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SEVEN

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European Identity Politics: Europe at the Crossroads

Introduction

Apart from the impact of the "refugee crisis" of 2015, the Brexit referendum in 2016, Trump's election to the US presidency in 2016, and the changing global balance of power between China, Russia, and the US ever since, the rise of far-right populist parties in the wake of such developments has been a cause of great concern to the EU establishment and many national mainstream parties (Bevelander and Wodak 2019; Wodak and Krzyżanowski 2017). Interestingly, however, the apparent chaos in UK politics while Britain negotiates its exit from the EU has led to much greater cohesion and unity amongst the remaining 27 member-states than anybody would have expected.

When studying the results from the recent European Parliament election (23–26 May 2019), for example, it is obvious that both the European People's Party (EPP) and the Progressive Alliance of Socialists and Democrats (S&D) lost a number of seats when compared to the 2014 election. The far right, however, made major gains, but less than predicted in many opinion polls. Moreover, the Green Party and the Liberal Party also won many seats. In this way, the long-term coalition between the EPP and the S&D will hold no longer, new alliances and coalitions will have to be negotiated (see Fig. 1, below (EP, 2019a)). Moreover, British MEPs will have to leave the European Parliament, should the UK exit the EU on 31 January 2020. Nevertheless, although Eurosceptic voices are loud, they are no longer campaigning to leave the EU; they would like to strengthen national sovereignty without cutting all their ties to the EU.

Accordingly, the latest *Eurobarometer Survey* from spring 2019 states that "the European sense of togetherness does not seem to have weakened. Continued support for EU membership goes with a strong belief (68%) that EU countries overall have benefited from being part of the EU – equalling the highest level recorded since 1983". (EP 2019b) In addition, 61% of respondents say their country's EU membership is a good thing. However, ca. 50% of EU respondents feel things are not going in the right direction in either the EU or their own country; however, half

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

Fig. 1. Political Groups in the European Parliament, after the election in May 2019

of the respondents (51%) believe their voice does count in the EU. Interestingly, and in contrast to the frequently explicitly xenophobic campaigns of many conservative mainstream and far-right parties, the top priorities have gradually changed – from uncertainty and fear of immigration as the main agenda – to economy and growth (50%), as well as youth unemployment (49%). (EP 2019b)

Nevertheless, the political scientist Ivan Krastev maintains in his book *After Europe* (*Europadämmerung* 2017) that migration remains the single most important factor behind the rising discontent in Eastern and Western European countries and the significant cleavage between them. It is not the numbers of refugees and

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migrants that are of such importance, he continues, it is the brain drain from Eastern European countries, with millions of Poles, Czechs, Bulgarians, Slovaks, and Romanians having left and continuing to leave their homes, making many people afraid that "their" culture, language, and traditions might literally die out. This is why, Krastev argues, they close their borders to migrants and refugees coming from elsewhere, especially if the latter are Muslim; they are convinced that such people don't belong in Europe and would actually threaten European traditions and an allegedly homogenous European culture. Krastev points to the fear that many people have of "others" – a fear that is then used for political ends by far-right populist parties. However, as Bevelander and Wodak (2019b) elaborate, there exist many different forms of mobility and, therefore, a range of different categories of migrants; in other words, migrants do not form *one* homogenous group. Significant differences exist between, for example, asylum seekers, refugees, various types of migrants, and tourists. Only specific migrants and asylum seekers (Muslims) are usually instrumentalized as scapegoats for all the common woes, a very simplistic explanation of complex social, economic, and political challenges.

The populist far-right *politics of fear* continues to fuel such arguments: a fear of foreigners, a fear of losing out, a fear of being "invaded" – which is substantiated by manifold threat scenarios proclaiming an apocalyptic catastrophe if the imagined pluralistic, multilingual, cosmopolitan and diverse EU were to win over a nativist body-and-border politics. Such scenarios suggest the closing of even more borders in order to protect the 'true' Austrians, Finns, Hungarians, and French (Triandafyllidou, Krzyżanowski, and Wodak 2018). From such a perspective, images of old enemies are evoked, related to – amongst others – traditional antisemitic stereotypes of *world conspiracy*, and metonymically condensed in the many posters and slogans launched by the Hungarian Prime Minister, Viktor Orbán, against the American Jewish philanthropist George Soros, who is allegedly masterminding the immigration of refugees to both Europe and the US (Grabbe and Lehne 2019; Balcer 2019). "Taking back control" has thus become the slogan of choice for the far right, drawing on the pro-Brexit campaign (Goodwin and Milazzo 2017; Bevelander and Wodak 2019b).

In spite of the obvious shift to the political right, and alongside the move to more 'illiberal democracies' (Wodak 2019a, b), a range of different standpoints and positions exist among the EU leaders and governing parties. In examining the discursive-political changes and shifts that dominate European debates and developments, I briefly focus on the genre of "speculative speeches" and juxtapose two contrary visions for Europe and the EU, metonymically identified with Emanuel Macron and Victor Orbán, respectively, in order to illustrate the huge existing tensions.

Legitimizing a politics of exclusion

Obviously, the phenomena of right-wing extremism and a populist far right are not new. And neither is their focus on fear. As social historian Gianni Silei (2019: 5) notes, "fear and insecurity are dimensions that apparently characterize the Euro-

pean *Zeitgeist* of the beginning of the twentieth-first century, but they actually are as ancient as humankind". He continues his comprehensive "social history of Europe's fears" by claiming that "the origins of the third millennium's fears are deeply rooted in the 20th century: they represent a sort of mixture between the modern age and post-modern fears, and both originated from phases of great transformations and apparent optimism".

Silei traces the re/emergence of fear and uncertainty through the manifold crises in the 20th century, especially in the inter-war period (1918–1939). He concludes – and this point is indeed salient with respect to the agenda of the far right in the 21st century – that the idea of the decline of Western civilization, the "demographic panic", is becoming dominant via frequently evoked and repeated threat scenarios and apocalyptic dystopias. Hence, following Silei (ibid. 11), "fear can assume both positive and negative implications. It can be a factor of decline or progress. Fear is, above all a question of political responsibility." Silei quotes Sigmund Freud's *Civilization and Its Discontents* (1930) who claimed that "civilized man has exchanged a portion of his possibilities of happiness for a portion of security", thus underlining the intimate connection between security and freedom. As will be elaborated below, the interdependence between fear, hope, security and freedom is complex, volatile, constantly shifting, easily exploited and instrumentalized for political ends. As linguist Piotr Cap (2017: 9) rightly maintains, "the construal of imminent danger paves the way for legitimization of preventive measures in a vast number of public discourses". Accordingly, many people seem to quite easily renounce some democratic rights if promised more protection and security.

Indeed, in crisis situations, both politics and the media tend to reduce complex historical processes to snapshots which allow constructing and triggering Manichean dichotomies – friends and foes, perpetrators and victims, and so forth. As argued by Murray Edelman in his seminal book *The Symbolic Uses of Politics* (1967), crises are promoted to serve the interests of political leaders and other interest groups who will most certainly benefit from such definitions (e.g., Altheide 2002: 12). We are therefore confronted by a contingency of factors that serve to facilitate dichotomist perspectives, create scapegoats, and play into the hands of far-right populist parties: traditional and new threat scenarios, real and exaggerated crises, as well as related horror and moral narratives, real and exaggerated security issues, media reporting that reproduces fear scenarios, and political parties which instrumentalize all these factors to legitimize exclusionary policies. It is evident that all of these factors are related to each other: that they are, in fact, interdependent.

Investigating 'European identity'

According to Triandafyllidou and Wodak (2003), the term 'identity' has – at least – two basic meanings. The first implies *sameness* and the second *distinctiveness*, which differentiates the members of a group that are distinct from 'Others', the

non-members, and presumes consistency and continuity over time (2003: 210). However, neither individual nor collective identities are stable or unique; there is not a single form of identity but *multiple identities*. Thus, one of the most common distinctions is that between *individual and collective identity* (e.g., Wodak and Boukala 2014). In the following, I list some relevant social science approaches to defining and investigating European identities and European identity politics (Wodak 2019c, d):

Focusing on the relation between identity politics and discourse from a "post-Marxist" perspective, Laclau (1994) discussed the emergence and transformation of political identities in contemporary society. He considers the articulation of discursive practices capable of establishing, challenging, and dismantling relations among discursive elements. A discourse, therefore, is interpreted as the temporary fixation of meaning(s) around 'nodal points' which constitute sites of discursive and social struggle in which social reality is constructed through attempts to partially fix meanings and concepts in a discursive field and to relate them to institutionalized structures. Torfing emphasizes that discourse theory has persuaded many mainstream theorists to pay attention to new issues, such as knowledge paradigms, identity formations, and the discursive construction of sedimented norms, values, and symbols (2005: 4) (e.g., Zappettini 2015: 38ff, 48ff).

From a different perspective, scholars from the political sciences and philosophy have regarded European institutions investing in the project of unification with a distinct 'degree of transnational European sentiment' (Kaye 2009: 56). Of course, Habermas (2001) has always argued that the European project could promote new civic ideals and a 'civic patriotism' that would bring Europeans together in a post-nationalistic spirit. On the other hand, Malmborg and Stråth (2002) maintain that, since the Enlightenment, the term 'European identity' has been colonized by many political narratives, and specifically those of the elites because of 'the interpretive power contained in the concept [of Europe]' (ibid.: 3).

For Ifversen (2002), 'European identity' is a concept which replaces the universalistic idea of 'European culture' in a shift from an essentialist to a constructivist conceptualization of Europe (e.g., Krzyżanowski 2010: 52ff). He argues that 'as culture relates to forces that actually shape and have shaped Europe, identity points directly to the discursive level where peoples – consciously or unconsciously – create "Europes" with which to identify' (ibid.:14). Furthermore, Mole (2007) illustrates how constructions of European identity in national-political discourses have undergone profound changes after 1989 (the fall of the Iron Curtain) and 2004 (EU enlargement). Indeed, these distinctions have become even more relevant in the debates over Turkey's possible accession to the EU and new developments since 2015 and the attempted coup against the AKP government in July 2016 (Aydın-Düzgit 2015: 170).

A model proposed by Herrmann, Risse, and Brewer (2004) captures the interplay between bottom-up and top-down imposed identities using the 'Russian Doll' metaphor. Identities are seen as nested inside each other in a pecking order of "belonging and loyalties [..] so that 'Europe' forms the outer boundary, while one's region or nation-state constitutes the core" (ibid.: 250). A more fluid representa-

tion of multiple identities is suggested by Triandafyllidou (2008) and Duchesne (2012) who argue that a significant proportion of EU citizens have been able to integrate Europeanness as a component of individual self-understanding in a variety of 'reflexive' combinations alongside local, regional, and national identities (e.g., Mole 2007: 210ff; Zappettini 2015: 58). Accordingly, Risse (2010) claims that one could think of European identity as a 'marble cake' in which 'Europe and the EU become intertwined and amalgamated in the various national identity narratives' (2010: 87).

Finally, it is important to mention interdisciplinary discursive approaches which have been applied in a number of research projects (e.g., Wodak 2011, 2019d for summaries; see below; sections 4 and 5). Indeed, investigating European integration from a discourse-analytical point of view allows relating the micro-level of the production, reproduction, and dissemination of discourses of inclusion and exclusion across many fields and genres to the macro-strategies of top-down imposed policies and strategies in systematic ways. Thus, the dynamics of European integration can be traced in detail, while focusing on ruptures, continuities, and discontinuities as well as on simultaneous and non-simultaneous developments in different EU member states, different political parties, across social fields and institutions, involving a huge range of actors and public spheres (politicians, journalists, experts, bureaucrats, academics, NGOs, and so forth). Such systematic in-depth analyses transcend the purely hermeneutic and intuitive, frequently only illustrative, character of traditional qualitative social science research.

Speculative speeches

Speculative talk on Europe primarily reveals an interplay of two salient dimensions and respective goals (Weiss 2002; Wodak and Weiss 2004): (a) *Making meaning of Europe* (ideational dimension), (b) *Organizing Europe* (organizational dimension). It is the specific relationship of these two dimensions that constitutes the form of the text and talk. The first dimension refers to what Weiss (2002) labels the *idea/s* of Europe, the manifold meanings in use. The second dimension reflects the question of how Europe shall be organized, which institutional forms of decision-making and political framework might be appropriate for the future. These two dimensions are connected with at least two forms of legitimizing the political construction of the EU: (a) *legitimation through ideas* (identity, history, culture), (b) *legitimation through procedures* (participation, democracy, efficiency).[9] Both legitimation strategies touch on essential problems of political representation.

In an interdisciplinary research project (2000–2003), we analysed a corpus of 28 speeches given by a range of prominent European politicians in the context

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[9] The formula "legitimation through procedure" draws on the German sociologist Niklas Luhmann: "*Legitimation durch Verfahren*" (e.g., Luhmann 1969).

of the Millennium. It became apparent that all 28 speeches (mostly from British, French, Spanish, and German politicians) began with an overview of the EU's history and a reference to the so-called founding fathers, thus *temporalizing the EU* via its creation and the expectations raised by this new transnational entity. Furthermore, all speeches defined Europe as a *territory*, a geographical space, albeit in different ways (for example, including or excluding Turkey). Another similar element consists of a f*undamental dualism* created between so-called experts and "the people" (i.e., the citizens). Whereas the experts are believed to be guided by rationality, the people are perceived as irrational, uninformed, and full of fear and uncertainty (see also Wodak 2019c). All the speeches also delved into what we labelled as *competitiveness and globalization rhetoric*, proposals to solve problems and master the complex future. Accordingly, Europe should strive to be a "global player", economically speaking. Of course, the socio-political context in 1999/2000 differed massively and significantly to that in 2018; thus, in 2000, most speeches also emphasized the necessity of enlargement and integration, whereas in 2018, the priorities concerned migration, human rights and diversity.

At this point, it is important to elaborate – albeit very briefly – one of the first speculative speeches, given by the then Foreign Minister Joschka Fischer, who initiated the speculative talk about Europe at Humboldt University, Berlin, in May 2000, with the title *Vom Staatenverbund zur Föderation – Gedanken über die Finalität der europäischen Integration*. The title focuses on the two notions that constitute Fischer's perspective: "finality" and "integration". Fischer's focus is to "finalize" Europe, that is, to complete *the* European project, to bring it to an end. In other words, what has to be finalized in Fischer's view is European integration. Integration, for Fischer, has two central meanings: (a) the then hugely debated enlargement of the EU (which happened in 2004, 2007, and 2008), and (b) political integration. The latter refers mainly to the strengthening of the "capacity to act" of the EU, i.e., reform of the institutions. Integration as "Eastern enlargement", however, clearly ranks first on Fischer's list. Fischer also proposes several policy instruments to strengthen the federal character of the Union: a constitution is needed – particularly in order to regulate the "division of sovereignty between the Union and the nation-states". For Fischer, however, this does *not* mean the abolition of the nation-state:

> Diese drei Reformen: die Lösung des Demokratieproblems sowie das Erfordernis einer grundlegenden Neuordnung der Kompetenzen sowohl horizontal, d.h. zwischen den europäischen Institutionen, als auch vertikal, also zwischen Europa, Nationalstaat und Regionen, wird nur durch eine konstitutionelle Neugründung Europas gelingen können, also durch die Realisierung des Projekts einer europäischen Verfassung, deren Kern die Verankerung der Grund-, Menschen- und Bürgerrechte, einer gleichgewichtigen Gewaltenteilung zwischen den europäischen Institutionen und einer präzisen Abgrenzung zwischen der europäischen und der nationalstaatlichen Ebene sein muss. Die Hauptsache einer solchen

> europäischen Verfassung wird dabei das Verhältnis zwischen Föderation und Nationalstaat bilden.[10]

These statements are important because they manifest some of the main characteristics of the, at that time, prominent "German talk about Europe". The primary focus was on legal-institutional procedures. Accordingly, following Fischer's arguments, the legitimation of the "new" Europe would primarily be one achieved through procedures. Basically, this position can be understood as "*Verfassungspatriotismus*" (constitutional patriotism) in the Habermasian sense (Habermas 1990: 147f; Weiss 2002), which is transferred here from the national to the supranational level. Such a *Verfassungspatriotismus* is based on, to use Habermas' words, "a proceduralist theory of morals and law" (1997: 93). Eighteen years later, in 2018, the European Union continues to search for its identity/ies in spite of the many procedural and constitutional changes since 2000 due to the vast global and glocal socio-political developments (Krzyżanowski and Oberhuber 2007; Wodak 2011, 2019d).

Two visions of Europe – 2018

While examining the discursive-political changes and shifts dominating European debates and developments with respect to definitions of European and national identities and narratives of the past, I briefly juxtapose two contrary visions for Europe and the EU, metonymically identified with French President Emanuel Macron, on the one hand, and Hungarian Prime Minister Victor Orbán, on the other, to illustrate the huge polarization dominating recent European political debates, between Europhiles and Eurosceptics, between those claiming to have learnt their lessons from the past; and those, who are overwhelmed with nostalgia for an imagined grand past (as heroes) or who want to correct perceived injustices (as victims) inflicted upon them.

For example, May 2018 saw two remarkable speeches: Macron was awarded the "Karl's Prize" in Germany; while Orbán inaugurated his new government, after having been re-elected with an impressive majority for his far-right/ national-conservative party, Fidesz. Although both countries are EU member states, the two speeches staked out two significantly different positions on migration and diversity, on nationalism and globalization. They also offered two incommensurable visions for the future of European democracies and the European Union, thus also

[10] These three reforms – the solution of the democracy problem and the need for fundamental reordering of competences both horizontally, i.e., among the European institutions, and vertically, i.e., between Europe, the nation-state and the regions, will only be able to succeed if Europe is established anew with a constitution. In other words: through the realization of the project of a European constitution centred around basic, human and civil rights, an equal division of powers between the European institutions and a precise delineation between European and nation-state level. The main axis for such a European constitution will be the relationship between the Federation and the nation-state. Let me not be misunderstood: this has nothing whatsoever to do with a return to renationalization, quite the contrary.

differing interpretations of the past. Most importantly, what are the lessons of the past is assessed very differently.

The construction of a nation's collective past often takes the form of a (*heroic) narrative*. Significantly, such narrativization entails the selection and representation of, inter alia, key events, actors, and places to establish a meaningful framework in which to interpret the existence and continuity of the nation or people, given that communities of this scale or nature are not real but imagined, in Benedict Andersen's (1983) sense. Due to their reach and salience, albeit in strikingly different ways, *commemorative* (and other official hortatory) *speeches* as a genre of political discourse present salient aspects of the discursive construction of national identities (Rheindorf and Wodak 2017). In his speech, Macron made the case for a "united Europe", i.e., a "Europe of hope", in four appeals (labelled as *imperatives*) to European citizens (I list the relevant text extracts below; italics by RW[11]):

> *The first imperative is simple: let's not be weak and let's not be passive!* We're facing major threats, major imbalances that are unsettling our people and adding to their worries every day. The question being asked of each one of us is: do we want to be passive? Do we accept others' rules or the tyranny of events, or do we make the choice to decide for our fellow citizens the rules that protect their private lives? (….) If we decide that a major digital player can decide on secrecy or tax rules, we're no longer sovereign and the debate is invalid; if we decide that such-and-such a major international energy group decides on our climate policy for us, we're no longer in a position to decide and to have a democratic debate.
> *Our second imperative is: let's not be divided.* The temptation is great, in this troubled period of self-absorption and nationalism, to think that at national level we'll control things better and regain a share of this sovereignty, which is still too ephemeral or nascent at [the] European level. We had this alarm bell with Brexit, but we're also hearing it from the Italian elections to Hungary, Poland and everywhere in Europe (…) Many would like to see history repeating itself and have our peoples believe we'll be more effective this time. In the face of all the risks I've just described, division would be fatal; it would further reduce our actual sovereignty. Barbed wire is reappearing everywhere across Europe, including in people's minds (…) But our only solution is unity; divisions push us only towards inaction.
> *Our third imperative, my friends, is: let's not be afraid, let's not be afraid of the world we're living in, let's not be afraid of our principles, let's not be afraid of what we are, and let's not betray it.* Today we're facing all kinds of anger and uncertainty, and confronting temptation, sometimes of the worst kind: the temptation to abandon the very foundations of our democ-

11 Due to space restrictions, a detailed text analysis cannot be presented here; see Wodak 2019d for an example of such a systematic analysis following the discourse-historical approach.

> racies and our rule of law. Let's not give up any, any of it! (…) Europe is civility is the Europe of cafés, debates, universities, the conflict of ideas, the opposition of ideas that rejects both state violence and street violence but believes in the strength of truth because it believes in the strength of the democratic confrontation of ideas.
> *Finally, I believe the last imperative is that we mustn't wait and that the time is now!*

In this way, while reminding his audience of Europe's dark heritage, he argued against new walls and fences ("barbed wire"), against divisive nationalisms which – as he maintains – are very dangerous for the EU and, as he stated later, built upon a *politics of fear instead of hope*: "Let's not be afraid; it means not being afraid of one another [.…] We have got to fight for something which is greater than ourselves, a new stronger Europe again!"

Macron repeatedly uses the *topos of history* (Reisigl and Wodak 2001: 43*ff.*). As Forchtner (2014: 21) states, "it is the specific context of our time, 'the age of apology' (Gibney et al. 2008) which renders possible a variety of uses of *historia magistra vitae*". Forchtner distinguishes four functions of this *topos*, which may also be combined in specific contexts: *rhetorics of judging* (i.e., because cooperation with dictators is wrong, we need to learn the lesson that we have to oppose dictators now), *rhetorics of failing* (i.e., because a terrible wrongdoing was committed in the past, we need to remain alert and prevent a repetition), *rhetorics of penitence* (because we were responsible for wrongdoing, we have to constantly monitor ourselves to prevent repetition of our past failures) and, finally, *rhetorics of judge-penitence* (we were responsible for past wrongdoings and we have learnt our lesson, thus we are morally superior vis-à-vis those countries and groups and peoples who have not learnt this lesson) (ibid.: 26–38).

This range of *topoi* is always integrated with types of narratives that represent specific interpretations of past events, according to the context and intentions of the speaker, as well as the expectations of the recipients. Forchtner (2016: 117) argues that a *rhetoric of penitence* strongly fuses past and present: "there is a complex dialectic of rupture and continuity at work as the in-group embodies a temporal continuum which, at the same time, cannot be affirmed in a straightforward, heroic way". While acknowledging past wrongdoings of the in-group, the narrative also requires a demarcation from those past wrongdoings, a sort of internal othering. Thus, "being pushed and pulled between continuity and rupture", the collective We is reconstituted as a reformed moral being, both good now and forever marred by what We did then. Macron's speech extract above combines the rhetorics of failing with rhetorics of penitence: the wrongdoings of the tragic past have to be remembered in order to prevent such tragedies being repeated. Such rhetoric allows for collective learning processes, for a "Never again!"

In contrast, Orbán argued for a different future, for a Christian-based, illiberal democracy, maintaining that everything should be done to ensure the "survival" of the Hungarian nation. Of course, the two contexts are very different – Macron is speaking in a foreign country, Germany, and is reaching out to a huge international

audience; while conversely, Orbán is primarily addressing his fellow Hungarians. Nevertheless, both politicians used the respective occasions for programmatic, rhetorically well-polished and persuasive statements and, crucially, for elaborating their respective views of the future:

> In my view, the age of liberal democracy is at an end. Liberal democracy is no longer able to protect people's dignity, provide freedom, guarantee physical security or maintain Christian culture .. We are Christian democrats and we want Christian democracy .. The survival of Hungarians as a nation is not automatic. Hungarian policy should be predicated on the possibility that we could disappear, we could become extinct. Survival is a question of life force. We are a unique species. We have a language that is unique to us. There is a world which we alone see.
>
> I am convinced that migration eventually leads to the disintegration of nations and states: national languages weaken, borders become blurred, national cultures dissolve; and what remains is a single "open society". Finally, the merging of European societies makes such headway that a single, unified European government can come into being. This is the fate that awaits those who fail to defend themselves against migration – perhaps not tomorrow, but within the foreseeable future. This is the name of the game; this is the true master plan. I will not conceal our intentions: here before you I am making it clear that, acting in the name of Hungarian freedom, my government will be a determined opponent of this plan, the process that has led here and its intermediate steps. Multiculturalism was the first such step. Political correctness, which muzzles freedom of speech, was the second. This is where Europe stands today. The third step would be the mandatory migrant resettlement quotas. We must and we will enter the arena of European politics, in order to stop the Europe that we love – and for which we are ready to make major sacrifices – climbing to the next step towards self-immolation. We shall oppose the mandatory quotas, stand up for Christian culture, and fight to defend borders. (Orbán, 2018)

The crisis was 2008, the financial crisis. Subsequently, reforms, Orbán concludes in his argument, have become necessary, in order to protect the Hungarian nation-state, indeed establish a new Hungary. Although he endorses "democracy" at the outset of his speech, he then moves on to the vision of a centralist state with long-term plans, decided by Fidesz's majority.

The fear of a changing demographic due to enormous *emigration* and the brain drain from Hungary to "the West" should be countered by new economic and demographic policies. Hungarian women should thus give birth to many Hungarian children. More importantly and related to his definition of illiberal democracy, Orbán rhetorically constructs an imminent danger scenario (alluding to Soros' "open society") which frames his rationalization-legitimation of his agenda: he appeals predominantly to *fear*, fear of being invaded (by so-called 'illegal migrants') equated with, and alluded to as having been invaded by the Soviets

in 1956. This fallacy, a *topos of history* (the analogy between poor and destitute refugees and the strong and victorious Soviet army) is foregrounded, whereas Hungary's own fascist past in the 1930s and the occupation by Nazi Germany is not even mentioned in this speech.

In this way, he depicts a dystopian future should the EU's migration and integration policies proceed. He endorses nationalism and uniqueness as alternatives, not the EU's values of unity and diversity. It is primarily a rhetoric of judging which – as Forchtner (2014: 39) illustrates – usually blocks collective learning processes due to the silencing of internal doubts as a potential motor of learning. The most perilous danger, Orbán suggests in his rhetorical list of three, is "multiculturalism" which would destroy the allegedly homogenous Hungarian people. Second, political correctness and respect for others are perceived as "muzzling" (i.e., restricting) the people's freedom of speech. However, it is obvious, that Fidesz and Orbán control the media and have no problem whatsoever in restricting the opposition's opinions and any form of criticism. Hence, freedom of speech here refers to a specific aspect of Hungarian citizens, so-called 'true Hungarians'. And third, Orbán rejects the European Commission's demands to distribute refugees via a quota system across EU member states. These three aspects are, he claims, part and parcel of migration which should therefore be prevented at any cost.

Outlook

It seems that, from the French perspective, the contents and idea of France are linked to the *contents and idea* of Europe. In other words, *l'Europe* is the civilizational project of the French Revolution, of the Enlightenment, oriented towards the future. This *l'Europe* is the salient counter-concept of the "*Christian Abendland*". *Abendland* is directed to the past, it construes an origin, it refers to Christian roots. Historically speaking, the political unit representing the *Abendland* was the Holy Roman Empire. For most of the second Millennium, Habsburg-Austria represented the institutions of the Occident. The political unit representing *l'Europe* and the new civilizational mission was France, the so-called *grande nation*. This civilizational mission was based on three elements: Democracy, Liberalism, and Nationhood (nation in the sense of a political community of will, a matter of free decision) (Schulze 1999: 169; Weiss 2002).

Hence, we conclude that – again – the legitimation that Europe in the 21st century requires is not so much one through procedure but a *legitimation through ideas*. Without the latter, a true "political identity" of Europe cannot be constructed. Indeed, the few extracts of the two antagonistic speculative speeches illustrate the differences between the national cultures (traditions, past, roots, heritage), on the one hand, and the universal idea of the civilizational project, the aims of enlightenment (directed to the future, political will, community of values), on the other. Both visions draw on memories and histories, but on different ones; or on different interpretations of the same facts. Of course, the reasons for such a polarization are manifold, historical, sociopolitical, economic – and are influenced by global as well as

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glocal developments, which cannot be elaborated in this chapter.[12] There obviously exist many "in-between" positions, apart from these two totally polarized views.

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