www.radiokrakow.pl/aktualnosci/krakow/byli-funkcjonariusze-sluzb-mundurowych-protestuja-nie-zgadza-sie-na-obnizenie-emerytur/>.

130 Comments of the Supreme Court to the governmental bill amending the Act on the retirement provisioning of officers of the Police, Internal Security Agency, Intelligence Agency, Military Counterintelligence Service, Military Intelligence Service, Central Anti-Corruption Bureau, Border Guard, Government Protection Bureau, State Fire Service and Prison Service and their families of Dec. 9, 2016 (BSA 111-021-525/16).

131 <https://www.gazetaprawna.pl/wiadomosci/artykuly/1075156,premier-ustawa-dezubekizacyjna-to-przywrocenie-sprawiedliwosci.html>; <https://www.polskieradio.pl/128/3/Artykul/1864725,Mariusz-Blaszczak-ustawa-dezubekizacyjna-to-akt-sprawiedliwosci-spolecznej>.



2011 the march had been organized by Stowarzyszenie Marsz Niepodległości [the Independence March Association]. In the years 2011–2014, during the march there were several riots, hooligan excesses and clashes with the police.<sup>132</sup>

Since 2015, the main slogans of the Independence March emphasized the radical, agonic, religious, and national character of the event: 2015 – *Polska dla Polaków, Polacy dla Polski* [Poland for Poles, Poles for Poland]; 2016 – *Polska bastionem Europy* [Poland [as a] bastion of Europe]; 2017 – *My chcemy Boga* [We want God].<sup>133</sup> The number of demonstrations increased at that time to tens of thousands of participants.

Every year, the police recorded incidents related to illegal use of flares and firecrackers during the march. The media also recorded that some of the participants had raised slogans that were clearly racist, xenophobic and hateful.<sup>134</sup> As a result of these incidents, independence marches were reported on not only in the national but also in the global media.<sup>135</sup> It was emphasized that the Independence March had state legitimacy because a letter was addressed to its participants by President Andrzej Duda.<sup>136</sup> At the same time, the organizers invited European politicians from e.g. the Italian party Forza Nuova to participate in the march.<sup>137</sup> In 2017, by virtue of an amendment to the Act on Assemblies, the Independence March Association registered the march in the streets of Warsaw on November 11 as a cyclical assembly, which gave it priority in terms of organization.<sup>138</sup>

132 Malinowska, Winiewski, Górka 2016, p. 2; Malendowicz 2016, pp. 195–197.

133 <https://www.wprost.pl/kraj/10081397/narodowcy-oglosili-haslo-marszu-niepodleglosci-2017-my-chcemy-boga.html>; <https://natemat.pl/194353,11-listopada-marsze-zgromadzenia-i-parady-niepodleglosciowe-w-calym-kraju>; <https://www.polskieradio.pl/5/3/Artykul/1529492,Polska-dla-Polakow-Polacy-dla-Polski-Marsz-Niepodleglosci-zgloszony-do-stolecznego-urzedu>.

134 <https://www.wprost.pl/kraj/10086084/faszystowskie-hasla-i-symbole-na-marszu-niepodleglosci-w-warszawie-i-na-wiecu-we-wroclawiu.html>.

135 <https://polskatimes.pl/marsz-niepodleglosci-2017-swiatowe-media-o-marszu-pokaz-nacjonalizmu-faszyzmu-i-raszizmu/ar/12669490>.

136 <https://www.gazetaprawna.pl/wiadomosci/artykuly/904596,list-prezyden-ta-dudy-do-uczestnikow-marszu-niepodleglosci.html>.

137 <https://oko.press/roberto-fiore-faszysta-terrorysta-rycerz-bialej-europy-gwiazda-marszu-niepodleglosci-a-margines/>.

138 <https://amnesty.org.pl/raport-z-observacji-zgromadzen-11-listopada-2017-w-warszawie/>.



## Topic no. 10 (March 2, 2017 – March 10, 2017)

### Renewal of the term of office of Donald Tusk as President of the European Council.

Former Polish Prime Minister (2007–2014) Donald Tusk was elected President of the European Council on August 30, 2014, although he formally took office on December 1, 2014.<sup>139</sup> According to Article 15(5) of the Treaty on European Union, the European Council elects its President by a qualified majority for a term of two and a half years, renewable once.<sup>140</sup> Following the declaration by Donald Tusk himself on his wish to extend his mandate for the period from June 1, 2017 to November 30, 2019, the European Council had to decide at the beginning of 2017 whether to agree to such an extension.

The Polish government formed in 2015 by Law and Justice, i.e. a party in opposition to Donald Tusk, faced the question whether to support its rival. Initially, some Law and Justice politicians suggested that the domestic political rivalry did not have to be reflected in decisions relevant to Poland's international position.<sup>141</sup>

However, on March 4, 2017, the Law and Justice Political Committee adopted a resolution in which it opposed supporting Donald Tusk on the grounds that he had violated the principle of neutrality toward a member state (i.e. Poland).<sup>142</sup> At the same time, the Polish Ministry of Foreign Affairs informed that the official candidate of the Polish government for the post of President of the European Council was MEP Jacek Saryusz-Wolski.<sup>143</sup>

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139 <https://www.tvp.info/16641967/to-ogromne-uznanie-dla-polskiej-pozycji-tusk-sze-fem-re-relacja>; <https://www.polskieradio.pl/5/3/Artykul/1305544>.

140 *Treaty on European Union (consolidated version)* (Journal of Laws C 326 of Oct. 26, 2012).

141 Ryszard Czarnecki wrote in the Rzeczpospolita daily on 8 May 2016: “But Jarosław Kaczyński will not sacrifice the principles in the name of revenge. If Tusk does not become head of the European Council again, it is not because of the action of the Law and Justice government, but because of the lack of support from other states. Ours he will have, unlike his home party, our leader will not break the rule that a Pole votes for a Pole.” (<https://www.rp.pl/opinie-polityczno-spoeczne/art3699231-czarnecki-poprzemy-tuska>).

142 <https://pis.org.pl/aktualnosci/polski-rzad-nie-poprze-kandydaty-donald-tuska-na-szefa-re>.

143 <https://www.salon24.pl/newsroom/761153,msz-lobbuje-na-rzecz-saryusz-wolskiego-niemiecki-europosel-poucza-polski-rzad>; <https://wiadomosci.onet.pl/swiat/waszcykowski-lobbuje-w-brukseli-za-saryusz-wolskim/jhss8qk>.

During a meeting of the European Council on March 9, 2017, however, it was Donald Tusk who obtained a renewal of his term as President of the European Council, gaining the support of representatives of 27 EU member states. Only the Polish representative, Prime Minister Beata Szydło, expressed her opposition to this candidacy.<sup>144</sup>

## Topic no. 11 (from March 9, 2017)

### **Actions taken by the Commission for Removal of the Legal effects of Reprivatization Decisions Issued in Violation of the Law, in Relation to Certain Warsaw Properties.**

After the political changes of 1989, no reprivatization act was passed in Poland which would enable the rightful owners of properties nationalized in 1945 or later to recover them.<sup>145</sup> This led to the situation in which the owners, their heirs or attorneys made their claims before the common courts. It also resulted in the popularization of the phenomenon of so-called ‘wild reprivatization,’ including the purchase of such claims at greatly discounted prices.<sup>146</sup>

Irregularities in the process of ‘wild reprivatization’ were repeatedly pointed out by municipal activists, tenant associations, the media, and local political activists.<sup>147</sup> However, it was only after a series of investigative articles published in the press that the true scale of the abuse was exposed and the number of people involved in the illegal practice of seizing townhouses for sale on the free market.<sup>148</sup>

In the course of a journalistic investigation, it was revealed that some officials of the Warsaw City Hall were also involved in the ‘wild reprivatization’,<sup>149</sup> which immediately had political repercussions. Representatives

144 <https://www.consilium.europa.eu/pl/press/press-releases/2017/03/09/european-council-president-election/>; <https://www.polityka.pl/tygodnikpolityka/swiat/1697180,1,donald-tusk-ponownie-wybrany-na-szefa-rady-europejskiej-tylko-polska-byla-przeciw.read>.

145 <https://wydarzenia.interia.pl/agnieszka-maj/news-rzecznik-brak-ustawy-reprywatyzacyjnej-to-lekcewazenie-praw-,nId,2586907>; <https://www.radiokrakow.pl/rozmowy/marek-sowa-brak-ustawy-reprywatyzacyjnej-to-ogromne-zaniedbanie/>.

146 <https://polskatimes.pl/jak-chodzila-dzika-reprywatyzacja-w-warszawie-studium-przypadkow/ar/12750505>.

147 <https://wiadomosci.wp.pl/reprywatyzacja-w-warszawie-co-warto-wiedziec-6049263652242562a>.

148 See also: Szpala, Zubik 2017.

149 I. Szpala, M. Zubik, “Układ warszawski. Czy reprivatyzacja w stolicy zatrząśnie polską

of Law and Justice demanded the resignation of Hanna Gronkiewicz-Waltz, the then Mayor of the City, representing the Civic Platform. However, the Mayor's response was ultimately limited to a personal and structural reorganization of the office.<sup>150</sup>

On March 9, 2017, the Sejm passed a law<sup>151</sup> establishing the Commission for Removal of Legal Effects of Reprivatization Decisions issued in violation of the law, concerning certain Warsaw properties.<sup>152</sup> The legal and administrative status of the Commission aroused a good deal of controversy, with objections raised, among others, by the Ombudsman or the Sejm's Office of Analyses.<sup>153</sup> The committee gained the power to overrule reprivatization decisions in cases of violation of specific provisions of law, but also when their issuance led to effects that were grossly contrary to the public interest.

The political aspect of the Commission's activity, acting under the leadership of the candidate put forward by Law and Justice in the elections for the Mayor of Warsaw, was emphasized by the incumbent President, Hanna Gronkiewicz-Waltz, who questioned its constitutionality, and repeatedly failed to appear at its hearings, ignoring the committee's summons.<sup>154</sup>

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polityką?" *Gazeta Wyborcza*, <https://wyborcza.pl/magazyn/7,124059,20572140,uklad-warszawski-czy-reprywatyzacja-w-stolicy-zatrzesie-polska.html>.

150 <https://polskatimes.pl/afery-reprywatyzacyjna-hanna-gronkiewiczwaltz-zgrillowana-przez-partyjnych-kolegow-video/ar/10608280>; <https://www.tvp.info/26863052/dymisje-w-warszawskim-ratuszu-po-afery-reprywatyzacyjnej>.

151 The Act of Mar. 9, 2017 on special rules for removing the legal effects of reprivatization decisions issued in violation of the law, concerning certain Warsaw properties, (Journal of Laws 2017, item 718).

152 From Jan. 26, 2018, onwards known as "Komisja do spraw reprivatyacji nieruchomości warszawskich" [Commission for Reprivatization of Warsaw Real Estate]. Cf. The Act of Jan. 26, 2018 on amending the Act of Mar. 9, 2017 on special rules for removing the legal effects of reprivatization decisions issued in violation of the law, concerning certain Warsaw properties (Journal of Laws of 2018, item 431).

153 <https://bip.brpo.gov.pl/sites/default/files/Komisja%20Reprywatyzacyjna%20-%20wyst%C4%85pienie%20do%20Marsza%C5%82ka%20Senatu%2C%2020.022017.pdf>. Legal opinion on the constitutionality of the draft bill on special rules for removing the legal effects of reprivatization decisions issued in violation of the law, concerning certain Warsaw properties (doc. no. 1056): <https://orka.sejm.gov.pl/rexdomk8.nsf/0/2DC404B8201AEDFAC1258083003A5D0C/%24File/i2608-16A.rtf>.

154 <https://tvn24.pl/tvnwarszawa/najnowsze/sad-uchylil-grzywny-dla-gronkiewicz-waltz-613245>; <https://www.prawo.pl/samorzad/nsa-komisja-ds-reprywatyzacji-nie-miala-prawa-ukarac-grzywna,114682.html>.

The Office of the Ombudsman also received complaints from persons summoned and questioned by the commission about the failure of the body conducting the proceedings to observe the standards of interrogation.<sup>155</sup> Administrative decisions issued by the Commission were repeatedly challenged in courts.<sup>156</sup>

## Topic no. 12 (from February 11, 2016)

### Events in connection with the Act on State aid in Raising Children.

In its election platform in 2014, Law and Justice announced that after a possible victory in the parliamentary elections, the newly formed government would introduce a monthly allowance of PLN 500 for the second, third and subsequent child in a family. The aid was to be paid until the child turned 18, and in the case of low-income families, it was to be paid also for the first child.<sup>157</sup>

After Law and Justice (PiS) took power in the Ministry of Family, Labor and Social Policy, work was started on preparing the relevant draft bill. It was submitted to the Sejm on February 1, 2016, and the act itself was passed on February 11, 2016.<sup>158</sup> The act, which was promoted by the government as the “Family 500+” program, was one of the largest social-demographic programs in Poland after 1989. The opposition accused the government that it would overburden the budget and the fact that the allowance did not cover all children, but only the second child and any subsequent ones.<sup>159</sup>

155 <https://bip.brpo.gov.pl/sites/default/files/Wyst%C4%85pienie%20do%20Sekretarza%20Stanu%20w%20Ministerstwie%20Sprawiedliwo%C5%9Bci%20w%20sprawie%20standard%C3%B3w%20przes%C5%82ucha%C5%84%20przed%20tzw.%20Komisj%C4%85%20Weryfikacyjn%C4%85.pdf>.

156 <https://oko.press/niemozliwe-okazalo-sie-mozliwe-osiagnela-komisja-weryfikacyjna-dlaczego-nikt-zostal-skazany/>; <https://warszawa.wyborcza.pl/warszawa/7,54420,23504142,sad-przyjrzy-sie-pracy-komisji-jakiego.html>; <https://www.tvp.info/39091629/kaleta-gronkiewiczwaltz-wszystkie-decyzje-komisji-dotyczace-mieszkanow-zaskarzyła-do-sadu>.

157 *Zdrowie. Praca. Rodzina. Program Prawa i Sprawiedliwości 2014*, <https://pis.org.pl/media/download/528ca7b35234fd7dba8c1e567fe729741baaf33.pdf>.

158 The Act of Feb. 11, 2016 on state aid raising children (Journal of Laws of 2016, item 195).

159 <https://www.polskieradio.pl/5/3/Artykul/1583849>; <https://wydarzenia.interia.pl/kraj/news-opozycja-krytycznie-o-programie-500-plus-debata-w-sejmie,nId,2142836>.

In public opinion polls, the program was assessed very positively and perceived as state aid to those most in need.<sup>160</sup> According to data from the Ministry of Family, Labor and Social Policy, during the first two years of the program's operation, 3.684 million children from 2.413 million families benefited from the aid.<sup>161</sup>

## Topic no. 13 (October 2, 2017 – February 8, 2018)

### Protest of resident physicians.

On October 2, 2017, a group of resident doctors began a hunger strike. Their demands included increasing healthcare spending to the European level, no less than 6.8% of GDP over three years, addressing the shortage of medical personnel effectively, and improving the conditions of work and pay in healthcare.<sup>162</sup> Initially, a hunger strike was undertaken at the Children's Clinical Hospital of the Warsaw Medical University. In the following days, more doctors joined the group, and strike actions was also initiated in other medical facilities.<sup>163</sup>

All across Poland, resident physicians donated blood to legalize their absence from work, or applied for a leave, which in many places led to problems with the staffing of hospital wards and clinics. The first talks between the Minister of Health and the protesters took place during the night of October 4–5, but the negotiations on the following days ended in failure. On October 11, talks with Prime Minister Beata Szydło took place. She proposed to set up a team consisting of representatives of resident physicians, other medical professionals and the government, which would work out how best to fulfill the demands of the protesters by December 15. This did not meet with the approval of the protesters, who decided to continue the strike.<sup>164</sup>

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160 <https://www.tvp.info/24278068/polacy-od-programie-500>; <https://tvn24.pl/biznes/z-kraju/cbos-polacy-wiedza-o-co-chodzi-w-programie-500-i-go-popierajara620525-4466478>.

161 <https://businessinsider.com.pl/finanse/makroekonomia/program-rodzina-500-plus-wyniki-po-dwoch-latach/pqmv3ym>.

162 *Stanowisko i postulaty Porozumienia Rezydentów OZZ*: <http://www.rezydenci.org.pl/2017/10/02/protest-2-pazdziernika-stanowisko-postulaty-pr-ozzl/>.

163 <https://trojka.polskieradio.pl/artykul/1875821>.

164 <https://dorzeczy.pl/obserwator-mediow/43785/premier-gotowa-na-rozmove-z-rezydentami.html>; <https://www.tokfm.pl/Tokfm/7,103454,22500529,nie-bylo-rozmowy-potraktowano-nas-nicelegancko-rezydent.html>; <https://tvn24.pl/polska/premier-nie-przyszla-naspotkanie-z-lekarzami-czujemy-sie-upokorzeni-ra780931-2573300>.

Faced with the lack of agreement with the government at the turn of November, the resident physicians decided to change the form of their protest. The hunger strike was discontinued, but an action was launched to encourage doctors not to sign the so-called opt-out clauses, whereby doctors could work more than 48 hours per week. Widespread refusal to do so resulted in personnel problems in many outpatient clinics and hospitals, which began to lack the necessary number of doctors.<sup>165</sup>

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165 <https://polskatimes.pl/zaostrza-sie-protest-lekarzy-rezydentow-klauzule-optout-wypowiedzialo-juz-4200-medykow/ar/12772504>; <https://www.money.pl/gospodarka/wiadomosci/artykul/protest-lekarzy-klauzula-opt-out,137,0,2395273.html>; <https://polityka.se.pl/wiadomosci/protest-lekarzy-odmowa-dodatkowych-dyzurow-uderzyw-pacjentow-aa-jiFv-Gtd8-HAkk.html>.

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The aim of the analyses undertaken in the book was to examine whether the messages shown on the information strips shown in the main news service *Wiadomości TVP 1* [...] provide support for the proper development of language as a means of interpersonal communication, which should be the task of public television as a national institution. For this reason, the authors needed to resort to multiple methodologies, which was the logical consequence of the research material selected for analysis. The use of several methods of examination of messages that were often conveyed using multiple media codes did not result in methodological chaos, but rather deepened the study and allowed the authors to create a holistic description of the issue.

The choice of linguistic pragmatics as the dominant method of research is understandable, as pragmatics covers all aspects of language use, including the cultural, situational, and individual conditions of communication, as well as understanding. It allowed the authors to describe implicature and presupposed information, analyze persuasive content, and clarify the true meanings of manipulative statements. To both broaden and deepen their insight into the mechanisms of the analyzed slice of media communication, the authors extended the classical set of analytical tools of pragmatics, by using elements from the toolkit of cognitive linguistics. They discussed the conceptual metaphors which the broadcaster used primarily for the purpose of depreciating political opponents. The authors also analyzed instances of stereotyping and profiling, and discussed the connotational backgrounds of certain words, in connection with their multifaceted analysis and interpretation of other means of linguistic valuation.

*from the review of Professor Katarzyna Wyrwas  
(University of Silesia)*

