which must underlie any successful democracy. Any community inevitably limits our freedom. A democratic community does not apply political coercion, yet it is founded on the acceptance of civic duty. Moreover, one could imagine a democracy without liberalism and liberalism without formal democracy. These are rather rare cases, yet in terms of logic they are viable. Thus, "liberal democracy" is a combination of contradictions, which makes it a concept lacking in meaning, at least from a theoretical point of view. In most cases, we have in mind the democratic rule of law. However, the emphasis on the maximization of freedom (liberalism) is on the rise, and rightly so, which inevitably leads to radical individualization. The less we are attached to any sort of community, the freer we are. This problem has been noticed both by communitarians and republicans, but not by liberals and democrats. As a result, we still apply the fictitious "liberal democracy".

This fiction was not questioned for decades, from the late 1940s till the beginning of the 21st century, since, irrespective of the applied labels, the state of the political matter was not bad at all. Yet, creating fiction always ends badly. Now we can see clearly that it is impossible to simultaneously preserve maximal individual freedom and a strong democratic political community. More and more often we complain about individualism and consumerism, and the reason behind this are the forms and varieties of liberalism – in particular, that of utilitarianism. On the other hand, we observe noticeable cracks in the existing democratic communities; we even question their existence. And this is the result of the wearing off of warm or even hot democracy, heated by the breath of community; now it yields its primal spot to the "cold democracy" (Ralph Dahrendorf's concept), which in fact is not democracy anymore, but the rule of law and procedures.

I do not believe that the explication of the meaning of concepts as well as the conflict between them will lead to a change of reality. But without such an explication and without a discussion devoted to it any change, including that of the rule of law, democracy and liberalism, is not possible. Fallacious concepts inform fallacious politics, which we have had plenty a chance to observe in the recent years.

JOANNA KURCZEWSKA

Constructing European Remembrance Policies

On European past-oriented cultural policy

This is, as I would like to stress, a small "argument" for the European cultural policy created, conducted, and controlled by the institutions of the European Union. Its scope is not limited to cultural policies, understood as a specific type of historical policy, but includes the cultural policies strategies contained in various other types of policies, both the everyday and the "festive" kind.

In general, I would to engage into a dialogue with researchers who study the EU and analyse the multilevel nature of its institutional structures. Recognizing its macro level (the level of basic values translated into varying cultural codes), and the micro-social level (the level of individual and group social activities and imaginings) I would like to concentrate on the meso level of the European Union. It is understood here as the level of cultural policies (not only in the form of historical policies), both individually and in their configurations.

In my analyses I will not stop at the reconstruction of cultural policies in regard to European heritage in the holistic sense. I also do not limit my interest solely to an "operation" on visual or discursive representations of the past. Instead, directed by the principle of the equality of the three dimensions of social time, I am concerned with the "weaker" and "stronger" cultural interpretations of Europe's future, or its axiological here and now. In other words, based on my intellectual choice as a citizen, I am joining the club of researchers who give prominence to the meso level, and consider it to be the strategic level for the future of the European Union, and for its place in the global social and political order. I think it is precisely this level that determines the quality of the "banal Europeanism" ("banal" in Michael Billig's sense (1995)), which I consider to be the cornerstone of the European Union, both as an axiological project and an institutional project.

Several arguments for European past-oriented cultural policies

My interest lies not so much with the festive[6] dimension of the operation on the past data, but rather with the everyday strategies, both general and particular, of EU legislative and executive institutions. The existing analysis on the place and role of the past in shaping the EU integration processes is too general and conducted at too high a political level, that of the most important principles or events in the long-term perspective, i.e. EU macro-decisions, on one hand. And on the other hand, in rather excessive detail at the level of specific decisions, or at most, programs. I believe that it is the everyday strategies (Brugmans 1978; Gierat-Bieroń 2018) that should be the focus of continual and multidimensional interest, both at the level of general principles, and in terms of so-called development strategy. What is required is a middle-range theory, that is, a concentration on the organizations and their representatives at the level of general characteristics and program frameworks (projects).

In contrast to the "festive" strategies, particularly those defining the canon of EU sanctities (or fundamental values), these everyday strategies have been con-

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[6] Festive dimension of the operation on the interpretation of "social world" in the past:
 – The strategies of making commemoration: the strategy of "sacred rituals" of being together (examples of commemoration which join the nation of Europe).
 – The strategies oriented towards "new rules and norms" as a sacred anchor of Europe of leading compass (basic differences of hegemonic time orientation: the anchor = the past, leading compass = the future).
Different masks of festivity: secular, post-secular, strictly religious, deep history or flat – façade (examples).

cealed in the rules and resources of EU cultural policy since 1973. This process started with the declaration of an EU identity by the heads of states or governments of the EEC and ending with the programs for a creative Europe (2014–2020) constructed on the basis of a passage from "unity in diversity" to "creativity."

The everyday strategies that affect the majority of operations on interpretations of the past and that have been designed to increase the range and intensity of integration by providing similar codes for interpreting Europe's past or its basic agencies or fields are the most important ones not only for the EU's *real politik* but for defining its social and cultural internalization. These are the strategies behind the cultural policies and various kinds of documents directed at various countries and actors that determine the processes of socializing the European Union citizens. They depend on the interpretations of the past and the relation between the past and the future expected by EU agencies and programs. In other words, these are the covert everyday strategies and tactics that shape these interpretations' popularization, massification, and rootedness in citizens' small and large homelands.

In a general sense, concentration on the problematics of covert everyday strategies of interpreting the past (in or out of their context) affects the quality and strength of rootedness and to some degree the capacity to generate and prolong development trends for future interpretations of the past in something we could call possibilities, or the near future.

In this meso-level analysis of the constructing of the past, the following questions deserve more attention. First, the existing resources concerning the past, in its civilizational and cultural dimension, determining the form and functions of EU cultural policy, from 1973 till the present moment deserve a closer examination, (e.g. the reports by Leo Kindemans (1975) and Pietro Adonnino (1983), or the initiatives of the member states' ministers of culture, including the resolutions of the European Community's Culture Council (1983–1989)). Second, the EU cultural policy support for individual countries and their culture sectors need a closer analysis, including:

- the axiological choices and justifications of entities within the framework of the Protection of Cultural Heritage of European Significance program are especially worthy of interest (Michałowska 2003);
- the Rafael programme aimed at protecting the European heritage from the individual member countries' institutional expectations as well as the analysis of the genesis and function of EU prizes in the sphere of heritage (Europa Nostra) and the principles for defining the European heritage brand;
- the memorial sites that are established within the framework of projects to protect literature, literary translations, and reading with the view to understanding the values underpinning EU support in cultural policy;
- the way literature translates the experiences of people and institutions in the past, serving the project of negotiating the rapprochement of individual member countries (e.g. the study of the works selected for the Aristeion Prize or the Ariane Programme (supporting European literature and literary translations) could reveal the EU's book of values, through its collective and individual visions of the best literary works in Europe).

Third, the multidimensional analyses of an EU cultural policy that is outwardly oriented toward the future, yet covertly promotes what is conciliatory and negatively portrays what has hampered the coexistence of former cultures. In particular this concerns the reconstruction of the past on the basis of projects to further a European orchestra (music as an especially effective link with the past) and European programs of cities promoted through culture—particularly "European City of Culture" projects and "European Culture Month" programs (Palmer 2002). In these various types artistic creativity promotion in the here and now, past creativity serves as a reference system, just as dialogical studies use historical European instances of urban civilization (Sassen 2012) also has rich historical references, which reveal the "tested" ways in which a cultural order is built and seek indicators of "unity in diversity"). Fourth, the complexity of relations between building closeness with the past requires attention (how not to make the past into a foreign country, or at least only into a neighbouring one—see David Loventhal's *The Past as a Foreign Country (1985)*. Basically, programs such as Culture 2000 and Culture 2007–2013 which were conducted not so long ago, or the present Creative Europe 2014–2020, indicate a passage from the past to the future within diverse cultural forms.

The logic of such a passage, is based on the principle of continuation (or at least partial modification, justified by new events), is worth investigating with the aim to strengthen the conviction that purely academic operations on the past are based on a continuum of values and not on a revolutionary break with them. The most recent programs have a pro-market ideology; however, they have a clear mission to collect and use examples of phenomena or processes indicating the transnational nature of changes in culture. It also seems that it is a matter of constructing a European added value in the near future (see analyses of tasks for individual countries, for instance, within the framework of the Eastern Partnership).

Although producers and analysts of this latter programme are concentrating on emphasizing the business and economic productiveness of the creative industry on the global scale and of creative Europe in the area of culture and the media, I would like to stress that the historical component in the culture sector is very strong and is treated as the infrastructure for new European activities (Salisz 2001; Ziętek 2010; Wawrowska 2015). These include Europe as a creative community building the future of a creative global society (Stiglitz 2002; Stiglitz, Greenwald and Bruce 2015), and sometimes as something more than mere infrastructure. Rootedness in the past allows for an understanding of the past (monuments). It includes not only what might be called memory culture but culture in general in integrative processes. In other words, ways of involving the past *via* memory culture transmitted by academics and culture animators on the basis of a spill-over mechanism create a form of a laboratory—tested by historical events—for the inclusion of cultures by means of the slow infiltration of certain forms of artistic and culture-creating activity into specific community policies.

In the context of the phenomena and processes characterized and problematized above, the introduction—in a more evolutionary than revolutionary way—of a European identity to the community discourse through the declaration in 1973 underscored the significance of building a sense of unity in the EU.

In conclusion, I would like to indicate the necessity of differentiating special strategies based on the past from everyday strategies, which concern the same institutional and hegemonic, mnemonic actor (Kubik and Bernhard 2014). The everyday strategies speak not only in the language of current policies but also in the language of basic forms of socialization, where rootedness is understood as a strong form of socialization.

The special strategies concerning the building of a discursive or audiovisual representation to allow people to expand or reinforce their knowledge of fundamental identity shifts (the problem of the relation of EU identity to national identity) and show how they are or could be in the near future rooted through specific practices and programs. We are dealing with deep and long-duration governance in the field of culture based on a polycentric model of integrative policy and simultaneously on a model of culture pointing to the tension between its universal frames and differences. We have in this a positive and, if one looks at its realization, a fairly effective attempt to indicate the possibility of unity in diversity. The problem is one of constructing appropriate arrangements of the canon of values and examples on the ideology of everyday practices.

Three suggestions

I would like to draw the attention of researchers – and not only those who study the historical policy of the EU – to the following hot issues:

1. First, it seems to me that an interesting analytical enterprise would be to pose the problem of mnemonic actors (defined in accordance with Kubik's and M. Bernhard's (2014) followers' recommendations for definitions) for the three levels of the EU's aggregation: macro, meso, and micro. It would be interesting to consider whether the same types of actors appear at the three levels. It would be important to discover which of the types of mnemonic actors is specific for a certain level of aggregation, and which appear in various forms at two or more levels (and if they do, how do their characteristics differ?). It would also be interesting and unusually important politically – especially if it is recognized that the aim of the EU is to build a pan-European political community – to investigate where mnemonic actors are strongly rooted and which types (and at which level of aggregation) cooperate with other types of entities. This question is continually present in European public debates over whether, in regard to "operations" on representations of the past, professional historians, the leaders of small groups, the guardians of family traditions, or small civil society institutions operating beside the large organizations commemorating something or somebody, are more creative and positive. The debate would obtain a broader perspective and would have deeper meaning.

2. Second, an equally interesting research enterprise would be to study the "ethical enrichment" of the meso level, which is saturated with the resources of specific historical policies from the macro or micro level, that is, the use – often quite refined – of their resources of moral codes referring to the moral community,

justice, and the good, and concerning clear models of public morality or models of individual morality. In this manner, it seems to me, the frequent accusations against this level of having an ethical deficit and of involving an excess of reference to economic or organizational effectiveness would be limited.

3. Last, but not least, the cultural policies constituting the third level of the EU deserve special attention. These cultural policies intensively and directly make use of the models for an emotional community associated with the constructions of "sacred" EU values. I consider that bringing strategy from the macro-axiological level to the level of meso strategy allows for the development of the emotional dimension of both special and ordinary strategies of cultural policies, as historical policies. In this manner positive, pro-social emotions cease to be a mask or cultural decorum. I would like to add that, for the architects and builders of strategy at the meso level, making the sacred values of the EU into a system of emotional references (strong, positive, and inclusive emotions) could be a very interesting civil enterprise and research undertaking.

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